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Abstract
This thesis synthesizes probability and entropic inference with Quantum Mechanics and
quantum measurement [1–6]. It is shown that the standard and quantum relative entropies
are tools designed for the purpose of updating probability distributions and density matrices,
respectively [1]. The derivation of the standard and quantum relative entropy are completed
in tandem following the same inferential principles and design criteria. This provides the
first design derivation of the quantum relative entropy while also reducing the number of
required design criteria to two.
The result of Caticha and Giffin [7, 8] and Giffin’s thesis [9] is invaluable; it shows that
the standard (relative) maximum entropy method is a “universal method of inference” –
it is able to process information simultaneously that neither a Bayesian nor a standard
maximum entropy method can process alone while being able to reproduce the results of
both. An analogous conclusion is reached in this thesis, the quantum maximum entropy
method derived in [1] is the “universal method of density matrix inference”. This was
accomplished by deriving, from the quantum maximum entropy method, a Quantum Bayes
Rule [2] and generalizations that cannot be obtained from a Quantum Bayes or a quantum
(von Neumann) maximum entropy method [10] alone while being able to reproduce the
results of both. The expanded results of [2] more-or-less follow the main results of [7–9]
in structure, but instead use density matrices rather than probability distributions. As the
quantum maximum entropy method only uses the standard quantum mechanical formalism,
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the quantum maximum entropy method derived here may be appended to the standard
quantum mechanical formalism and remove collapse as a required postulate, in agreement
with [11, 12].
The second part of this thesis revolves around the foundational theory of Quantum Me-
chanics called Entropic Dynamics [13]. Entropic Dynamics uses the standard maximum
entropy method and information geometry to reformulate the Schro¨dinger Equation and
Quantum Mechanics as a theory of inference. We derive a density matrix formalism of
Quantum Mechanics using the standard maximum entropy method in Entropic Dynamics,
and thus, the quantum maximum entropy method [1] may be adopted by Entropic Dynamics
wholesale. This implies that indeed the standard maximum entropy method is the “univer-
sal method of inference” and that the quantum maximum entropy method holds the more
specialized title of the “universal method of density matrix inference” as it does not provide
an intrinsic mechanism for the unitary evolution of pure states.
Entropic Dynamics is different than most interpretations of Quantum Mechanics because,
rather than appending an interpretation to Quantum Mechanics, it states its interpretation,
“that particles have definite yet unknown positions and that entropic probability updating
works”, and only then does it derive Quantum Mechanics from these assumptions. This
radical shift in interpretation allows one to solve the quantum measurement problem [14]
(which was extended to included von Neumann and weak measurements in [3]) and address
quantum no-go theorems [4]. Crucial to understanding why these apparent paradoxes pose
no issue in Entropic Dynamics is understanding the foundation of inference that Entropic
Dynamics is built upon. In particular, when it comes to measurement in Entropic Dynamics,
we are able to divvy-up variables (observables, ect.) into two classes: they are the ontic
beables [15], which are the positions of particles, and the epistemic inferables [3] that in
principle are inferred from detections of position and are therefore not predisposed to be
part of the ontology. The fact that observables other than position are inferables in Entropic
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Dynamics, and that the positions of particles are the ontic beables, allows the Entropic
Dynamics formulation of Quantum Mechanics to not be ruled out by the following pertinent
no-go theorems [4]: no ψ-epistemic [16], Bell-Kochen-Specker [17–19], and Bell’s inequality
[20]. Entropic Dynamics is found to be viable theory of Quantum Mechanics.
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Introduction and Preface
The majority of the work in this thesis is inspired by Ariel Caticha’s book, “Entropic Infer-
ence and the Foundations of Physics” [21], which itself is inspired by the life work of E.T.
Jaynes [22]. While facing push-back about Bayesian probability theory and his method of
maximum entropy, Jaynes wrote [23]:
You cannot base a general mathematical theory on imprecisely defined concepts. You can
make some progress that way; but sooner or later the theory is bound to dissolve into ambi-
guities which prevent you from extending it further. (A)
By fine-tuning his notions of probability theory, Jaynes was able to reformulate Statisti-
cal Mechanics as an application of inference using the method of maximum entropy [10, 24].
Caticha takes this notion one step further and uses the maximum entropy method and in-
formation geometry to reformulate Quantum Mechanics (QM) as an application of inference
called Entropic Dynamics [13, 21, 25–28]. Using Entropic Dynamics and precise notions
of probability, inference, and entropy, we are able to resolve measurement problems and
paradoxes in Quantum Mechanics through a newly prescribed lens [3, 4, 14].
Caticha’s book is enlightening in its ability to give meaning and purpose to mathematical
objects that might otherwise be taken for granted. In particular, probability and entropy
are derived, not by ansatz, but by design as tools for inference [21, 22, 29–32].1 The precise
1Cox derived probability theory as a measure of reasonable expectation [29]. Later, E.T. Jaynes derived
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nature of these tools form the foundation for the rest of his work. This design approach to
inference and Physics not only reveals the functional form of the object in question, but also
tells us how and when it should be used. For this reason, the design of probability will be
reviewed in Chapter 1 as it provides the foundation of this thesis.
Perhaps the most compelling chapter in [21] is Chapter 6: “Entropy III: Updating Prob-
abilities”. In it, a functional of probabilities, which ends up being the relative entropy, is
designed for the purpose of updating probability distributions, ϕ
∗→ ρ, on the basis of new
information (∗) [7, 30–36]. I am happy that a large portion of my thesis is based on this
chapter. In [1], I was able to refine and reduce the number of design criteria needed to design
the relative entropy from the first principles of inference. In addition, and using the same
design criteria, I was able to design a tool for the purpose of inferentially updating density
matrices (ϕˆ
∗→ ρˆ) – it is the quantum relative entropy. This was accomplished though an
(acknowledged) assistance by Caticha in [1] – he proposed the idea of designing a method of
density matrix inference in the first place. These parallel derivations are reviewed in Chapter
2.
Because the relative entropy is found to be the tool designed for updating probability
distributions, we arrive at a refined description of Jaynes’s maximum entropy method [10,
24]. The immediate result is, of course, consistency with Jaynes’s notion that Statistical
Mechanics may be reformulated as a theory of inference; however, it was the work in Caticha
and Giffin [7–9], reviewed in [21], that proves the designed method of inference invaluable.
In it, the maximum (relative) entropy method is revealed to be the universal method of
inference. When joint probability distributions are constrained to satisfy expectation values
over measured data, the maximum entropy method reproduces Bayes Rule and Jeffreys Rule
as special cases. This shows that entropic methods are completely compatible with Bayesian
probability as a measure of plausibility [22]. Shore and Johnson provided the first design derivation of the
relative entropy as a tool for inference. Many have since refined these design derivations of the relative
entropy [7, 30, 33–36].
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methods of inference; however, the maximum entropy method may be updated with respect
to arbitrary pieces of information (data, moments, both data and moments simultaneously,
non-commuting constraints, etc.), and thus it forms a “universal method of inference” [7–9].
Because both the standard and quantum relative entropies share the same design criteria
and functional form [1], many of the well known applications (and restrictions) of the stan-
dard maximum entropy method manifest equally-well in the quantum maximum entropy
method. Because density matrices are quantum mechanical, applications of the quantum
maximum entropy method have direct ramifications in quantum mechanical experiments
and inferences. Inspired by the work of Caticha and Giffin [7–9], I was able to derive the
Quantum Bayes Rule [37–39] using the quantum maximum entropy method, and a few of its
generalizations [2]. This work therefore unifies topics in Quantum Information and quantum
measurement through entropic inference in as much as Caticha and Giffin unified the max-
imum entropy method with Bayesian inference. In doing so, I reformulated Lu¨ders’ notion,
that the operation of a measurement device must be to project the quantum state into a
mixed state ρˆ → ∑x PˆxρˆPˆx [40], from purely entropic (or quantum information-theoretic)
arguments. Lu¨ders’ notion was found to be a manifestation of the “unupdatability” of com-
pletely biased prior probability distributions in the density matrix formulation (i.e., if the
state is known with certainty then it is in fact the state of the system). I state this math-
ematical restriction on density matrix updating as a theorem, the “Prior Density Matrix
Theorem” (PDMT), that a prior density matrix may only be updated within the eigenspace
that it spans. Thus the quantum maximum entropy method suggests that “the collapse of
the wavefunction” in the standard Quantum Mechanics formalism should really be rephrased
as “the decoherence of the wavefunction and then the collapse of the mixed state”. The re-
sults and arguments from [2] are reviewed in Chapter 3. Because the quantum maximum
entropy method derived here only uses the standard quantum mechanical formalism, the
quantum maximum entropy method may be appended to the standard quantum mechanical
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formalism.
A new conclusion from this thesis is that the quantum maximum entropy method is the
“universal method of density matrix inference”. This was accomplished by deriving, from
the quantum maximum entropy method, a Quantum Bayes Rule and generalizations that
cannot be obtained from a Quantum Bayes or a quantum (von Neumann) maximum entropy
method [10] alone while being able to reproduce the results of both. The results from [2]
are extended in Chapter 3 and more-or-less follow the structure of [7–9] (here we use density
matrices and the quantum relative entropy rather than probability distributions and the
standard relative entropy).
A special case of the PDMT is that pure-state density matrices cannot be updated ϕˆ
∗→ ϕˆ
via the quantum maximum entropy method. This implies that the quantum maximum
entropy method does not provide an intrinsic dynamical evolution for pure quantum states,
meaning that another mechanism is needed to generate the Schro¨dinger Equation from the
first principles of inference. The dynamical method for generating the Schro¨dinger Equation
as an application of inference may be done using the standard maximum entropy method
and information geometry – it is Caticha’s Entropic Dynamics formulation of Quantum
Mechanics. An Entropic Dynamics-like formalism using the quantum relative entropy would
ultimately miss the point – it would not be foundational as it inevitably would require the
use of Quantum Mechanics to derive Quantum Mechanics. Caticha’s Entropic Dynamics
is therefore reviewed in Chapter 4. In addition, Section 4.2 contributes a derivation of the
beginnings of a density matrix formalism using the standard maximum entropy method
and information geometry within the Entropic Dynamics framework. Because Entropic
Dynamics derives Quantum Mechanics from the standard maximum entropy method, as
well as the density matrix formalism added here, the quantum maximum entropy method
can be appended to Entropic Dynamics; and therefore, the standard maximum entropy
method retains its title as the “universal method of inference”. The quantum maximum
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entropy method thus holds the more specialized title of “the universal method of density
matrix inference”.
Having designed probability, entropy, quantum entropy, and derived Quantum Mechanics
from the first principles of inference, my thesis is prepared to address, in Jaynes’s words, the
ambiguities which prevent you from extending (the theory) further in Quantum Mechanics;
these are the “quantum measurement problem” and the various pertinent “quantum no-go
theorems”.
In [41], the “quantum measurement problem” is broken into two related quantum mea-
surement problems: the problem of definite outcomes and the problem of preferred basis (or
degenerate basis). In QM, particles evolve unitarily from one pure state to another, and in
some sense never “settle down” to a definite final state, in all but the most trivial cases.
Although the experimental results match the predictions of QM after a large number of
experiments, they fail to match in formalism – how do the definite outcomes in experiment
come about? “Wavefunction collapse” is usually tacked onto the formalism ad hocly as a
second form of dynamical evolution to alleviate the problem of definite outcomes [42]. The
second quantum measurement problem of preferred basis stems from the standard quan-
tum formalism having an indifference toward a preferred ontology. The standard quantum
formalism introduces Quantum Mechanics mathematically in terms of operators that act
on vectors in a Hilbert space. There is no reason to believe one set of vectors should be
more “real” than any other set of vectors in the standard formalism. This lack of ontology
becomes an issue when performing a von Neumann measurement [42], which is arguably
the most fundamental measurement technique in Quantum Mechanics. A von Neumann
measurement uses quantum entanglement between the system of interest and the states of a
detector to perform inference. If the ontology of the detector and system are not specified,
when a detector state is measured, it can be unclear what (ontological) state was actually
detected and thus what state of interest was actually inferred. Thus, without specification
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of a preferred basis, quantum measurement procedures are insufficient in general.
Pivotal to the arguments that allow Entropic Dynamics to solve the quantum measure-
ment problem [14] ([3] extends the treatment to von Neumann and weak measurements),
and avoid being ruled out by quantum no-go theorems [4], is that Entropic Dynamics derives
dynamical probability distributions whose evolution are constrained by the assertion that
particles have definite and ontological, yet unknown, positions. This assertion is implemented
via expectation value constraints that impose continuous motion, and (expected) drift, of
particle positions using the standard maximum entropy method. The quantum measurement
problem of preferred basis is solved by the fact that particles in Entropic Dynamics do have
a preferred basis, it is the ontological position of the particles that Entropic Dynamics is
built around [3, 14]. The quantum measurement problem of definite values or “wavefunction
collapse” is solved within the Entropic Dynamics framework by using Bayesian inference to
update one’s probability when confronted with information in the form of data [3, 7, 14].
This Bayesian treatment of collapse is completely consistent with the Entropic Dynamics
framework because both Bayesian inference and Schro¨dinger evolution are derived as special
cases of entropic probability updating – the method of inference is generated by the available
information at hand. Thus, Entropic Dynamics solves the quantum measurement problem in
a way that afflicts other interpretations of Quantum Mechanics – inference is the foundation
of Entropic Dynamics. The results of [3, 14] will be expanded upon in Chapter 5.
In [3], we differentiate between quantum “observables” and what we call the inferables
of a theory, i.e., the quantities that may be inferred.2 Entropic Dynamics insists upon this
change of language, observables → inferables, when it derives Quantum Mechanics as an
application of inference; and although on the surface this change of language seems purely
semantical, it has deep implications for the interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. Using
2“Observables” other than position, and odd quantum mechanical quantities such as complex valued
“Weak Values” [43], are treated as purely epistemic inferables (they need not have an ontological predispo-
sition) [3]. Rather than being directly measured, they are inferred from the preferred position basis.
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the concept of inferables, as well as treating particles as having ontological (beable) posi-
tions, we address the following quantum no-go theorems in Entropic Dynamics [4]: the no
ψ-epistemic theorem [16], Bell’s theorem [20], and the Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem [17–19].
The standard interpretation of the result of the Bell-Kochen-Specker Theorem is that opera-
tors in Quantum Mechanics are contextual, that is, an observable’s “character”, “aspect”, or
“value” depends on the remaining set of commuting observables in its measurement setting.
Thus, quantum observables in general cannot be assigned definite, preexisting, yet poten-
tially unknown, values before measurement. Because in Entropic Dynamics, variables other
than position are epistemic inferables, we do not need to assign them definite prexisting
values before measurement. Because positions are ontological, but other inferables are epis-
temic, and thus naturally contextual, we classify Entropic Dynamics as a hybrid-contextual
theory of Quantum Mechanics, which as it turns out, is not ruled out by the Bell-Kochen-
Specker Theorem. As quantum no-go theorems are proofs by contradiction, they only rule
out theories or interpretations of Quantum Mechanics that strictly adhere to their (shown
contradictory) set of assumptions. In short, Entropic Dynamics does not adhere to these set
of assumptions in any of the previously mentioned no-go theorems, and therefore it is not
ruled out. This will be reviewed in Chapter 6.
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Part I: Universal Entropic Inference
1
Chapter 1
Foundations of Probability Theory
This chapter reviews Caticha’s design derivation of probability theory [21] and reiterates
related concepts from [44]. A formal equivalence between, the “degree of rational belief”
one ought to have that a proposition is true, and, the “probability” a proposition is true,
is found. Cox derived probability theory as a measure of reasonable expectation by solving
functional equations over Boolean equivalent propositions in 1946 [29]. His derivation was
appreciated by Jaynes [22], who instead designed probability as an objective measure of
plausibility. The approach taken by Caticha differs in a few ways from Cox and Jaynes; the
goal is to design a tool for inductive inference such that objective statements may be made
about one’s rational, but informationally subjective, beliefs. The main differences will be
noted within the derivation below.
1.1 Designing a tool for inference
When faced with incomplete information, complete and precise deduction may not always
be possible. In these instances, we require a tool to perform inductive reasoning such that
trustworthy inferences may be made. Usual deduction runs a straightforward course, “If a
then b”, and “If b then c”, one may deduce: “If a then c”. Deduction fails to address less
2
certain situations, such as “If a suggests b and b suggests c” then, by what measure should we
infer, “a suggests c”? Although correlations between the propositions {a, b, c, ..} are known
to exist, there is no rule for manipulating these “suggestions” logically. We are therefore
motivated to design a tool capable of giving rational assessments in situations with limited
information. Not knowing if we should believe a proposition to be true or false, we seek to
design rules for making inferences that maintain a high standard of honesty in our beliefs,
for the purpose of doing science [45]. We therefore seek a tool capable of quantifying the
degree of rational belief (DoRB) we ought to hold that a proposition is true.1
In Cox’s derivation of probability, he let {a, b, c, ...} denote “propositions” rather than
“events”. He states, “speaking of events easily invokes the notion of sequence in time, and
this may become a source of confusion. A proposition may, of course, assert the occurrence
of an event, but it may just as well assert something else, for example, something about a
physical constant.” [29]. Propositions are self-contained statements or assertions that may
be true or false – and therefore they may take on a wide variety of character; for example a
could represent “ the position of a particle is x”, b “the gene sequence of a banana is y”, to
anything c one might wish to infer “z”.
In everyday situations it is apparent that some propositions are more believable than
others. By design we would like our tool for inference to quantify the believability of a
proposition. If a is more believable than b and b more believable that c, then we wish de-
grees of rational belief (DoRBs) to represent this information, as well as a being quantifiably
more believable than c. We are therefore inclined to represent DoRBs by real numbers such
that they may be ranked in a transitive manner. It is then by design that a DoRB should be
a function that maps arbitrary propositions {a, b, c, ...} to values on the real line such that
the believability of propositions are ranked. We will denote this function with square brack-
ets [...] such that [z] ∈ R represents the DoRB an arbitrary proposition z is true. That is [21],
1The question of whether degrees of rational belief are scientific is discussed in a comment at the end of
the derivation.
3
Degrees of rational belief (or, as we shall later call them, probabilities) are represented by
real numbers.
When utilizing DoRBs, to be maximally informed [45], we should make inferences only
once all of the relevant information has been taken into account. It is clear that the knowledge
of one proposition may support or oppose another proposition. For instance, if we know a :“It
is cloudy today”, then a logically supports the belief in the claim b :“ It will rain today”. To
remain honest about our beliefs, if we know a to be true, we should logically assign a larger
DoRB to b rather than if we had not known a to be true. We introduce a vertical bar “|”
between propositions b|a to denote a new proposition, which is read: “b is true given a is
true”, “b given a”, or “b conditional on a”. As b|a is a proposition itself, we may assign it a
DoRB such that [b|a] is read “the degree of rational belief b is true given that a is true” or
for short “the DoRB of b given a”.
Conditional propositions allow us to construct the upper and lower limit a DoRB may
take. Because a|a = vt is true, the DoRB of a|a must represent the “most” believable
situation for logical and rational consistency – we denote the value of this DoRB as [a|a] =
[vt]. Conversely, the DoRB that not-a, denoted a˜, is true given a is true is a˜|a = vf is
false such that [a˜|a] = [vf ] represents complete rational disbelief or the “least” degree of
rational belief. The amount of rational belief we assign to a certainly true proposition a|a
or a certainly false proposition a˜|a is independent of the specific proposition a. This lets [vt]
and [vf ] be single, but distinct, numbers such that transitivity may be obeyed.
Compound propositions may be built by considering Boolean logic operations between
propositions: the “and” conjunction, denoted ∧, constructs propositions of the form a ∧ b
(later denoted as ab or with a comma a, b) that are true iff both a and b are true, as well as
the Boolean disjunction “or”, denoted ∨, that constructs propositions of the form a∨ b that
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are true when a, b, or both are true while being false iff both are false. Because applying
arbitrary conjunctions and disjunctions between propositions results in a new proposition
itself, “z”, the set of all propositions is closed under Boolean operations. This realization
is fundamental in moving forward because anything we learn about the functional form of
[a ∨ b] and [a ∧ b] leads to us learning more about the desired functional form of [z] for
arbitrary propositions z.
1.2 Functional form of [a or b]
Consider the DoRB a proposition z|d ≡ a ∨ b|d is true. For consistency, it must be that
[z|d] = [a ∨ b|d], which means that finding the functional form of [a ∨ b|d] will ultimately
give insight into the functional form of [z|d]. Because of this, we expect the functional form
of [a ∨ b|d] to somehow be related to the functions: [a|d], [b|d], [a|bd], and [b|ad]. We let F
denote the functional dependence of a DoRB over a disjunction,
[a ∨ b|d] ≡ F ([a|d], [b|d], [a|b, d], [b|a, d]), (1.1)
with that of the constituting disjunct DoRBs. First consider the special case when a and b
are mutually exclusive (i.e. given b|a is false and vice versa), then,
[a ∨ b|d] = F ([a|d], [b|d], [vf ], [vf ]) ≡ F ([a|d], [b|d]), (1.2)
for brevity. The functional form of F can be found by considering the associative property
of three propositions,
z ≡ a ∨ (b ∨ c) = (a ∨ b) ∨ c, (1.3)
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where again we will let a, b, c be mutually exclusive propositions. The DoRB function must
arrive at the same result for the logically equivalent forms of z. This imposes,
[a ∨ (b ∨ c)|d] = [(a ∨ b) ∨ c|d]. (1.4)
F may be applied two-fold in each instance, first,
[a ∨ b ∨ c|d] = F ([a ∨ b|d], [c|d]) = F ([a|d], [b ∨ c|d]), (1.5)
and then again,
[a ∨ b ∨ c|d] = F (F ([a|d], [b|d]), [c|d]) = F ([a|d], F ([a|d], [c|d])), (1.6)
with equality due to the equivalency of the propositions and for self consistency. This is the
well known Associativity Functional Equation [46]; it has the general solution
[a ∨ b|d] = F ([a|d], [b|d]) = φ−1(φ([a|d]) + φ([b|d]) + α), (1.7)
where φ is an arbitrary monotonic function and α is a constant [21, 46]. It should be noted
that in [22, 29], the Associativity Functional Equation is used to specify the form of [a and
b] rather than [a or b], the φ function of ours being related to theirs by its logarithm. This
is consistent because the logarithm of a (positive) monotonic function is monotonic itself
(theirs is a positive exponential). Because φ is a monotonic function, it necessarily preserves
transitivity. Without loss of generality we may take φ of both sides
φ([a ∨ b|d]) = φ([a|d]) + φ([b|d]) + α, (1.8)
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and regraduate (monotonically rescale) our DoRB function by letting,
[a|d]→ ζ(a|d) ≡ φ([a|d]) + α, (1.9)
such that the mutually exclusive disjunction rule for DoRBs takes the convenient form,
ζ(a ∨ b|d) = ζ(a|d) + ζ(b|d). (1.10)
The special case of mutually exclusive propositions can be lifted by considering the logical
identities: a = ab∨ab˜, b = ab∨ a˜b, and a∨b = ab∨ a˜b∨ab˜. Because ab, ab˜, a˜b are propositions
themselves we may use equation (1.10) to find,
ζ(a ∨ b|d) = ζ(ab ∨ a˜b ∨ ab˜|d) = ζ(ab|d) + ζ(ab˜|d) + ζ(a˜b|d) + [ζ(ab|d)− ζ(ab|d)]
= ζ(ab ∨ ab˜|d) + ζ(ab ∨ a˜b|d)− ζ(ab|d), (1.11)
which means the general sum rule for DoRBs is,
ζ(a ∨ b|d) = ζ(a|d) + ζ(b|d)− ζ(ab|d). (1.12)
1.3 Functional form of [a and b]
Consider we wish to find the DoRB of a proposition z ≡ a ∧ b ≡ ab. Again this means that
finding the functional form of ζ(ab|d) will give insight into the functional form of ζ(z|d).
Due to this, we again expect the functional form of ζ(ab|d) to be related to the functions:
ζ(a|d), ζ(b|d), ζ(a|bd), ζ(b|ad), which we express as,
ζ(ab|d) = G(ζ(a|d), ζ(b|d), ζ(a|bd), ζ(b|ad)). (1.13)
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The function G can be deconstructed from four arguments down to two arguments by fol-
lowing eliminative induction [21, 47]. The functional dependencies that capture conjunction
“and” as it pertains to the DoRB of a and b depend both on the DoRB of a as well as our
DoRB of b given a is true – b|a,
ζ(ab|d) = G(ζ(a|d), ζ(b|ad)) = G(ζ(b|d), ζ(a|bd)) = ζ(ba|d), (1.14)
while all other candidates fail to perform as desired. The functional form of G can be found
by considering the distributive property of propositions,
z ≡ a(b ∨ c) = ab ∨ ac. (1.15)
For our inference tool to not be self-refuting, ζ must arrive at the same result for the logically
equivalent forms of z, which imposes the following relation,
ζ(a(b ∨ c)|d) = ζ((ab ∨ ac)|d). (1.16)
Letting b and c be mutually exclusive for simplicity, we have ζ(b∨ c|d) = ζ(b|d)+ ζ(c|d) such
that ζ((ab ∨ ac)|d) = ζ(ab|d) + ζ(ac|d), so,
ζ(z) = G(ζ(a|d), ζ(b|ad) + ζ(c|ad)) = G(ζ(a|d), ζ(b|ad)) +G(ζ(a|d), ζ(c|ad)). (1.17)
Letting u = ζ(a|d), v = ζ(b|ad) and w = ζ(c|ad) recasts G into a more obvious form,
G(u, v + w) = G(u, v) +G(u, w). (1.18)
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This functional equation is linear in the second argument meaning it has the general solution
[46],
G(u, v) = A(u)v. (1.19)
Because ab = ba, if we let u′ = ζ(a|bd) and v′ = ζ(b|d) we have that ζ(ab) = ζ(ba) implies
G(u, v) = G(v′, u′), so,
A(u)v = A(v′)u′. (1.20)
In the special case that the propositions in question are independent, u = u′ and v = v′, one
finds the functional form of A(u) must be A(u) ∝ u. The general solution for conjunction is
therefore proportional to the simple product of its constituents, G(u, v) ∝ uv. This means,
ζ(ab|d) = G(ζ(a|d), ζ(b|ad)) = χζ(a|d)ζ(b|ad) = χζ(b|d)ζ(a|bd), (1.21)
where χ is a constant, and the last equality is due to the commutativity of ab (1.20).
Cleaning up the constants: Lastly we find values for χ, ζ(vf), and ζ(vt). Because a
proposition or its negation is certainly true, ζ(vt) = ζ(a ∨ a˜), we have,
ζ(vt) = ζ(a ∨ a˜|a) = ζ(a|a) + ζ(a˜|a) = ζ(vt) + ζ(vf). (1.22)
This equation is satisfied for ζ(vt) = ±∞ or ζ(vf) = 0 because by design ζ(vt) 6= ζ(vf).
Because the DoRBs are real numbers by design, ζ(vt) is finite such that it is not a non-
number, like infinity. This then allows DoRBs to be understood as a fraction of certainty,
something that would be impossible if the DoRB of a true proposition was infinite. The only
reasonable solution to the above equation is therefore ζ(vf) = 0.
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We find χ by evaluating the DoRB of ab|ab and using the product rule,
ζ(vt) = ζ(ab|ab) = χζ(vt)2, (1.23)
and therefore χ = 1/ζ(vt) because ζ(vt) 6= ζ(vf) = 0. The product rule becomes,
ζ(ab) =
ζ(b|a)ζ(a)
ζ(vt)
. (1.24)
We may further regraduate the DoRB ζ(z)→ p(z) = ζ(z)
ζ(vt)
for convenience such that p(vt) =
p(z ∨ z˜) = 1 is normalized to unity, and therefore, 0 ≤ p(z) ≤ 1 for any proposition z.
1.4 Corollaries and Comments
From now on we will use the standard comma notation between propositions to denote an
“and” conjunction. The sum rule,
p(a ∨ b|d) = p(a|d) + p(b|d)− p(a, b|d), (1.25)
as well as the product rule,
p(a, b|d) = p(a|d)p(b|a, d) = p(b|d)p(a|b, d), (1.26)
were found to be the desired strategies designed for manipulating degrees of rational belief.
These rules are formally equivalent to the sum and product probability rules, and thus,
this derivation provides an interpretation for probability as “a degree of rational belief”
wherever and whenever probability theory is utilized. This is perhaps the first suggestion
that Statistical and Quantum Theory are theories of inference, that is, they are theories
that quantify, rank, and guide one’s intuition of what one ought to believe is true rather
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than providing an ultimate description of nature; however, this is not revealed to be the case
until the maximum entropy method and the Entropic Dynamics formulation of Quantum
Mechanics are derived. Future chapters in this thesis will provide the foundation for laws
of Physics as applications of inference. Note that at this point it is straightforward to
introduce probability densities p(xi)→ ρ(x) for continuous propositions xi → x that provide
probabilities when taken with the product of their measure ρ(x)dx = p(x). When there is no
room for misinterpretation I may simply call ρ(x) a probability or probability distribution
rather than a probability density. It is interesting to note that when one is summing
∑
i p(xi)
that it is a sum over propositions. In the continuous case
∫
ρ(x) dx is, in the strictest
interpretation, an integration over propositions. I believe this interpretation is interesting in
the later chapters pertaining to Entropic Dynamics.
Corollaries If we know b to be true and potentially correlated to a, then as a matter of self
honesty, we should include this information when considering the probability of a (whenever
available). The probability of a conditional on b, p(a|b) may be rewritten using the product
rule (where logically p(b) > 0), as
p(a|b) = p(b|a)p(a)
p(b)
. (1.27)
This is Bayes Theorem, and therefore it is designed to reflect informed and honest judgment
concerning the DoRB a is true given b is true. In certain instances when the truth of a
proposition is learned, one is obligated, for the purpose of making informed judgments and
self honesty, to update an old probability p(a) to a new probability,
p(a)
∗→ p(a|b), (1.28)
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from (1.27). It is thus natural to define information operationally (∗) as the rationale that
causes a probability distribution to change (inspired by [21]), (1.28) being one example. In
another example, if it is unclear whether b is true or b˜ is true, then one can use the fact that
b ∨ b˜ = (∗) is certainly true, and make the following inference about a,
p(a, b)
∗→ p(a, b ∨ b˜|d) = p(a, b|d) + p(a, b˜|d) = p(a|d)
∑
b
p(b|a, d) = p(a|d). (1.29)
This process is called marginalization, in particular above, b has been marginalized over and
gives a best guess for a. If, later, the value of b is learned, one may use (1.28), or revert back
to p(a, b) if one inquires about the probability of a and b.
The expectation value of an outcome is defined to be such that the variance about its
value is minimal [21], and therefore the expected value is,
〈x〉 =
∑
i
xip(xi). (1.30)
It should be noted that in general 〈x〉 is not within {xi}, and thus it cannot in general
represent an element of reality even if {xi} do. In this sense, expectation values, like DoRBs,
pertain to the characterization of knowledge about reality, rather than reality itself, and
therefore they are potentially useful epistemic quantities.
A particularly interesting notion in probability theory is information geometry. There
are several derivations of information geometry reviewed and given in [21], one of them
in particular is as “a measure of distinguishably between probability distributions”. The
measure of distinguishably is the invariant interval,
dℓ2 = gabdθ
adθb, (1.31)
where θa is the ath parameter of θ = {θ1, θ2, ...}, which label the family of probability
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distributions {ρ(x|θ)} that populate a statistical manifold M having coordinates θ. In
particular, the information metric gab assigns geometry to M, and it is unique up to an
overall scale factor C [48, 49],
gab = C
∫
dxρ(x|θ)∂ log ρ(x|θ)
∂θa
∂ log ρ(x|θ)
∂θb
. (1.32)
Entropic Dynamics will take advantage of Information Geometry in the derivation of Quan-
tum Mechanics in Chapter 4.
Comment: Are rational beliefs scientific? In short, “Yes” [44]. In science we have
access to data, observations, and mathematical tools for accurately describing these data and
observations. We are particularly complacent when a mathematical tool is able to predict
new data and observations; however, if it fails to do so, we either modify it, abandon it,
or claim it was being used in a region outside its operation. The set of mathematical tools
that together form the body of scientific description are rigorous because they are subject
to testing, peer-review, and may be adapted to reflect new evidence. This practice preserves
honesty as well as allows one to make the most informed predictions. It is therefore clear that
rational practices allow one to form rational beliefs, and certainly, science aims to discredit
the alternative. If the physics of today is changed tomorrow, our scientific process allows us
to adjust accordingly such that we have the most informed description of nature as possible.
This process may be exactly described by manipulating DoRBs, or as we find, probability.
Comment: Why not simply use Kolmogorov’s Axioms? The axiomatic derivation
of probability given by Kolmogorov in 1933 [50], is arguably incomplete. In it, probability is
defined as a map from a set E of events {ei} (which may be sets themselves) to the positive
real line: ei → P (ei) ∈ R. The remaining axioms state that probability is normalized
P (E) = 1 and that under exclusive addition P (e1 + e2) = P (e1) + P (e2). This axiomatic
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characterization of probability is not favored on two accounts.
The first is that it fails to provide an interpretation for probability. Because at most the
interpretation of probability in the Kolmogorov picture is a map from a set of events to the
real line between 0 and 1, it is isomorphic to other instances represented in this interval,
which may lead to misidentification. I dedicated an article [6] to argue against the notions
of a “generalized complex probability” or “complex quasi-probability”, because they fail
to rank propositions by more or less probable – the whole point of having probability in
the first place. Some have poorly named these instances quasi-probabilities, because when
viewed axiomatically, they appear to simply relax Kolmgorov’s third axiom that probabilities
are real but fail to mention their inability to rank the DoRB, plausibility, or probability a
proposition is true. I do give an explanation for how probabilities may be complex and
still rank degrees of rational belief, but the complex representation of actual probabilities is
ultimately not particularly useful other than for showing how quasi-probability distributions
might fail to rank (a miniature no-go theorem of sorts), so the full development is omitted
here.
A second flaw is that the axiomatic characterization lacks an updating procedure or a
reason to update. This flaw may actually be regarded as an instance of the first flaw, since
ultimately we would like to know what probability is and how to use it. In the Kolmogorov
paper [50], conditional probability (or Bayes Theorem) is defined and then used to “derive”
the product rule, neither of which make reference to the original axioms in an obvious way
– in some sense joint probability distributions are neglected all together in the axioms. In
our derivation above, probability is a tool designed for the pragmatic purpose of making
inferences; far more desirable for doing science than the axiomatic approach, which appears
to design probability for the purpose of describing its set theoretic foundations.
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1.5 Conclusions and the desire for an updating tool
Probability theory has been derived as the unique tool for manipulating degrees of rational
belief, and thus, the “degree of rational belief one ought to assign to a proposition being
true” is formally equal to “the probability” of that proposition. A probability distribution is
therefore a statement of rational beliefs, or as it is sometimes called, a “state of knowledge”.
Although we have derived rules for manipulating probability distributions using the sum
and product rules, we have not given a definitive prescription for assigning numerical values
to individual probability distributions [29]. This leads to the problem of priors [21, 29], a
problem Jaynes discusses at length [51]. Ultimately it is found that the proper assignment
of prior distributions is on the onus of the agent to use the tools of inference correctly –
they must be reasonable and use the information at hand, which may include, but is not
limited to, the symmetries in the problem. Updating probability distributions has been
motivated by practicality as well as self honesty, but a general, less ad hoc method for
updating probability distributions is desired. In the next Chapter we will design a rigorous
tool for updating probability distributions as well as a tool for updating density matrices –
they are the standard and quantum relative entropies, respectively.
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Chapter 2
The Shared Inferential Foundation of
the Standard and Quantum Relative
Entropies
As is desired in the comments and conclusions of Chapter 1, we design an inferential updating
procedure for probability distributions and density matrices such that inductive inferences
may be made. This chapter follows [1].
The inferential updating tools found in this derivation take the form of the standard and
quantum relative entropy functionals, and thus we find that these functionals are designed
for the purpose of updating probability distributions and density matrices, respectively.
Previously formulated design derivations that find the relative entropy to be a tool for
inference originally required five design criteria (DC) [31–33], this was reduced to four in
[34–36], and then down to three in [7, 30] (reviewed in [21]). We reduced the number of
required DC down to two while also providing the first design derivation of the quantum
relative entropy—using the same design criteria and inferential principles in both instances.
The designed quantum relative entropy takes the form of Umegaki’s quantum relative
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entropy, and thus it has the “proper asymptotic form of the relative entropy in quantum
(mechanics)” [52–54]. Recently, Wilming et al. [55] gave an axiomatic characterization of
the quantum relative entropy that “uniquely determines the quantum relative entropy”. Our
derivation differs from their’s, again in that we design the quantum relative entropy for a
purpose, but also that our DCs are imposed on what turns out to be the functional derivative
of the quantum relative entropy rather than on the quantum relative entropy itself. The use
of a quantum entropy for the purpose of inference has a large history: Jaynes [22, 24]
invented the quantum maximum entropy method [10], and this method was found to be
useful by [56–63] and many others. However, we find the quantum relative entropy to be
the suitable entropy for updating density matrices, rather than the von Neuman entropy
[42], as is suggested in [64]. Thus, [1] gives the desired motivation for why the appropriate
quantum relative entropy for updating density matrices, from prior to posterior, should be
logarithmic in form while also providing a solution for updating non-uniform prior density
matrices [64]. The relevant results of these papers may be found using the quantum relative
entropy with suitably chosen prior density matrices.
One of the primary conclusions from [31, 32] is that because the relative entropies were
reached by design, they may be interpreted as such, “the relative entropies are tools for
updating”, which means we no longer need to rely on an interpretation of entropy as a
measure of disorder, an amount of missing information [65], or amount of uncertainty [24].
This shifts the focus on entropy away from measures of “information” or “uncertainty”,
which may be misleading,1 and rather toward a notion that entropies are objective tools
1The following example from [21] shows that interpreting entropy as an “amount of missing information”
(or uncertainty) can be misleading: Given someone who normally carries their keys in their pocket, the
probable location of their keys is described by narrow probability distribution in their pocket. If this person
makes a measurement, something that’s normal utility is to gain information, but finds that their keys are not
in their pocket, then the newly assigned probability distribution for the location of the keys is widespread.
Thus, counterintuitively, by gaining the knowledge that their keys were outside of their pocket, they have
lost information (as the entropy has increased). This leads [21] to define information as that which causes
probability distributions to change (independent of whether or not that change leads entropy to increase or
decrease).
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for inference (as was utilized by Jaynes [10, 22, 24]). In this sense, the relative entropies
were built for the purpose of saturating their own interpretation [21, 34]2, and, therefore,
the quantum relative entropy is the tool designed for updating density matrices.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: first, we will discuss some universally
applicable principles of inference and motivate the design of an entropy functional able to
rank probability distributions. This entropy functional will be designed such that it is
consistent with inference by applying a few reasonable design criteria, which are guided
by the principle of minimal updating. Using the same principles of inference and design
criteria, we find the form of the quantum relative entropy suitable for inference. An example
of updating 2 × 2 prior density matrices with respect to expectation values over spin matrices
that do not commute with the prior, via the quantum maximum entropy method, is given
in Appendix C.
2.1 The Design of Entropic Inference
Inference is the appropriate updating of probability distributions when new information
is received. Bayes rule and Jeffreys rule are both equipped to handle information in the
form of data; however, the updating of a probability distribution due to the knowledge of
an expectation value was realized by Jaynes [10, 22, 24] through the method of maximum
entropy. The two methods of inference were thought to be separate until the work of [7–
9], which showed Bayes Rule and Jeffreys Rule are the derived forms of inference using the
method of maximum entropy when the expectation value constraints are in the form of data.
In the spirit of the derivation we will pretend the maximum entropy method is not known
and show how it may be derived as an application of inference.
Given a probability distribution ϕ(x) over a general set of propositions x ∈ X , if new
information is learned, we are obligated to assign a new probability distribution ρ(x) that
2Although, Skilling only accomplished this for “intensities” rather than probabilities.
18
somehow reflects this new information while also respecting our prior probability distribution
ϕ(x). The main question we must address is: “Given some information, to what posterior
probability distribution ρ(x) should we update our prior probability distribution ϕ(x)?”,
that is,
ϕ(x)
∗−→ ρ(x)?
This specifies the problem of inductive inference. Since “information” has many colloquial,
and potentially counterintuitive, definitions (as discussed earlier), we remove potential con-
fusion by defining information operationally (∗) as the rationale that causes a probability
distribution to change (inspired by and adapted from [21]). As probabilities are “degrees of
rational belief”, a probability should only change value if there exists a rationale to do so.
Thus, information can take many forms, for instance, learning the truth of a proposition or
the value of an expectation value, but, obtaining “new” information also depends on one’s
current state of knowledge ϕ [21].
The motivation for designing entropy is to build a function that allows for a systematic
search of a preferred posterior distribution in the presence of new information for the purpose
of inductive inference [21]. It is best described in [21]:
“The central idea, first proposed in [34], is disarmingly simple: to select the
posterior, first rank all candidate distributions in increasing order of preference
and then pick the distribution that ranks the highest. Irrespective of what it
is that makes one distribution preferable over another (we will get to that soon
enough), it is clear that any ranking according to preference must be transitive: if
distribution ρ1 is preferred over distribution ρ2, and ρ2 is preferred over ρ3, then
ρ1 is preferred over ρ3. Such transitive rankings are implemented by assigning to
each ρ(x) a real number S[ρ], which is called the entropy of ρ, in such a way that
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if ρ1 is preferred over ρ2, then S[ρ1] > S[ρ2]. The selected distribution (one or
possibly many, for there may be several equally preferred distributions) is that
which maximizes the entropy functional.”
Because we wish to update from prior distributions ϕ to posterior distributions ρ by
ranking, the entropy functional S[ρ, ϕ] is a real function of both ϕ and ρ. In the absence
of new information, there is no available rationale to prefer any ρ to the original ϕ, and
thereby the relative entropy should be designed such that the selected posterior is equal
to the prior ϕ (in the absence of new information). The prior information encoded in ϕ is
valuable and we should not change it unless we are informed otherwise. Due to our definition
of information, and our desire for objectivity, we state the predominate guiding principle for
inductive inference:
The Principle of Minimal Updating (PMU): A probability distribution should only
be updated to the extent required by the new information.
This simple statement provides the foundation for inference [21]. If the updating of
probability distributions is to be done objectively, then possibilities should not be needlessly
ruled out or suppressed. Being informationally stingy, that we should only update probability
distributions when the information requires it, pushes inductive inference toward objectivity.
Thus, using the PMU helps formulate a pragmatic (and objective) procedure for making
inferences using (informationally) subjective probability distributions [44].
This method of inference is only as universal and general as its ability to apply equally
well to any specific inference problem. The notion of “specificity” is the notion of indepen-
dence; a specific case is only specific in that it is separable from other specific cases. The
notion that systems may be “sufficiently independent” plays a central and deep-seated role
in science and the idea that some things can be neglected and that not everything matters,
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is implemented by imposing criteria that tells us how to handle statistically independent
systems and independent domains within a single system [21]. Ironically, the universally
shared property by all specific inference problems is their ability to be independent of one
another—they share independence. Thus, a universal inference scheme based on the PMU
permits:
Properties of Independence (PI): Subdomain Independence: When information is re-
ceived about one set of propositions, it should not affect or change the state of knowledge
(probability distribution) of the other propositions (else information was also received about
them too);
And,
Subsystem Independence: When two systems are a priori believed to be independent and we
only receive information about one, then the state of knowledge of the other system remains
unchanged.
The PIs are special cases of the PMU that describe situations when someone should not
update pieces of their probability distribution. The PIs are ultimately implemented through
design criteria in this design derivation of the entropy S[ρ, ϕ]. The process of constraining
the form of S[ρ, ϕ] by imposing design criteria may be viewed as a process of eliminative
induction from which a single form for the entropy remains. Thus, the justification behind
the surviving entropy is not that it leads to demonstrably correct inferences, but, rather,
that all other candidate entropies demonstrably fail to perform as desired [21]. Rather than
the design criteria instructing one how to update, they instruct in what instances one should
not update. That is, rather than justifying one way to skin a cat over another, we tell you
when not to skin it, which is operationally unique—namely you don’t do it—luckily enough
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for the cat.
The Design Criteria and the Standard Relative Entropy
The following design criteria (DC), guided by the PMU, are imposed and one finds that
the standard relative entropy is a tool designed for inductive inference. The form of this
presentation is inspired by [21].
DC1: Subdomain Independence We keep DC1 from [7, 21, 66] and follow it below.
DC1 imposes the first instance of when one should not update—the Subdomain PI. Suppose
the information to be processed does not refer to a particular subdomain D of the space X
of x’s. In the absence of new information about D, the PMU insists we do not change our
minds about probabilities that are conditional on D. Thus, we design the inference method
so that ϕ(x|D), the prior probability of x conditional on x ∈ D, is not updated and therefore
the selected conditional posterior is
P (x|D) = ϕ(x|D). (2.1)
(The notation will be as follows: we denote priors by ϕ, candidate posteriors by lower case
ρ, and the selected posterior by upper case P .) Caticha emphasizes that the point is not
that we make the unwarranted assumption that keeping ϕ(x|D) unchanged is guaranteed
to lead to correct inferences. It need not; induction is risky. The point is, rather, that, in
the absence of any evidence to the contrary, there is no reason to change our minds and the
prior information takes priority. [21]
DC1 Implementation Consider the set of microstates xi ∈ X belonging to either of two
non-overlapping domains D or its complement D′, such that X = D ∪ D′ and ∅ = D ∩ D′.
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For convenience, let ρ(xi) = ρi. Consider the following constraints:
ρ(D) =
∑
i∈D
ρi and ρ(D′) =
∑
i∈D′
ρi, (2.2)
such that ρ(D)+ ρ(D′) = 1 (however this will not be imposed directly with a Lagrange mul-
tiplier as it would lead to inter domain dependencies), and the following “local” expectation
value constraints over D and D′,
〈A〉 =
∑
i∈D
ρiAi and 〈A′〉 =
∑
i∈D′
ρiA
′
i, (2.3)
where A = A(x) is a scalar function of x and Ai ≡ A(xi). As we are searching for the
candidate distribution which maximizes S while obeying (2.2) and (2.3), we maximize the
entropy S ≡ S[ρ, ϕ] with respect to these expectation value constraints using the Lagrange
multiplier method,
0 = δ
(
S − λ[ρ(D)−
∑
i∈D
ρi]− µ[〈A〉 −
∑
i∈D
ρiAi]
−λ′[ρ(D′)−
∑
i∈D′
ρi]− µ′[〈A′〉 −
∑
i∈D′
ρiAi]
)
,
and, thus, the entropy is maximized when the following differential relationships hold:
δS
δρi
= λ+ µAi ∀ i ∈ D, (2.4)
δS
δρi
= λ′ + µ′A′i ∀ i ∈ D′. (2.5)
Equations (2.2)–(2.5), are n+4 equations we must solve to find the four Lagrange multipliers
{λ, λ′, µ, µ′} and the n probability values {ρi} associated to the n microstates {xi}.
If the subdomain constraint DC1 is imposed in the most restrictive case, then it will hold
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in general. The most restrictive case requires splitting X into a set of domains {Di} such
that each Di singularly includes one microstate xi. This gives,
δS
δρi
= λi + µiAi in each Di. (2.6)
Because the entropy S = S[ρ1, ρ2, ...;ϕ1, ϕ2, ...] is a functional over the probability of each
microstate’s posterior and prior distribution, its variational derivative is also a function of
said probabilities in general,
δS
δρi
≡ φi(ρ1, ρ2, ...;ϕ1, ϕ2, ...) = λi + µiAi for each (i,Di). (2.7)
DC1 is imposed by constraining the form of φi(ρ1, ρ2, ...;ϕ1, ϕ2, ...) = φi(ρi;ϕ1, ϕ2, ...) to
ensure that changes in Ai → Ai + δAi have no influence over the value of ρj in domain Dj,
through φi, for i 6= j. If there is no new information about propositions in Dj , its distribution
should remain equal to ϕj by the PMU. We further restrict φi such that an arbitrary variation
of ϕj → ϕj + δϕj (a change in the prior state of knowledge of the microstate j) has no effect
on ρi for i 6= j and therefore DC1 imposes φi = φi(ρi, ϕi), as is guided by the PMU.
At this point, it is easy to generalize the analysis to continuous microstates such that the
indices become continuous i→ x, sums become integrals, and discrete probabilities become
probability densities ρi → ρ(x).
Remark We are designing the entropy for the purpose of ranking posterior probability
distributions (for the purpose of inference); however, the highest ranked distribution is found
by setting the variational derivative of S[ρ, ϕ] equal to the variations of the expectation value
constraints by the Lagrange multiplier method,
δS
δρ(x)
= λ+
∑
i
µiAi(x). (2.8)
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Therefore, the real quantity of interest is δS
δρ(x)
rather than the specific form of S[ρ, ϕ]. All
forms of S[ρ, ϕ] that give the correct form of δS
δρ(x)
are equally valid for the purpose of inference.
Thus, every design criteria may be made on the variational derivative of the entropy rather
than the entropy itself, which we do. When maximizing the entropy, for convenience, we will
let,
δS
δρ(x)
≡ φx(ρ(x), ϕ(x)), (2.9)
and further use the shorthand φx(ρ, ϕ) ≡ φx(ρ(x), ϕ(x)), in all cases.
DC1’: In the absence of new information, our new state of knowledge ρ(x) is equal to the
old state of knowledge ϕ(x).
This is a special case of DC1, which is implemented differently in [21]. The PMU is
in principle a statement about informational honestly—that is, one should not “jump to
conclusions” in light of new information, and in the absence of new information, one should
not change their state of knowledge. If no new information is given, the prior probability
distribution ϕ(x) does not change, that is, the posterior probability distribution ρ(x) = ϕ(x)
is equal to the prior probability. If we maximize the entropy without applying constraints,
δS
δρ(x)
= 0, (2.10)
then DC1’ imposes the following condition on φx:
δS
δρ(x)
= φx(ρ, ϕ) = φx(ϕ, ϕ) = 0, (2.11)
for all x in this case. This special case of the DC1 and the PMU turns out to be incredibly
constraining as we will see over the course of DC2.
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Comment If the variable x is continuous, DC1 requires that when information refers to
points infinitely close but just outside the domain D, that it will have no influence on prob-
abilities conditional on D. This may seem surprising as it may lead to updated probability
distributions that are discontinuous. Is this a problem? No. [21]
In certain situations (e.g., physics) we might have explicit reasons to believe that con-
ditions of continuity or differentiability should be imposed and this information might be
given to us in a variety of ways. The crucial point, however – and this is a point that we
keep and will keep reiterating – is that unless such information is explicitly given, we should
not assume it. If the new information leads to discontinuities, so be it. [21]
DC2: Subsystem Independence DC2 imposes the second instance of when one should
not update – the Subsystem PI. We emphasize that DC2 is not a consistency requirement.
The argument we deploy is not that both the prior and the new information tells us the
systems are independent, in which case consistency requires that it should not matter whether
the systems are treated jointly or separately. Rather, DC2 refers to a situation where the
new information does not say whether the systems are independent or not, but information
is given about each subsystem. The updating is being designed so that the independence
reflected in the prior is maintained in the posterior by default via the PMU and the second
clause of the PIs. [21]
The point is not that when we have no evidence for correlations we draw the firm con-
clusion that the systems must necessarily be independent. They could indeed have turned
out to be correlated and then our inferences would be wrong. Again, induction involves risk.
The point is rather that if the joint prior reflects independence and the new evidence is silent
on the matter of correlations, then the prior independence takes precedence. As before, in
this case subdomain independence, the probability distribution should not be updated unless
the information requires it. [21]
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DC2 Implementation Consider a composite system, x = (x1, x2) ∈ X = X1 × X2.
Assume that all prior evidence led us to believe the subsystems are independent. This belief
is reflected in the prior distribution: if the individual system priors are ϕ1(x1) and ϕ2(x2),
then the prior for the whole system is their product ϕ1(x1)ϕ2(x2). Further suppose that
new information is acquired such that ϕ1(x1) would by itself be updated to P1(x1) and that
ϕ2(x2) would itself be updated to P2(x2). By design, the implementation of DC2 constrains
the entropy functional such that, in this case, the joint product prior ϕ1(x1)ϕ2(x2) updates
to the selected product posterior P1(x1)P2(x2) [21].
The argument below is considerably simplified if we expand the space of probabilities to
include distributions that are not necessarily normalized. This does not represent any limi-
tation because a normalization constraint can always be applied. We consider a few special
cases below:
Case 1: We receive the extremely constraining information that the posterior distribution for
system 1 is completely specified to be P1(x1) while we receive no information at all about sys-
tem 2. We treat the two systems jointly. Maximize the joint entropy S[ρ(x1, x2), ϕ(x1)ϕ(x2)]
subject to the following constraints on the ρ(x1, x2) :
∫
dx2 ρ(x1, x2) = P1(x1). (2.12)
Notice that the probability of each x1 ∈ X1 within ρ(x1, x2) is being constrained to P1(x1) in
the marginal. We therefore need one Lagrange multiplier λ1(x1) for each x1 ∈ X1 to tie each
value of
∫
dx2 ρ(x1, x2) to P1(x1). Maximizing the entropy with respect to this constraint is,
δ
[
S −
∫
dx1λ1(x1)
(∫
dx2 ρ(x1, x2)− P1(x1)
)]
= 0, (2.13)
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which requires that
λ1(x1) = φx1x2 (ρ(x1, x2), ϕ1(x1)ϕ2(x2)) , (2.14)
for arbitrary variations of ρ(x1, x2). By design, DC2 is implemented by requiring ϕ1ϕ2 →
P1ϕ2 in this case, therefore,
λ1(x1) = φx1x2 (P1(x1)ϕ2(x2), ϕ1(x1)ϕ2(x2)) . (2.15)
This equation must hold for all choices of x2 and all choices of the prior ϕ2(x2) as λ1(x1) is
independent of x2. Suppose we had chosen a different prior ϕ
′
2(x2) = ϕ2(x2) + δϕ2(x2) that
disagrees with ϕ2(x2). For all x2 and δϕ2(x2), the multiplier λ1(x1) remains unchanged as
it constrains the independent ρ(x1) → P1(x1). This means that any dependence that the
right-hand side might potentially have had on x2 and on the prior ϕ2(x2) must cancel out.
This means that
φx1x2 (P1(x1)ϕ2(x2), ϕ1(x1)ϕ2(x2)) = fx1(P1(x1), ϕ1(x1)). (2.16)
Since any value of ϕ2 gives the same fx1, we may choose a convenient constant prior set
equal to one, ϕ2(x2) = 1, therefore
fx1(P1(x1), ϕ1(x1)) = φx1x2 (P1(x1) · 1, ϕ1(x1) · 1) = φx1 (P1(x1), ϕ1(x1)) (2.17)
in general. This gives
λ1(x1) = φx1 (P1(x1), ϕ1(x1)) . (2.18)
The left-hand side above does not depend on x2, and therefore neither does the right-hand
side. An argument exchanging systems 1 and 2 gives a similar result.
Case 1—Conclusion: When system 2 is not updated the dependence on ϕ2 and x2 drops
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out,
φx1x2 (P1(x1)ϕ2(x2), ϕ1(x1)ϕ2(x2)) = φx1 (P1(x1), ϕ1(x1)) , (2.19)
and vice-versa when system 1 is not updated,
φx1x2 (ϕ1(x1)P2(x2), ϕ1(x1)ϕ2(x2)) = φx2 (P2(x2), ϕ2(x2)) . (2.20)
As we seek the general functional form of φx1x2 , and because the x2 dependence drops out
of (2.19) and the x1 dependence drops out of (2.20) for arbitrary ϕ1, ϕ2 and ϕ12 = ϕ1ϕ2, the
explicit coordinate dependence in φ consequently drops out of both such that,
φx1x2 → φ. (2.21)
Thus, φ = φ(ρ(x), ϕ(x)) must only depend on coordinates through the probability distribu-
tions themselves.
Case 2: Now consider a different special case in which the marginal posterior distributions
for systems 1 and 2 are both completely specified to be P1(x1) and P2(x2), respectively.
Maximize the joint entropy S[ρ(x1, x2), ϕ(x1)ϕ(x2)] subject to the following constraints on
the ρ(x1, x2) ,
∫
dx2 ρ(x1, x2) = P1(x1) and
∫
dx1 ρ(x1, x2) = P2(x2) . (2.22)
Again, this is one constraint for each value of x1 and one constraint for each value of x2,
which, therefore, require the separate Lagrange multipliers µ1(x1) and µ2(x2). Maximizing
S with respect to these constraints is then,
0 = δ
[
S −
∫
dx1µ1(x1)
(∫
dx2 ρ(x1, x2)− P1(x1)
)
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−
∫
dx2µ2(x2)
(∫
dx1 ρ(x1, x2)− P2(x2)
)]
, (2.23)
leading to
µ1(x1) + µ2(x2) = φ (ρ(x1, x2), ϕ1(x1)ϕ2(x2)) . (2.24)
The updating is being designed so that ϕ1ϕ2 → P1P2, as the independent subsystems are
being updated based on expectation values that are silent about correlations. DC2 thus
imposes,
µ1(x1) + µ2(x2) = φ (P1(x1)P2(x2), ϕ1(x1)ϕ2(x2)) . (2.25)
Write (2.25) as,
µ1(x1) = φ (P1(x1)P2(x2), ϕ1(x1)ϕ2(x2))− µ2(x2). (2.26)
The left-hand side is independent of x2 so we can perform a technique similar to before.
Suppose we had chosen a different constraint P ′2(x2) that differs from P2(x2) and a new prior
ϕ′2(x2) that differs from ϕ2(x2) except at the point x¯2. At the value x¯2, the multiplier µ1(x1)
remains unchanged for all P ′2(x2), ϕ
′
2(x2), and thus x2. This means that any dependence
that the right-hand side might potentially have had on x2 and on the choice of P
′
2(x2), ϕ
′
2(x2)
must cancel out, leaving µ1(x1) unchanged. That is, the Lagrange multiplier µ(x2) cancels
out these dependences such that
φ (P1(x1)P2(x2), ϕ1(x1)ϕ2(x2))− µ2(x2) = g(P1(x1), ϕ1(x1)). (2.27)
Because g(P1(x1), ϕ1(x1)) is independent of arbitrary variations of P2(x2) and ϕ2(x2) on
the left hand side (LHS) above—it is satisfied equally well for all choices. The form of
g = φ(P1(x1), q1(x1)) is apparent if P2(x2) = ϕ2(x2) = 1 as µ2(x2) = 0 similar to Case 1 as
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well as DC1’. Therefore, the Lagrange multiplier is
µ1(x1) = φ (P1(x1), ϕ1(x1)) . (2.28)
A similar analysis carried out for µ2(x2) leads to
µ2(x2) = φ (P2(x2), ϕ2(x2)) . (2.29)
Case 2—Conclusion: Substituting back into (2.25) gives us a functional equation for φ ,
φ (P1P2, ϕ1ϕ2) = φ (P1, ϕ1) + φ (P2, ϕ2) . (2.30)
The general solution for this functional equation is derived in the Appendix A.3, and is
φ(ρ, ϕ) = a1 ln(ρ(x)) + a2 ln(ϕ(x)), (2.31)
where a1, a2 are constants. The constants are fixed by using DC1’. Letting ρ1(x1) = ϕ1(x1) =
ϕ1 gives φ(ϕ, ϕ) = 0 by DC1’, and, therefore,
φ(ϕ, ϕ) = (a1 + a2) ln(ϕ) = 0, (2.32)
so we are forced to conclude a1 = −a2 for arbitrary ϕ. Letting a1 ≡ A = −|A| such that
we are really maximizing the entropy (although this is purely convention) gives the general
form of φ to be
φ(ρ, ϕ) = −|A| ln
( ρ(x)
ϕ(x)
)
. (2.33)
As long as A 6= 0, the value of A is arbitrary. The general form of the entropy designed for
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the purpose of inference of ρ is found by integrating φ, and, therefore,
S[ρ(x), ϕ(x)] = −|A|
∫
dx
(
ρ(x) ln
( ρ(x)
ϕ(x)
)
− ρ(x)
)
+ C[ϕ]. (2.34)
The constant in ρ, C[ϕ], will always drop out when varying ρ. The apparent extra term
(|A| ∫ ρ(x)dx) from integration cannot be dropped while simultaneously satisfying DC1’,
which requires ρ(x) = ϕ(x) in the absence of constraints or when there is no change to one’s
information. In previous versions where the integration term (|A| ∫ ρ(x)dx) is dropped,
one obtains solutions like ρ(x) = e−1ϕ(x) (independent of whether ϕ(x) was previously
normalized or not) in the absence of new information. Obviously, this factor can be taken care
of by normalization, and, in this way, both forms of the entropy are equally valid; however,
this form of the entropy better adheres to the PMU through DC1’ when normalization is
not applied. Given that we may regularly impose normalization, we may drop the extra∫
ρ(x)dx term and C[ϕ]. For convenience then, (2.34) becomes
S[ρ(x), ϕ(x)]→ S∗[ρ(x), ϕ(x)] = −|A|
∫
dx ρ(x) ln
( ρ(x)
ϕ(x)
)
. (2.35)
Given that normalization is applied regularly, the same selected posterior ρ(x) maximizes
both S[ρ(x), ϕ(x)] and S∗[ρ(x), ϕ(x)], so in future use, the star notation will be dropped.
Remarks It can be seen that the relative entropy is invariant under coordinate transfor-
mations. This implies that a system of coordinates carry no information, which is to say
that changing coordinates is simply a change in the label of the proposition, while the set of
propositions ultimately stay the same [21].
The general solution to the maximum entropy procedure with respect to N linear con-
straints in ρ, 〈Ai(x)〉, and normalization gives a canonical-like selected posterior probability
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distribution,
ρ(x) =
ϕ(x)
Z
exp
(∑
i
αiAi(x)
)
. (2.36)
The positive constant |A| may always be absorbed into the Lagrange multipliers so we may
let it equal unity without loss of generality. DC1’ is fully realized when we maximize with
respect to a set of constraints on ρ(x) that are already satisfied by ϕ(x). If all of the
constraints are already held by ϕ(x), their corresponding Lagrange multipliers are forcibly
zero (as can be seen in (2.36) using (2.34)), in agreement with Jaynes, as the expectation
values 〈A〉 = 〈A〉(α) are monotonic in their Lagrange multipliers and are satisfied when set
equal to zero. This gives the expected result ρ(x) = ϕ(x) as there is no new information.
Our design has arrived at a refined maximum entropy method [24], whose universality can
be seen by following [7, 8]. We will follow [7, 8] using density matrices in the next chapter.
2.2 The Design of the Quantum Relative Entropy
In the last section, we assumed that the universe of discourse (the set of relevant propositions
or microstates) X = A × B × ... was known. In quantum physics, things are a bit more
ambiguous because many probability distributions, or many experiments, can be associated
with a given density matrix. As any probability distribution from a given density matrix,
ρ(a) = Tr(|a〉〈a|ρˆ) = ∑n〈n|a〉〈a|ρˆ|n〉,3 may be ranked using the standard relative entropy,
it is unclear why we would choose one universe of discourse over another. In lieu of this, so
that one universe of discourse is not given preferential treatment, we consider ranking entire
density matrices against one another. Probability distributions of interest may be found
from the selected posterior density matrix. This moves our universe of discourse from sets
of propositions X → H to Hilbert space(s).
3Tr(...) is the trace.
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When the objects of study are quantum systems, we desire an objective procedure to
update from a prior density matrix ϕˆ to a posterior density matrix ρˆ. We will apply the
same intuition used for ranking probability distributions (Section 2.1) and implement the
PMU, PI, and design criteria to the ranking of density matrices.
2.2.1 Designing the Quantum Relative Entropy
In this section, we design the quantum relative entropy using the same inferentially guided
design criteria as were used in the standard relative entropy.
DC1: Subdomain Independence The goal is to design a function S(ρˆ, ϕˆ) that is able
to rank density matrices. This insists that S(ρˆ, ϕˆ) be a real scalar valued function of the
posterior ρˆ, and prior ϕˆ density matrices, which we will call the quantum relative entropy
or simply the entropy in this section. An arbitrary variation of the entropy with respect to
ρˆ is,
δS(ρˆ, ϕˆ) =
∑
ij
δS(ρˆ, ϕˆ)
δρij
δρij =
∑
ij
(δS(ρˆ, ϕˆ)
δρˆ
)
ij
δ(ρˆ)ij =
∑
ij
(δS(ρˆ, ϕˆ)
δρˆT
)
ji
δ(ρˆ)ij
= Tr
(δS(ρˆ, ϕˆ)
δρˆT
δρˆ
)
, (2.37)
where ρˆT is the transpose of ρˆ. We wish to maximize this entropy with respect to expectation
value constraints, such as 〈A〉 = Tr(Aˆρˆ) on ρˆ. Using the Lagrange multiplier method to
maximize the entropy with respect to 〈A〉 and normalization, is setting the variation equal
to zero,
δ
(
S(ρˆ, ϕˆ)− λ[Tr(ρˆ)− 1]− α[Tr(Aˆρˆ)− 〈A〉]
)
= 0, (2.38)
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where λ and α are the Lagrange multipliers for the respective constraints. Because S(ρˆ, ϕˆ)
is a real number, we require δS to be real, and because ρˆ is Hermitian, δρˆ and δS(ρˆ,ϕˆ)
δρˆT
are
Hermitian. Furthermore, because expectation values are real, Aˆ’s are Hermitian and their
corresponding Lagrange multipliers are real too. Arbitrary variations of ρˆ give,
Tr
((δS(ρˆ, ϕˆ)
δρˆT
− λ1ˆ− αAˆ
)
δρˆ
)
= 0, (2.39)
where 1ˆ is the identity matrix. For these arbitrary variations, the variational derivative of S
satisfies,
δS(ρˆ, ϕˆ)
δρˆT
= λ1ˆ + αAˆ, (2.40)
at the maximum; however, forcing δρˆ to be Hermitian gives the same result (after a bit more
algebra) as is demonstrated in Appendix B. As in the remark earlier, all forms of S that
give the correct form of δS(ρˆ,ϕˆ)
δρˆT
under variation are equally valid for the purpose of inference.
For notational convenience, we let
δS(ρˆ, ϕˆ)
δρˆT
≡ φ(ρˆ, ϕˆ), (2.41)
which is a matrix valued function of the posterior and prior density matrices. The form of
φ(ρˆ, ϕˆ) is already “local” in ρˆ (the variational derivative is with respect to the whole density
matrix and the RHS is a function of the density matrices), so we don’t need to constrain it
further as we did in the original DC1.
DC1’: In the absence of new information, the new state ρˆ is equal to the old state ϕˆ.
Applied to the ranking of density matrices, in the absence of new information, the density
matrix ϕˆ should not change, that is, the posterior density matrix ρˆ = ϕˆ is equal to the prior
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density matrix. Maximizing the entropy without applying any constraints gives,
δS(ρˆ, ϕˆ)
δρˆT
= 0ˆ, (2.42)
and, therefore, DC1’ imposes the following condition in this case:
δS(ρˆ, ϕˆ)
δρˆT
= φ(ρˆ, ϕˆ) = φ(ϕˆ, ϕˆ) = 0ˆ. (2.43)
As in the original DC1’, if ϕˆ is known to obey some expectation value 〈Aˆ〉, and then
if one goes out of their way to constrain ρˆ to that expectation value and nothing else, it
follows from the PMU that ρˆ = ϕˆ, as no information has been gained. This is not imposed
directly but can be verified later due to the monotonocity of expectation values in their
corresponding Lagrange multipliers.
DC2: Subsystem Independence The discussion of DC2 is the same as the standard
relative entropy DC2 – it is not a consistency requirement, and the updating is designed so
that the independence reflected in the prior is maintained in the posterior by default via the
PMU when the information provided is silent about correlations.
DC2 Implementation Consider a composite system living in the Hilbert space H =
H1 ⊗ H2. Assume that all prior evidence led us to believe the systems were independent.
This is reflected in the prior density matrix: if the individual system priors are ϕˆ1 and ϕˆ2,
then the joint prior for the whole system is ϕˆ1⊗ ϕˆ2. Further suppose that new information is
acquired such that ϕˆ1 would itself be updated to ρˆ1 and that ϕˆ2 would be itself be updated
to ρˆ2. By design, the implementation of DC2 constrains the entropy functional such that in
this case, the joint product prior density matrix ϕˆ1 ⊗ ϕˆ2 updates to the product posterior
ρˆ1 ⊗ ρˆ2 so that inferences about one do not affect inferences about the other.
The argument below is considerably simplified if we expand the space of density matrices
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to include density matrices that are not necessarily normalized. This does not represent any
limitation because normalization can always be imposed as one additional constraint. We
consider a few special cases below:
Case 1: We receive the extremely constraining information that the posterior distribution
for system 1 is completely specified to be ρˆ1 while we receive no information about system
2. We treat the two systems jointly. Maximize the joint entropy S(ρˆ12, ϕˆ1 ⊗ ϕˆ2), subject to
the following constraints on the ρˆ12 ,
Tr2(ρˆ12) = ρˆ1, (2.44)
where Tri(...) is the partial trace over the vectors in Hi. Notice that all of the N2 elements
in H1 of ρˆ12 are being constrained. We therefore need a Lagrange multiplier which spans
H1 and has N2 components – it is a square Lagrange multiplier matrix λˆ1. This is readily
seen by observing the component form expressions of the Lagrange multipliers (λˆ1)ij = λij .
Maximizing the entropy with respect to this H2 independent constraint is
0 = δ
(
S −
∑
ij
λij
(
Tr2(ρˆ12)− ρˆ1
)
ij
)
, (2.45)
but reexpressing this with its transpose (λˆ1)ij = (λˆ
T
1 )ji, gives
0 = δ
(
S − Tr1(λˆ1[Tr2(ρˆ12)− ρˆ1])
)
, (2.46)
where we have relabeled λˆT1 → λˆ1, for convenience, as the name of the Lagrange multipliers
are arbitrary. This variation is,
0 = Tr
(( δS
δρˆT12
− λˆ1 ⊗ 1ˆ2
)
δρˆ12
)
, (2.47)
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where ⊗ denotes, equally well, the tensor, direct, or Kronecker product. Similar to Appendix
B, but without assuming λˆ is Hermitian, one finds,
λˆ1 ⊗ 1ˆ2 = φ (ρˆ12, ϕˆ1 ⊗ ϕˆ2) , (2.48)
and therefore one concludes λˆ must be Hermitian because the RHS is Hermitian. DC2 is
implemented by requiring ϕˆ1⊗ ϕˆ2 → ρˆ1 ⊗ ϕˆ2, such that the function φ is designed to reflect
subsystem independence in this case; therefore, we have
λˆ1 ⊗ 1ˆ2 = φ (ρˆ1 ⊗ ϕˆ2, ϕˆ1 ⊗ ϕˆ2) . (2.49)
Had we chosen a different prior ϕˆ′2 = ϕˆ2+δϕˆ2, for all δϕˆ2 the LHS λˆ1⊗ 1ˆ2 remains unchanged
given that φ is independent of scalar functions of ϕˆ2, e.g., h(ϕˆ2) =
∑
ij ϕij. These scalar
functions could be simultaniously lumped into λˆ1 and φ and keep ρˆ1 fixed. The potential
dependence on scalar functions of ϕˆ2 can be removed by imposing DC2 in a subsystem
independent situation where ρˆ′1 in φ need not be fixed under variations of ϕˆ2, and then use
DC2 to impose that it is fixed.4 This means that any dependence that the right-hand side
of (2.49) might potentially have had on ϕˆ2 must drop out, meaning,
φ (ρˆ1 ⊗ ϕˆ2, ϕˆ1 ⊗ ϕˆ2) = f(ρˆ1, ϕˆ1)⊗ 1ˆ2. (2.50)
Since ϕˆ2 is arbitrary, suppose further that we choose a unit prior, ϕˆ2 = 1ˆ2 , and note that
4The resulting equation from such a situation, when for instance maximizing the entropy of an independent
joint prior while imposing a constraint in H1, Tr(Aˆ1 ⊗ 1ˆ2 · ρˆ12) = 〈A1〉, facilitated by a scalar Lagrange
multiplier λ, is,
λAˆ1 ⊗ 1ˆ2 = φ (ρˆ′1 ⊗ ϕˆ2, ϕˆ1 ⊗ ϕˆ2) ,
after imposing DC2. For subsystem independence to be imposed here, ρˆ′1 must be independent of variations
in ϕˆ2, and, therefore, in a general subsystem independent case, φ is independent of scalar functions of ϕˆ2.
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ρˆ1 ⊗ 1ˆ2, ϕˆ1 ⊗ 1ˆ2, and f(ρˆ1, ϕˆ1)⊗ 1ˆ2 are block diagonal in H2.5 This gives
f(ρˆ1, ϕˆ1)⊗ 1ˆ2 = φ
(
ρˆ1 ⊗ 1ˆ2, ϕˆ1 ⊗ 1ˆ2
)
. (2.52)
Because the LHS of the above equation is block diagonal in H2, the RHS is block diagonal in
H2 and, because the function φ is understood to be a power series expansion in its arguments,
f(ρˆ1, ϕˆ1)⊗ 1ˆ2 = φ
(
ρˆ1 ⊗ 1ˆ2, ϕˆ1 ⊗ 1ˆ2
)
= φ (ρˆ1, ϕˆ1)⊗ 1ˆ2. (2.53)
This gives
λˆ1 ⊗ 1ˆ2 = φ (ρˆ1, ϕˆ1)⊗ 1ˆ2, (2.54)
and, therefore, the 1ˆ2 factors out and λˆ1 = φ (ρˆ1, ϕˆ1). A similar argument exchanging systems
1 and 2 shows λˆ2 = φ (ρˆ2, ϕˆ2).
Case 1—Conclusion: The analysis leads us to conclude that when the system 2 is not
updated, the dependence on ϕˆ2 drops out,
φ (ρˆ1 ⊗ ϕˆ2, ϕˆ1 ⊗ ϕˆ2) = φ (ρˆ1, ϕˆ1)⊗ 1ˆ2, (2.55)
and, similarly,
φ (ϕˆ1 ⊗ ρˆ2, ϕˆ1 ⊗ ϕˆ2) = 1ˆ1 ⊗ φ (ρˆ2, ϕˆ2) . (2.56)
Case 2: Now consider a different special case in which the marginal posterior density
5By being “block diagonal in H2” we mean that:
Aˆ1 ⊗ 1ˆ2 =
 A111ˆ2 . . . A1N 1ˆ2... . . . ...
AN11ˆ2 . . . ANN 1ˆ2

1
=
 Aˆ1 . . . 0... Aˆ1 ...
0 . . . Aˆ1

2
. (2.51)
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matrices for systems 1 and 2 are both completely specified to be ρˆ1 and ρˆ2, respectively.
Maximize the joint entropy, S(ρˆ12, ϕˆ1⊗ ϕˆ2), subject to the following constraints on the ρˆ12 ,
Tr2(ρˆ12) = ρˆ1 and Tr1(ρˆ12) = ρˆ2. (2.57)
Here, each expectation value constrains the entire space Hi, where ρˆi lives. The Lagrange
multipliers must span their respective spaces, so we implement the constraint with the La-
grange multiplier operators µˆi, and,
0 = δ
(
S − Tr1(µˆ1[Tr2(ρˆ12)− ρˆ1])− Tr2(µˆ2[Tr1(ρˆ12)− ρˆ2])
)
. (2.58)
For arbitrary variations of ρˆ12, we have
µˆ1 ⊗ 1ˆ2 + 1ˆ1 ⊗ µˆ2 = φ (ρˆ12, ϕˆ1 ⊗ ϕˆ2) . (2.59)
By design, DC2 is implemented by requiring ϕˆ1 ⊗ ϕˆ2 → ρˆ1 ⊗ ρˆ2 in this case; therefore, we
have
µˆ1 ⊗ 1ˆ2 + 1ˆ1 ⊗ µˆ2 = φ (ρˆ1 ⊗ ρˆ2, ϕˆ1 ⊗ ϕˆ2) . (2.60)
Write (2.60) as
µˆ1 ⊗ 1ˆ2 = φ (ρˆ1 ⊗ ρˆ2, ϕˆ1 ⊗ ϕˆ2)− 1ˆ1 ⊗ µˆ2 . (2.61)
The LHS is independent of changes that might occur in H2 on the RHS of (2.61). This means
that any variation of ρˆ2 and ϕˆ2 must be canceled out by µˆ2 – it removes the dependence
of ρˆ2 and ϕˆ2 in φ. Therefore, any dependence that the RHS might potentially have had
on ρˆ2, ϕˆ2 must drop out in a general subsystem independent case, leaving µˆ1 unchanged.
Consequently,
φ (ρˆ1 ⊗ ρˆ2, ϕˆ1 ⊗ ϕˆ2)− 1ˆ1 ⊗ µˆ2 = g(ρˆ1, ϕˆ1)⊗ 1ˆ2. (2.62)
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Because g(ρˆ1, ϕˆ1) is independent of arbitrary variations of ρˆ2 and ϕˆ2 on the LHS above—it
is satisfied equally well for all choices. The form of g(ρˆ1, ϕˆ1) reduces to the form of f(ρˆ1, ϕˆ1)
from Case 1 when ρˆ2 = ϕˆ2 = 1ˆ2 and, similarly, DC1’ gives µˆ2 = 0. Therefore, the Lagrange
multiplier is
µˆ1 ⊗ 1ˆ2 = φ(ρˆ1, ϕˆ1)⊗ 1ˆ2. (2.63)
A similar analysis is carried out for µˆ2 leading to
1ˆ1 ⊗ µˆ2 = 1ˆ1 ⊗ φ(ρˆ2, ϕˆ2). (2.64)
Case 2—Conclusion: Substituting back into (2.60) gives us a functional equation for φ ,
φ(ρˆ1 ⊗ ρˆ2, ϕˆ1 ⊗ ϕˆ2) = φ(ρˆ1, ϕˆ1)⊗ 1ˆ2 + 1ˆ1 ⊗ φ(ρˆ2, ϕˆ2), (2.65)
which is
φ(ρˆ1 ⊗ ρˆ2, ϕˆ1 ⊗ ϕˆ2) = φ(ρˆ1 ⊗ 1ˆ2, ϕˆ1 ⊗ 1ˆ2) + φ(1ˆ1 ⊗ ρˆ2, 1ˆ1 ⊗ ϕˆ2). (2.66)
The general solution to this matrix valued functional equation is derived in Appendix A.5
and is
φ(ρˆ, ϕˆ) =
∼
A ln(ρˆ)+
∼
B ln(ϕˆ), (2.67)
where tilde
∼
A is a “super-operator” having constant coefficients and twice the number of
indicies as ρˆ and ϕˆ as discussed in the Appendix (i.e.,
( ∼
A ln(ρˆ)
)
ij
=
∑
kℓAijkℓ(log(ρˆ))kℓ and
similarly for
∼
B ln(ϕˆ)). DC1’ imposes
φ(ϕˆ, ϕˆ) =
∼
A ln(ϕˆ)+
∼
B ln(ϕˆ) = 0ˆ, (2.68)
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which is satisfied in general when
∼
A= −
∼
B, and, now,
φ(ρˆ, ϕˆ) =
∼
A
(
ln(ρˆ)− ln(ϕˆ)
)
. (2.69)
Recall that the RHS of (2.65) is equal to the RHS of (2.66), which is stated here:
φ(ρˆ1, ϕˆ1)⊗ 1ˆ2 + 1ˆ1 ⊗ φ(ρˆ2, ϕˆ2) = φ(ρˆ1 ⊗ 1ˆ2, ϕˆ1 ⊗ 1ˆ2) + φ(1ˆ1 ⊗ ρˆ2, 1ˆ1 ⊗ ϕˆ2). (2.70)
We may fix the constant
∼
A by substituting (2.69) into both sides of the above equation. This
gives,
( ∼
A1
(
ln(ρˆ1)− ln(ϕˆ1)
))
⊗ 1ˆ2 + 1ˆ1 ⊗
( ∼
A2
(
ln(ρˆ2)− ln(ϕˆ2)
))
=
∼
A12
(
ln(ρˆ1 ⊗ 1ˆ2)− ln(ϕˆ1 ⊗ 1ˆ2)
)
+
∼
A12
(
ln(1ˆ1 ⊗ ρˆ2)− ln(1ˆ1 ⊗ ϕˆ2)
)
, (2.71)
where
∼
A12 acts on the joint space of 1 and 2 and
∼
A1,
∼
A2 acts on single subspaces 1, 2,
respectively. Using the log tensor product identity, ln(ρˆ1 ⊗ 1ˆ2) = ln(ρˆ1)⊗ 1ˆ2, which can be
seen by series expansion, the RHS of (2.71) becomes
=
∼
A12
(
ln(ρˆ1)⊗ 1ˆ2 − ln(ϕˆ1)⊗ 1ˆ2
)
+
∼
A12
(
1ˆ1 ⊗ ln(ρˆ2)− 1ˆ1 ⊗ ln(ϕˆ2)
)
. (2.72)
Note that arbitrarily letting ρˆ2 = ϕˆ2 in (2.71), (2.72) gives
( ∼
A1
(
ln(ρˆ1)− ln(ϕˆ1)
))
⊗ 1ˆ2 =
∼
A12
(
ln(ρˆ1)⊗ 1ˆ2 − ln(ϕˆ1)⊗ 1ˆ2
)
, (2.73)
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or arbitrarily letting ρˆ1 = ϕˆ1 gives
1ˆ1 ⊗
( ∼
A2
(
ln(ρˆ2)− ln(ϕˆ2)
))
=
∼
A12
(
1ˆ1 ⊗ ln(ρˆ2)− 1ˆ1 ⊗ ln(ϕˆ2)
)
. (2.74)
As
∼
A12,
∼
A1, and
∼
A2 are constant tensors, inspecting the above equalities determines the form
of the tensor to be
∼
A=A
∼
1 where A is a scalar constant and
∼
1 is the super-operator identity
over the appropriate (joint) Hilbert space.
Because our goal is to maximize the entropy function, we let the arbitrary constant
A = −|A| and distribute ∼1 identically, which gives the final functional form,
φ(ρˆ, ϕˆ) = −|A|
(
ln(ρˆ)− ln(ϕˆ)
)
. (2.75)
“Integrating” φ gives a general form for the quantum relative entropy,
S(ρˆ, ϕˆ) = −|A|Tr(ρˆ log ρˆ− ρˆ log ϕˆ− ρˆ) + C[ϕˆ] = −|A|SU(ρˆ, ϕˆ) + |A|Tr(ρˆ) + C[ϕˆ], (2.76)
where SU(ρˆ, ϕˆ) is Umegaki’s form of the relative entropy [67–69], the extra |A|Tr(ρˆ) from
integration is an artifact present for the preservation of DC1’, and C[ϕˆ] is a constant in
the sense that it drops out under arbitrary variations of ρˆ. This entropy leads to the same
inferences as Umegaki’s form of the entropy with an added bonus that ρˆ = ϕˆ in the absence
of constraints or changes in information—rather than ρˆ = e−1ϕˆ, which would be given
by maximizing Umegaki’s form of the entropy. In this sense, the extra |A|Tr(ρˆ) better
adheres the quantum relative entropy to the PMU (DC1’), in cases when normalization is
not applied. In the spirit of this derivation, we will keep the Tr(ρˆ) term there, but, for all
practical purposes of inference, as long as there is a normalization constraint, it plays no
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role, and we find (letting |A| = 1 and C[ϕˆ] = 0),
S(ρˆ, ϕˆ)→ S∗(ρˆ, ϕˆ) = −SU(ρˆ, ϕˆ) = −Tr(ρˆ log ρˆ− ρˆ log ϕˆ), (2.77)
which is Umegaki’s form of the quantum relative entropy. S∗(ρˆ, ϕˆ) is an equally valid entropy
because, given normalization is applied, the same selected posterior ρˆ maximizes both S(ρˆ, ϕˆ)
and S∗(ρˆ, ϕˆ). The tool for inferentially updating density matrices was designed from the
first principles of inference, as was suggested to be possible in private communications with
Caticha [45].
2.2.2 Remarks
Due to the universality and the equal application of the PMU (the same design criteria for
both the standard and quantum case), the quantum relative entropy reduces to the standard
relative entropy when [ρˆ, ϕˆ] = 0 or when the experiment being performed ρˆ → ρ(a) =
Tr(ρˆ|a〉〈a|) is known. Because the two entropies are derived in parallel, we expect the well-
known inferential results and consequences of the relative entropy to have a quantum relative
entropy analog, and this is indeed what we see in the next chapter.
Maximizing the quantum relative entropy with respect to some constraints 〈Aˆi〉, where
{Aˆi} are a set of arbitrary Hermitian operators, and normalization 〈1ˆ〉 = 1, gives the follow-
ing general solution for the posterior density matrix:
ρˆ = exp
(
α01ˆ +
∑
i
αiAˆi + ln(ϕˆ)
)
=
1
Z
exp
(∑
i
αiAˆi + ln(ϕˆ)
)
≡ 1
Z
exp
(
Cˆ
)
, (2.78)
where αi are the Lagrange multipliers of the respective constraints and normalization
1
Z
≡ eα0
may be factored out of the exponential in general because the identity matrix commutes
universally. If ϕˆ ∝ 1ˆ, it is well known that the analysis arrives at the same expression for
ρˆ after normalization, as it would if the von Neumann entropy were used, and thus one
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can find expressions for thermalized quantum states ρˆ = 1
Z
e−βHˆ (β = 1
kT
is the inverse
temperature and Hˆ is the Hamiltonian operator). The remaining problem is to solve for the
N Lagrange multipliers using their N associated expectation value constraints. In principle,
their solution is found by computing Z =
∑
i e
λi, which is a sum over the eigenvalues of Cˆ,
and then using standard methods,
〈Aˆi〉 = − ∂
∂αi
ln(Z), (2.79)
and inverting to find αi = αi(〈Aˆi〉), which has a unique solution due to the joint concavity
(convexity depending on the sign convention) of the quantum relative entropy [52, 53] when
the constraints are linear in ρˆ. The simple proof that (2.79) is monotonic in α, and therefore
that it is invertible, is that its derivative ∂
∂α
〈Aˆi〉 = 〈Aˆ2i 〉−〈Aˆi〉2 ≥ 0. Between the Zassenhaus
formula [70],
et(Aˆ+Bˆ) = etAˆetBˆe−
t2
2
[Aˆ,Bˆ]e
t3
6
(2[Bˆ,[Aˆ,Bˆ]]+[Aˆ,[Aˆ,Bˆ]])..., (2.80)
and Horn’s inequality [71–73], the solutions to (2.79) lack a certain calculational elegance
because it is difficult to express the eigenvalues of Cˆ = log(ϕˆ)+
∑
αiAˆi (in the exponential)
in simple terms of the eigenvalues of the Aˆi’s and ϕˆ, in general, when the matrices do not
commute. A pedagogical exercise is, starting with a prior that is a mixture of spin-z up
and down ϕˆ = a|+〉〈+| + b|−〉〈−| (a, b 6= 0), to maximize the quantum relative entropy
with respect to an expectation of a general Hermitian operator with which the prior density
matrix does not commute. This 2 by 2 spin example is given in the Appendix C.
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Chapter 3
Inferential Applications of the
Quantum Relative Entropy
This chapter follows [2], which develops applications of the quantum relative entropy (QRE)
to describe quantum measurement within the standard formalism of Quantum Mechanics
(QM). The main advantage of our technique is the conceptual clarity it achieves by refor-
mulating quantum measurement from the point of view of inference.
In QM the wavefunction has two modes of evolution [40, 42]: one is the continuous
unitary evolution given by the dynamical Schro¨dinger equation, while the other is the discrete
collapse of the wavefunction that occurs when a detection is made. The collapse postulate is
generally implemented ad hoc to empirically represent the affect of detection on a quantum
system.
In a von Neumann measurement scheme, the goal is to make measurements on a pure
state of interest |Ψ〉θ =
∑
θ cθ|θ〉 (in the Hilbert space Hθ). This is accomplished by first
entangling |Ψ〉θ with a pointer variable state |0〉x (in the Hilbert space Hx) via a unitary
time evolution, and then by making detections of x, to “measure” θ. The entangled states
in a von Neumann measurement scheme take the form of a biorthogonal state or Schmidt
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decomposition, |Ψ〉θ|0〉x → |Ψ,Φ〉θ,x =
∑
θ cθ|θ, xθ〉, such that the probability of θ and xθ′ is
ϕ(θ, xθ′) = |cθ|2δθ,θ′. A detection of xθ “collapses the wavefunction”, which is implemented
via the ad hoc change of state |Ψ,Φ〉θ,x → |θ, xθ〉. Thus, by preparing the system of interest
as an entangled state |Ψ〉θ → |Ψ,Φ〉θ,x, one can “measure” the θ’s by making detections of
x’s.
A positive operator-valued measure (POVM) measurement [74–77] can be thought of as
a generalization of a von Neumann measurement for the purpose of measuring pure or mixed
states. The density matrix of interest ϕˆθ, which may be a pure or mixed state, is entangled
with a pointer variable x, which is detected for the purpose of “measuring” the state in Hθ.
If the pointer variable was detected at x, the resulting density matrix,
ρˆθ =
AxϕˆθA
†
x
Tr(AxϕˆθA
†
x)
, (3.1)
quantifies the collapse of ϕˆθ under a POVM measurement. A POVM is a set of positive
operators {Ex} ∈ Hθ that are labeled by the pointer variable values {x}. POVMs sum
to identity
∑
xEx = 1ˆθ and are commonly decomposed Ex = A
†
xAx into the operators Ax
(and its adjoint A†x), which are called the “measurement” or “Kraus” operators, and such
decompositions are not unique in general.1 In the POVM measurement above, because the
x’s are entangled with ϕˆθ, a detection of x, leads to the relevant measurement operators, Ex =
A†xAx, to be applied to ϕˆθ, resulting in (3.1) after normalization. The POVM measurement
scheme (3.1) is also known as the Quantum Bayes Rule2 [37–39], or as the fundamental
theorem of quantum measurement [79]. For the remainder of the thesis, we will refer to (3.1)
as the Quantum Bayes Rule (QBR).
1An example POVM for a two state system is E1 =
3
4
|+〉〈+|+ 1
4
|−〉〈−| and E2 = 14 |+〉〈+|+ 34 |−〉〈−|.
2Note that the Quantum Bayes Rule developed here solves a different problem than was explored in [78].
Here a single density matrix is being inferentially updated rather than the probability corresponding to the
form of N copies of an unknown density matrix, i.e. quantum state tomography. This type of quantum
tomography may be replicated using the standard maximum relative entropy method as it is a special case
of (the standard) Bayes Rule.
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The QBR is a generalization of Lu¨ders Rule [40] in which Aˆx’s are projectors. Here we
will derive the QBR from entropic arguments, which we claim eliminates the need for ad hoc
collapse postulates in QM. Our result supports the interpretation that entropy may be used
to inferentially collapse density matrices using projectors (Lu¨ders Rule), as was derived in
[11, 12]; however, our result is generalized to the QBR and beyond. Rather than appealing
to group theoretic arguments [11, 12], our derivations are seemingly simpler as they only
require solving Lagrange multiplier problems. Because the quantum relative entropy was
derived as the tool for density matrix inference in [1], our result discusses collapse from a
purely inferential perspective, and thus the quantum measurement proceedure gains more
clarity. The present derivation of the Quantum Bayes Rule using the quantum maximum
entropy method parallels the standard (probability) maximum entropy derivation of Bayes
Rule in [7], and so, their derivation will be reviewed for pedagogy.
As both forms of the standard and quantum relative entropy resemble one another and
were derived in parallel [1], they inevitably share analogous solutions and face similar limi-
tations; however, because we are dealing with density matrices, these limitations have con-
sequences in quantum mechanical experiments. In standard probability theory, there is a
phrase, “The maximum entropy method cannot fix flawed information” [21], and a similar
theme permeates the inference procedure for density matrices. Because the entropy was
designed to update from a prior density matrix ϕˆ to a posterior density matrix ρˆ, the form
of ϕˆ must accurately describe the prior state of knowledge of the system if ρˆ is going to
objectively represent the updated state of knowledge for that quantum system. For in-
stance, if our prior knowledge tells us that a particle is located within a certain interval,
it makes no sense to impose that the particle has an average position anywhere but within
that interval. We derive this type of logical compatibility in the quantum maximum entropy
method, which we name the Prior Density Matrix Theorem (PDMT). The PDMT states
that a prior density matrix can only be updated in the Hilbert space it originally spans. The
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PDMT is purely mathematical and follows from logic analogous to that of Bayes Theorem
– if a prior state assigns zero probability to some state, ϕ(θ0) = 0, Bayes Theorem gives
ϕ(θ0)
∗→ ϕ(θ0|x) = ϕ(x|θ0)ϕ(x) ϕ(θ0) = 0. The PDMT is a purely inferential consequence of en-
tropic updating, yet it sheds light on some of the nontrivial notions of quantum measurement
and QM in general.
A special case of the PDMT implies that if the prior state is a pure state |Ψ〉 =∑θ cθ|θ〉,
then the only inferential update one can make is normalization using the quantum maximum
entropy method. Thus, to be able to reproduce standard quantum mechanical projection
measurements, one must first ad hocly allow the pure state to decohere (or partially decohere)
within the measurement device such that it can be updated nontrivially. This is a reformula-
tion of Lu¨ders notion [40] that the function of a measurement device must be to project the
pure state into a mixed state ρˆ → ∑ PˆiρˆPˆi (where Pˆi are rank-1 orthonormal projectors),
except our argument is formulated purely in terms of entropy and inference. This concept
is not as foreign or as objectionable as it may seem if we consider the well known results of
the quantum two slit experiment. If a “which slit” detection of the particle is made, then
the resulting probability distribution is a decohered sum of distributions on the screen (after
many trials), whereas omitting this detection allows for interference effects. Decoherence of
the pure state was required for a which slit inference. Once the particle hits the screen, to
detect its state, it decoheres (potentially again) on the detection screen. This imprints a
mixed state realization of the incoming pure or decohered state on the screen ρˆ→∑ PˆxρˆPˆx,
which may be detected and collapse the state.3 When making measurements in QM, it is
important to include both the system of interest and the auxiliary pointer variable (and/or
the measurement device), such that the appropriate prior density matrix is generated. In
this sense, “collapse of the wavefunction” is better stated as the “collapse of the mixed state
after decoherence” – which then, as we will see, is nothing more than standard probability
3Note that both ρˆ and
∑
PˆxρˆPˆx have the same positional probability distribution p(x), but in general
they evolve differently in time.
49
updating. In conclusion, it is illogical for a prior pure state to directly collapse into a differ-
ent pure state because, in some sense, we are already maximally informed about the prior
(pure) state of the system, which may be viewed as a (priorly) collapsed state itself.
In preparation for the derivation of the Quantum Bayes Rule using the quantum max-
imum entropy method, the derivation of Bayes Rule using the standard maximum entropy
method is reviewed below [7]. We will introduce the PDMT and apply the quantum maxi-
mum entropy method to derive the aforementioned cases of interest.
Maximum Entropy and Bayes When the information provided is in the form of data,
entropic updating is consistent with Bayes Rule,
ρ(θ)
1
= ϕ(θ|x) 2= ϕ(x|θ)ϕ(θ)
ϕ(x)
, (3.2)
where Bayes Rule is the first equal sign and Bayes Theorem is the second equal sign [21].
This leads to the realization that Bayesian and entropic inference methods are consistent
with one another [7].
The posterior distribution ρ(θ) can only be realized once the data about x’s has been
processed. This implies the state space of interest is the product space of X ×Θ with a joint
prior ϕ(x, θ). Suppose we collect data and observe the value x′. The data constrains the
joint posterior distribution ρ(x, θ) to reflect the fact that the value of x is known to be x′,
that is,
ρ(x) =
∫
dθρ(x, θ) = δ(x− x′), (3.3)
however; this data constraint is not enough to specify the full joint posterior distribution,
ρ(x, θ) = ρ(θ|x)ρ(x) = ρ(θ|x)δ(x− x′), (3.4)
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because ρ(θ|x) is not determined. The above equation is known as Bayesian conditionaliza-
tion.
As there are many distributions that satisfy this data constraint, we rank candidate
distributions using the maximum entropy method. Note that the data constraint (3.3) in
principle constrains each x in ρ(x, θ). This means a Lagrange multiplier α(x) is required to
tie down each x ∈ X of the marginal distribution ρ(x). Maximizing the entropy with respect
to these constraints and normalization is,
0 = δ
(
S − λ[
∫
ρ(x, θ) dxdθ − 1]− (
∫
α(x)[
∫
ρ(x, θ) dθ − δ(x− x′)] dx)
)
(3.5)
where S = S[ρ(x, θ), ϕ(x, θ)] is the standard relative entropy and λ is the Lagrange multiplier
that imposes normalization. This leads to the following joint posterior distribution,
ρ(x, θ) = ϕ(x, θ)
eα(x)
Z
. (3.6)
The Lagrange multiplier Z is found by imposing normalization,
1 =
∫
ρ(x, θ) dxdθ =
1
Z
∫
ϕ(x, θ)eα(x) dxdθ
→ Z =
∫
ϕ(x, θ)eα(x) dxdθ. (3.7)
The Lagrange multiplier α(x) is found by considering the data constraint (3.3),
δ(x− x′) =
∫
ρ(x, θ)dθ =
eα(x)
Z
∫
ϕ(x, θ)dθ =
eα(x)
Z
ϕ(x). (3.8)
Substituting in the Lagrange multiplier gives the joint posterior distribution,
ρ(x, θ) =
ϕ(x, θ)
ϕ(x)
δ(x− x′) = ϕ(θ|x)δ(x− x′). (3.9)
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Integrating over x gives the marginalized posterior distribution,
ρ(θ) = ϕ(θ|x′) = ϕ(x
′|θ)ϕ(θ)
ϕ(x′)
, (3.10)
which is Bayes Rule. Jeffreys Rule is the generalization of Bayes Rule when the data is
uncertain and it is also consistent with the entropic inference.4 Further review can be found
in [21]. The universality of this entropic inference method is emphasized by its consistency
with other forms of inference like Bayesian inference [7–9].
A comment on biased priors Entropic inference of this nature is only as useful as
we are objective about our subjectivity. One should be careful not to apply nonsensical
constraints, for instance, attempting to impose impossible expectation values (like that the
average roll of a six sided die be seven). In such a case, the maximum entropy method
provides “no solution” to the optimization problem due to its irrationality [23]. Consider a set
of microstates x ∈ D0 ⊂ D, given a situation s, that have a prior probability ϕ(x ∈ D0|s) = 0,
representing impossibility. In this subdomain D0 and situation s, the values of x are believed
to be impossible, and furthermore, one can see that it is impossible to update this prior to
anything but ρ(x ∈ D0|s) = 0 using the maximum entropy method for any amount of new
information (as can be seen in (2.36)). In the same way, a delta function prior distribution
ϕ(x|s) ∼ δ(x − x0), which claims complete certainty at x0, cannot be updated. We shall
call priors that have domains of unupdatablity ϕ(x ∈ D0|s) ∗→ ρ(x ∈ D0|s) = ϕ(x ∈ D0|s)
“biased”, whether or not the prior was attained by objective evidence or personal bias5 as the
philosophical divide between the two is, in all but the most extreme cases, a bit subjective.6
A biased state of knowledge pertaining to a situation s does not imply bias for a new
situation s′, so a realization that a nonbiased probability should be assigned to the region
4That is, set ρD(x) =
∫
dθρ(x, θ) in place of (3.3).
5“ I’m not biased if I’m right!” - N. Carrara
6For instance, can an objective experimentalist be completely certain that their measurement device
hasn’t misfired?
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D0 admits the system is now in a new situation s
′. An example of this from Statistical
Mechanics (and also QM) occurs if the distance between the walls of an infinite potential
box is enlarged such that previous zero probability regions now gain possibility. In this
sense, and others, that entropic updates are purely epistemic. If the physical situation has
changed, the situation s→ s′ should be updated as well.7
3.1 Quantum Entropic Inference
Before deriving the QBR, we must first discuss the ramifications of “biased” prior density
matrices.
3.1.1 Prior density matrices
If the prior density matrix ϕˆ = |ϕ〉〈ϕ| is a pure state, then we consider it to be a completely
“biased” density matrix because no amount of information can update it, i.e., ϕˆ
∗→ ρˆ = ϕˆ,
without changing the situation, using entropic methods. An example using a pure spin state
prior is discussed below to introduce the predicament, although the analysis holds for all
prior density matrices that are 1-dimensional projectors.
Consider the biased prior density matrix ϕˆ = |+〉〈+| – the positive spin-z eigenstate. To
perform the calculation with any rigor using this biased prior, we must unbias it slightly
by allowing it to span more than 1-dimension, where we introduce ϕˆ = limǫ→0
(
|+〉〈+| +
ǫ|−〉〈−|
)
≡ limǫ→0 ϕˆǫ. We will use this ǫ-prior ϕˆǫ for the prior, and then take the limit ǫ→ 0
when appropriate. In attempting to force the issue, consider maximizing the relative entropy
subject to an expectation value constraint of a general 2 by 2 Hermitian matrix 〈cµσµ〉, the
expectation value of a weighted sum of Pauli matrices and identity, such that ρˆ would require
a nonzero component along spin down |−〉〈−| to meet the expectation value constraint, in
7In the next chapter we see this kind of “situational” entropic updating in Entropic Dynamics. Differences
in situations s′ − s in Entropic Dynamics are labeled by differences in time t′ − t.
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contrast to ϕˆ. Maximizing the entropy subject to this constraint, normalization, and using
the ǫ-prior gives an ǫ-posterior,
ρˆǫ =
1
Z
exp
(
αcµσ
µ + ln(ϕˆǫ)
)
≡ 1
Z
exp(Cˆǫ). (3.11)
The Lagrange multiplier that imposes normalization may be found by diagonalizing the
exponent Cˆǫ → Λˆǫ,
Z = Tr(exp(Cˆǫ)) = Tr(Uˆǫ exp
(
Uˆ †ǫ CˆǫUˆǫ
)
Uˆ †ǫ ) = Tr(e
Λˆǫ) =
∑
λǫ
eλǫ , (3.12)
which suggests a convenient representation of the posterior density matrix using Uˆǫ,
ρˆǫ =
1
Z
Uˆǫ exp(Λˆǫ)Uˆ
†
ǫ . (3.13)
In the limit ǫ → 0, the respective eigenvalues of Cˆǫ, λ±, approach a constant and −∞
while their respective eigenvectors straighten out |λ±〉ǫ → |±〉, and Uˆǫ → 1ˆ. Therefore the
posterior density matrix ρˆ = limǫ→0 ρˆǫ = ϕˆ is equal to the biased prior density matrix and has
not been updated. Because the pure state fails to update, it is biased, analogous to a delta
function probability distribution in the standard maximum entropy case. One might expect
an infinitely large Lagrange multiplier α to be able to overcome the negative infinities one
obtains when taking ǫ→ 0. However, because 〈cµσµ〉 = f(α) is monotonic in α, an infinitely
large Lagrange multiplier would imply the system is being constrained to a maximally large
expectation value (which represents a very small subset of expectations) and usually implies
that the posterior is actually known with certainty (in which case there is no need to use the
maximum entropy method). The mixed spin state example in Appendix C, is not biased,
and therefore it avoided issues surrounding biased prior density matrices. Below we will
discuss the general case and its implications.
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Consider an Mth order biased prior represented in its eigenbasis ϕˆ =
∑M
n=1 ϕn|ϕn〉〈ϕn|+∑N
n=M+1 0n|ϕn〉〈ϕn| in an N dimensional Hilbert space (M = 1 is a purestate). Given
an N × N dimensional constraint Aˆ (however the analysis holds for Aˆ of any rank), the
prescription is to add some ǫ’s to ϕˆ such that ϕˆ→ ϕˆǫ spans N , and,
log(ϕˆǫ) =

log(ϕ1) . . . 0 0 . . . 0
...
. . . 0 0 . . . 0
0 0 log(ϕM) 0 . . . 0
0 0 0 log(ǫ) 0
...
...
...
. . . 0
0 0 0 0 0 log(ǫ)

, (3.14)
has N − M diagonal log(ǫ) terms. Because density matrices are Hermitian, and have a
sum representation, ρˆ =
∑
ij ρij|i〉〈j|, they may always be rearranged and relabeled into the
form above without loss of generality. Thus, log(ϕˆǫ) may always be written as a direct sum
log(ϕˆǫ) = log(ϕˆM) ⊕ log(ǫ)1ˆN−M , where log(ϕˆM) is the first M ×M block of log(ϕˆǫ) and
log(ǫ)1ˆN−M is the remaining block proportional to log(ǫ). Expressing the N ×N constraint
matrices Aˆ =
∑
i αiAˆi in the eigenbasis of ϕˆǫ, and summing it, is,
Cˆǫ = Aˆ + log(ϕˆǫ), (3.15)
which is a general representation of the matrix that resides in the exponential of a posterior
density matrix, ρˆǫ =
1
Z
exp(Cˆǫ), having an ǫ-prior density matrix ϕˆǫ. Similarly partitioning
Cˆǫ by letting CˆM be its first M ×M block, the characteristic polynomial equation of Cˆǫ may
be written in the following form,
0 = det |Cˆǫ − λ1ˆ| = det |CˆM − λ1ˆM |(log(ǫ)− λ)N−M + c1(log(ǫ)− λ)N−M−1
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+ c2(log(ǫ)− λ)N−M−2 + ... + cN−M , (3.16)
where the cn’s are the remaining ǫ independent coefficients. For any finite λ, we may divide
the characteristic equation by the leading (log(ǫ) − λ)N−M ≈ log(ǫ)N−M term, which in
the limit of ǫ → 0, reduces the characteristic equation to the M ×M block characteristic
equation,
0 = det |Cˆǫ − λ1ˆ| → det |CˆM − λ1ˆM |, (3.17)
for all finite λ. The eigenvectors associated to these M-finite eigenvalues span the M ×M
vector space. As this is true for all finite eigenvalues, the remaining N −M eigenvalues are
not finite and indeed are all equal to negative infinity, due to the log(ǫ)’s as ǫ → 0. The
remaining eigenvectors with the associated infinite eigenvalues therefore span the remaining
(N−M)×(N−M) vector space, but are not unique because they have degenerate eigenvalues.
The eigenvectors for the finite and infinite eigenvalues span disjoint subspaces and therefore
so do the unitary matrices which diagonalize them Uˆ = UˆM⊕UˆN−M as the unitary operators
consist of columns of their associated eigenvectors. This disjointness is independence in the
sense that the unitary operator Uˆ is block diagonal, and therefore Cǫ = CM ⊕ CN−M =
UˆMΛM Uˆ
†
M ⊕ UˆN−MΛN−M Uˆ †N−M . The posterior density matrix is therefore,
ρˆ =
1
Z
eCˆM ⊕ 0ˆN−M = 1
Z
eAˆM+log(ϕˆM ), (3.18)
completely independent of the Aˆ − AˆM pieces of the constraints in Aˆ, and ϕˆM = ϕˆ is the
original Mth order biased prior. The lack of an ability to update biased priors in the N −M
region is not a failure of the method of maximum entropy, but rather a failure to choose
appropriate constraints given an Mth order biased prior density matrix.
In general, any prior density matrix that does not span the entire Hilbert space is anMth
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order biased prior density matrix. This insists the following, which we state as a theorem:
Prior Density Matrix Theorem (PDMT): An Mth order biased prior density matrix
ϕˆ can only be inferentially updated in the eigenspace that it spans.
The immediate consequence of the PDMT is that entropic updating can only cause
epistemic and inferential changes to ρˆ. The inability to update a pure state nontrivially8,
like in the pure state spin |+〉〈+| example, shows just this. The only way to change the state
of a 1-dimensional projector (pure state) prior density matrix is to physically rotate the state
by applying dynamical unitary operators U(t′, t) via the Schro¨dinger equation because no
inferential entropic update is possible.9 However, if ϕˆ is a pure state and one knows that
it will evolve unitarily to ρˆ = UϕˆU †, then one may evolve it. In this instance the quantum
maximum entropy method is not needed because the posterior state is known; however, the
quantum maximum entropy method has not failed because the PDMT indeed gives ϕˆ as its
solution.
Once the Quantum Bayes Rule is derived using entropy, we will see that the Schro¨dinger
equation and the quantum maximum entropy method complement one another in QM –
the first being responsible for continuous dynamical “physical” changes to the system and
the second being discontinuous inferential updates within the space originally spanned by ϕˆ,
all being part of the measurement process. This is not to say that the quantum maximum
entropy method cannot in general mimic the results of unitary state evolution, it could very
well be the special case that a unitary operator acting on an M > 1 ϕˆ evolves ϕˆ only within
M (rather than rotating the eigenvectors off their hyperplane), and thus the PDMT does
not prevent this update.
If one is serious about the assignment of a biased prior density matrix then the following
8The trivial update being pure state normalization.
9Entropic Dynamics, however, is an application of the standard maximum entropy method and informa-
tion geometry that does yield Schro¨dinger evolution.
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realization is needed, “Because pure states are completely biased, the quantum maximum
entropy method cannot update to a new posterior at that time”. If however the pure state
is changed “physically” by the addition of new microstates via interaction, allowing it to
decohere [41, 80] (and the references therein), or change by some other process, then at a
later time one could employ a method similar to [81, 82], that is, apply ϕˆ−1/2ϕˆ
′1/2(t) and its
transpose on either side of ϕˆ ≡ ϕˆ(0),
ϕˆ′(t) =
(
ϕˆ
′1/2(t)ϕˆ−1/2
)
ϕˆ
(
ϕˆ−1/2ϕˆ
′1/2(t)
)
, (3.19)
to represent a new prior density matrix that, decohered, evolved unitarily, or is part of a
new experimental configuration. Now, if the prior is an M > 1 mixed state, it is possible
to inferentially update it non-trivially. If the quantum relative entropy is going to be used
for making inferences that pertain to pure state quantum measurement, the function of a
measurement device must be to project the system into a basis ρˆ→∑i PˆiρˆPˆi, which evades
the potential trivial results of the PDMT. The proper prior for quantum measurement thus
depends on both the system of interest and the measurement device. This is a reformulation
of Lu¨ders’ notion, except here, it has been motivated and expressed in the language of
entropic updating.
There are a few things to take away from this section. The quantum maximum entropy
method only updates a density matrix inferentially, as can be seen by its lack of ability
to rotate biased priors into non-biased states or other biased priors states. This is exactly
what we expect as the unupdatability of biased priors exists in standard probability theory.
The solution to the biased prior problem (in the standard and quantum maximum entropy
method) is, if appropriate: to change the constraint(s), the prior, both, or neither and accept
the consequences of its solution. This reasoning guides us in choosing appropriate priors in
subsequent derivations throughout this chapter.
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3.2 The Quantum Bayes Rule
Notationally, we will let density matrices living in a Hilbert space Hx ⊗ Hθ to be denoted
ρˆx,θ. Density matrices may of course be expressed in any basis within these Hilbert spaces.
Below, x’s are the arbitrary variables (positions, momenta, ect.) that will be detected and
θ’s are the arbitrary variables that will be inferred. We find it convenient to denote the
diagonal (x′, x′) block matrix of ρˆx,θ with an equal sign such that 〈x′|ρˆx,θ|x′〉 ≡ ρˆx=x′,θ and
similarly 〈θ′|ρˆx,θ|θ′〉 ≡ ρˆx,θ=θ′, and on occasion probabilities ρ(θ′) = 〈θ′|ρˆθ|θ′〉 ≡ ρˆθ=θ′. Also,
a tilde above a density matrix will represent a mixed representation of the density matrix in
question ϕˆθ →
∼
ϕθ=
∑
α PˆαϕˆθPˆα, with Pˆθ = |α〉〈α|. Here we will review the standard POVM
measurement scheme that leads to the QBR.
Introduction – Quantum Bayes Rule: Following [79], consider a prior density matrix
ϕˆθ which is entangled with a pointer variable such that ϕˆθ → ϕˆx,θ. The system and the
pointer variable are entangled in the following way: given an initial state of the pointer
variable |0〉x〈0|, the joint system is entangled with a unitary operator U ,
ϕˆx,θ = U(|0〉x〈0| ⊗ ϕˆθ)U † (3.20)
where,
U =
∑
θ,θ′,x,x′
uθ,θ′,x,x′|x′〉|θ′〉〈x|〈θ| =
∑
x,x′
|x′〉x〈x| ⊗ Ax′x, (3.21)
and where,
Ax′x =
∑
θ,θ′
uθ,θ′,x,x′|θ〉〈θ′|, (3.22)
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is the x′, x sub-block matrix [79]. The prior density matrix of the joint system is therefore,
ϕˆx,θ =
∑
x,x′
|x〉x〈x′| ⊗ (AxϕˆθA†x′), (3.23)
where Ax0 ≡ Ax are the measurement operators of the POVM Eˆx = AˆxAˆ†x. Due to Naimark’s
theorem [83, 84], making a projective measurement of the pointer variable x can be used to
perform a POVM measurement on ϕˆθ. Projecting the pointer variable requires the following
action on ϕˆx,θ,
ϕˆx,θ → (|x′〉〈x′| ⊗ 1ˆθ)ϕˆx,θ(|x′〉〈x′| ⊗ 1ˆθ) = |x′〉〈x′| ⊗ (Ax′ϕˆθA†x′), (3.24)
which collapses the state in x to x′ and implies the new state of the system is,
ρˆθ =
Ax′ϕˆθA
†
x′
Tr(Ax′ϕˆθA
†
x′)
, (3.25)
after normalization. Again this is known as the Quantum Bayes Rule (QBR) [37–39], the
fundamental theorem of quantum measurement [79], or the POVM measurement formalism
[74–77].
In the remainder of this section we will derive inference rules using the quantum maximum
entropy method in order of increasing generality. In each case, the relevant prior density
matrix will be generated using standard methods of decoherence in QM. First, we will
consider the simplest case – it is the inference of a single system collapsing into one of
its eigenstates. We will then reconsider this simple case in the presence of measurement
uncertainty – we call this case a “simple partial (or uncertain) collapse”. The next level
of generality is to consider inferences on systems that are jointly coupled or entangled, i.e.,
a system of interest entangled with a pointer variable. In such a case, one must obtain
the appropriate joint prior density matrix for inference from QM. Inferences that lead the
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pointer variable to collapse to a definite state yield a derivation of the QBR from the quantum
maximum entropy method. As before, if there is measurement uncertainty in the pointer
variable, one has a partial (or uncertain) collapse of the pointer variable state. This yields
a posterior state that we call the Quantum Jeffreys Rule (QJR).
In the joint entangled system setting, we may wish to make detections of both the system
of interest and the pointer variable. We find that the order of detection does not affect the
final joint probability ρ(x, θ), which is consistent with the results of the delayed choice
experiment – a similar argument that argues from the point of view of epistemic probability
theory is given in [85]. Finally this section is concluded with a simple example of quantum
control in the quantum maximum entropy method setting. It is an instance of the QJR, and
it is shown, for a joint entangled system, that capturing the pointer particle inside a thermal
box with temperature β, or β ′, leads to changes in the statistics of the system of interest –
thus a bit of control may be exerted by the experimentalist by choosing the temperature of
the thermal box. Further generalizations are discussed in the following section.
Simple Collapse: This entropic update is a special case of (3.25) when the Ax’s are all
projectors rather than a more general POVM, i.e. we are going to reproduce Lu¨der’s Rule.
We must first argue for the appropriate form of a prior density matrix that is undergoing
measurement.
As we are simply doing a projective measurement on ϕˆx, “another” pointer variable is
not needed to generate the POVM. We follow the intuition that if we are going to make
inferences on the basis of detection, the prior density matrix should appropriately reflect the
fact that it has interacted with a measurement device. A projective measurement on the
x’s in experiment requires entangling ϕˆx to detector states {|d〉} and letting them decohere
within the detector. This avoids the potentially trivial results of the PDMT. For concreteness
we may imagine that ϕˆx = |Φ〉x〈Φ| is the pure state density matrix of a particle that went
though a two slit apparatus (no “which slit” measurement has been made) and is impinging
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onto a screen, CCD array, or a similar device designed to detect x. Let the pure state be
|Φ〉 =∑x√ϕ(x)eiφ(x)|x〉. The pure state evolves with the detector states,
|d0〉〈d0| ⊗ ϕˆx → ϕˆd,x = Uˆ |d0〉〈d0| ⊗ ϕˆxUˆ † = |D,Φ〉d,x〈D,Φ|. (3.26)
The unitary operators which couple the states are,
Uˆ =
∑
dy,dy′ ,x,x
′
udydyxx′|dy〉|x〉〈dy′|〈x′| =
∑
dy,dy′
|dy〉〈dy′| ⊗ Bdydy′ , (3.27)
with the sub-block matrices,
Bdydy′ =
∑
x,x′
udydy′xx′|x〉〈x′|. (3.28)
We define a good detector as one in which the |x〉th pointer variable state only entangles
with the local state of the detector |dx〉, which is an argument for the sub-block matrix to
take a simple form,
Bdy0 =
∑
x,x′
δy,xδy,x′|x〉〈x′| = |y〉〈y|. (3.29)
This then gives a fully entangled (von Neumann measurement) state,
|D,Φ〉 =
∑
x
√
ϕ(x)eiφ(x)|dx, x〉.
Tracing over the detector states {|dx〉} represents that the system has interacted with the
measurement device (in this case the screen), but its value has yet to be registered by either
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the device or the observer, and that we have neglected to keep track of the detector states,
ϕˆx →
∼
ϕx (t) = Trd(ϕˆd,x) =
∑
x
ϕ(x)|x〉〈x|. (3.30)
This is a mixed state realization of the original two slit pure state probability ϕ(x) =
|〈x|Φ〉|2 = ∼ϕ (x) on the screen. This is not original and may be obtained following [40] using
projectors ϕˆ→∼ϕx (t) =
∑
x PˆxϕˆxPˆx or more directly [41, 80]. Now that the form of the prior
density matrix has been argued for, we may utilize the quantum maximum entropy method.
In principle, when the result of a projective measurement (
∼
ϕx) is registered, the state of
the system is known with certainty. This is represented by the following constraint on the
posterior probability distribution,
Tr(|x〉〈x|ρˆx) = ρ(x) = δxx′, (3.31)
which is an expectation value on the posterior density matrix ρˆx, stating that the system
was detected in the state x′ with certainty. Because this constraint must be imposed for
every x, there is one Lagrange multiplier αx for each x. Maximizing the quantum relative
entropy with respect to this constraint and normalization is setting
0 = δ
(
S − λ[Tr(ρˆx)− 1]−
∑
x
αx[Tr(|x〉〈x|ρˆx)− δxx′]
)
, (3.32)
where S = S(ρˆx,
∼
ϕx) is the quantum relative entropy. The posterior which maximizes the
quantum relative entropy subject to these constraints is,
ρˆx =
1
Z
exp
(∑
x
αx|x〉〈x|+ log(
∼
ϕx)
)
. (3.33)
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Because the constraint and prior commute, the posterior density matrix takes a simple form,
ρˆx =
1
Z
∑
x
ϕ(x)eαx |x〉〈x|. (3.34)
The normalization constraint gives,
Z =
∑
x
ϕ(x)eαx , (3.35)
and the expectation value constraint (3.31) gives,
δxx′ = Tr(|x〉〈x|ρˆx) = ϕ(x)e
αx
Z
. (3.36)
The final form of the posterior density matrix is found by substituting for eαx , and the result
is a collapsed state,
ρˆx =
∑
x
δxx′|x〉〈x| = |x′〉〈x′|, (3.37)
as expected. Written in a suggestive “Bayes update”, or “projective collapse” form,
ρˆx ≡
∼
ϕx|x′ =
|x′〉〈x′| ∼ϕx |x′〉〈x′|
ϕ(x′)
=
|x′〉 ∼ϕx=x′ 〈x′|
ϕ(x′)
, (3.38)
the result is more easily comparable to Lu¨ders strong collapse rule and the QBR. Note the
tilde on
∼
ϕx indicates that it is the appropriate prior for inference as the state has decohered
in the detector. Although
∼
ϕx=x′= ϕˆx=x′ = ϕ(x
′) are numerically equal probabilities, sub-
stitution of this above is incorrect because ϕˆx is the state at the time prior to interacting
with the measurement device. Although this is perhaps a bit fussy, it makes explicit why
secure channels exist in quantum cryptography – the statistics and dynamics of a quantum
system change when it is measured (ϕˆx →
∼
ϕx) because the state must decohere before it is
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inferentially updated (
∼
ϕx→ ρˆx) due to the measurement. Thus, “wavefunction collapse” is
really decoherence and then collapse of the mixed state. Note that this result is completely
consistent with the use of Bayesian inference to update probability distributions upon the
observation of data in QM, i.e., ϕ(x) = |ψ(x)|2 → ρ(x) = δxx′.
Equation (3.38) is the special case of the QBR (3.1) when the measurements are projec-
tive. We call this inference a “simple collapse” and reserve the title of QBR for the general
result that will be derived later. Note that this derivation does not require first solving for
the “weak” collapse and taking the limit [11]. This is because [1] gives the general solution
to ρˆ (equation (2.78)) when the constraints are linear in ρˆ.
Simple Partial (or Uncertain) Collapse: A state may partially collapse if after de-
tection the state still has a certain probability of being in one state or another, due to
measurement uncertainty. This leads to a quantum analog of Jeffreys rule; however, we shall
reserve the title of the “Quantum Jeffreys Rule” for the general result derived later. Given
the similarly prepared prior density matrix
∼
ϕx, we maximize the entropy with respect to a
set of constraints {ρD(x) = Tr(|x〉〈x|ρˆx)} to codifying a lack of certainty in the final state
outcome (perhaps a narrow Gaussian distribution rather than exact knowledge in (3.31)).
Maximizing the entropy with respect to these constraints and normalization again gives the
posterior,
ρˆx =
1
Z
∑
x
ϕ(x)eαx |x〉〈x|, (3.39)
and normalization implies,
Z = Tr(ρˆx) =
∑
x
ϕ(x)eαx . (3.40)
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Satisfying the remaining expectation value constraint (ρD(x) = Tr(|x〉〈x|ρˆx)) gives eαx =
Z ρD(x)
ϕ(x)
for each x, and therefore,
ρˆx =
∑
x
ρD(x)|x〉〈x| =
∑
x′
ρD(x
′)
|x′〉 ∼ϕx=x′ 〈x′|
ϕ(x′)
=
∑
x′
ρD(x
′)
∼
ϕx|x′, (3.41)
which is a “partial” or “uncertain” collapse, reproducing [11, 12].
The Appropriate Joint Prior for the QBR: The previous sections derive the collapse of
a single simple system from the quantum maximum entropy method. There, the appropriate
prior density matrix was generated from standard decoherence arguments in QM. Here, the
inference is over a joint entangled system, and therefore, the appropriate prior density matrix
is itself a joint prior density matrix. The form of the joint prior density matrix for QBR
depends on the physical interactions between the system of interest, the pointer variable,
and later the detector used on the pointer variable. Thus, the appropriate joint prior density
matrix is generated from standard methods in QM.
Notice that if ϕˆθ is an Mth order biased prior, then,
ϕˆx,θ = U(|0〉x〈0| ⊗ ϕˆθ)U † =
∑
x,x′
|x〉〈x′| ⊗ (AxϕˆθA†x′), (3.42)
is an Mth order biased prior, meaning that ϕˆx,θ can only be inferentially updated in that
subspace (which may or may not be desirable). This is potentially problematic if M = 1
because ϕˆx,θ = ϕˆ
2
x,θ is a pure state and cannot be updated non-trivially due to the PDMT.
The unitary operators above represent the interaction between the pointer variable and
the system of interest, which entangles them according to (3.23), and effectively generates
the statistical dependencies that appear in the joint prior probability density ϕ(x, θ) =
ϕ(x|θ)ϕ(θ) of ϕˆx,θ, as well as the likelihood function ϕ(x|θ).
We follow the intuition that if we are going to make inferences on the basis of detection,
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the prior density matrix should appropriately reflect the fact that it has interacted with a
measurement device. This interaction will be modeled by entangling the pointer variable
and detector states {|dy〉}, which act as a local environment states within the detector, via a
unitary evolution (following [41] and the notation in [79], but a simple projection argument
from Lu¨ders on the pointer variable states of ϕˆx,θ would also suffice),
|d0〉〈d0| ⊗ ϕˆx,θ → ϕˆd,x,θ = (Uˆdx ⊗ 1ˆθ)(|d0〉〈d0| ⊗ ϕˆx,θ)(Uˆ †dx ⊗ 1ˆθ) (3.43)
where,
Uˆdx =
∑
dy,dy′ ,x,x
′
udydyxx′|dy〉|x〉〈dy′|〈x′| =
∑
dy ,dy′
|dy〉〈dy′| ⊗ Bdydy′ , (3.44)
and the sub-block matrices are,
Bdydy′ =
∑
x,x′
udydy′xx′|x〉〈x′|. (3.45)
We define a good detector as one in which the |x〉th pointer variable state only entangles
with the local state of the detector |dx〉, which is an argument for the sub-block matrix to
take a simple form,
Bdy0 =
∑
x,x′
δy,xδy,x′|x〉〈x′| = |y〉〈y|. (3.46)
The entangled density matrix becomes,
ϕˆd,x,θ =
∑
y,y′,x,x′
|dy〉〈dy′| ⊗ (By′0 ⊗ Iθ)ϕˆx,θ(B†y′0 ⊗ Iθ)
=
∑
y,y′
|dy〉〈dy′| ⊗ |y〉〈y′| ⊗ (Ay
∼
ϕθ A
†
y′). (3.47)
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The local environment of the detector states in which the pointer variable reside, are traced
over, as we do not keep track of their evolution. This is to say, a small period of time after
the projective measurement has been made, the pointer variable states transition to a mixed
state, which gives a standard (classical) probability distribution of the pointer variable states
over the detector. The prior density matrix after projective measurement has been made is
thus a block diagonal sum of states,
∼
ϕx,θ (t) = Trd(ϕˆd,x,θ) =
∑
x
|x〉〈x| ⊗ (AxϕˆθA†x) =
∑
x′
|x′〉〈x′|⊗ ∼ϕx=x′,θ, (3.48)
which we claim is the appropriate density matrix for POVM inference. This form of the
prior is no longer biased, even if ϕˆθ was itself biased.
The constraints leading to the QBR: In principle, when the result of a projective
measurement on the pointer variable is registered, the state of the pointer variable is known
with certainty. This is represented by the following constraint on the posterior probability
distribution,
ρ(x) = Tr(|x〉〈x| ⊗ 1ˆθ · ρˆx,θ) = δxx′, (3.49)
which resembles (3.3) (the symbol · is the standard matrix product). Notice that this
information alone is not enough to fully constrain ρˆx,θ as there are many ρˆx,θ which satisfy
this constraint. We therefore employ the quantum maximum entropy method and constrain
the posterior subject to normalization and the data constraint, and with respect to the
appropriate prior
∼
ϕx,θ,
0 = δ
(
S − λ[Tr(ρˆx,θ)− 1]−
∑
x
αx[Tr(|x〉〈x| ⊗ 1ˆθ · ρˆx,θ)− δxx′]
)
, (3.50)
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which gives,
ρˆx,θ =
1
Z
exp
(∑
x
αx|x〉〈x| ⊗ 1ˆθ + log(
∼
ϕx,θ)
)
. (3.51)
Because the prior density matrix is block diagonal log(
∼
ϕx,θ) =
∑
x |x〉〈x| ⊗ log(AxϕˆθA†x) ≡∑
x |x〉〈x| ⊗ log(
∼
ϕx=x,θ) we have,
ρˆx,θ =
1
Z
∑
x
|x〉〈x| ⊗ eαx1ˆθ+log(
∼
ϕx=x,θ) =
1
Z
∑
x
eαx |x〉〈x|⊗ ∼ϕx=x,θ . (3.52)
Imposing normalization gives,
Z = Tr
(∑
x
eαx |x〉〈x|⊗ ∼ϕx=x,θ
)
=
∑
x
eαx
∑
θ
〈θ| ∼ϕx=x,θ |θ〉 =
∑
x
eαx
∼
ϕ (x). (3.53)
The data expectation value constraint forces,
δxx′ =
1
Z
Tr(|x〉〈x| ⊗ 1ˆθ ·
∑
x
eαx |x〉〈x|⊗ ∼ϕx=x,θ)
=
1
Z
Tr(eαx |x〉〈x|⊗ ∼ϕx=x,θ) = e
αx
Z
∑
θ
〈θ| ∼ϕx=x,θ |θ〉 = e
αx
Z
∼
ϕ (x), (3.54)
meaning, eαx =
Zδxx′
∼
ϕ(x)
. Substituting in for the Lagrange multipliers gives the final form of the
posterior density matrix ,
ρˆx,θ =
∑
x
δxx′
∼
ϕ (x)
|x〉〈x|⊗ ∼ϕx=x,θ= |x
′〉〈x′|⊗ ∼ϕx=x′,θ
∼
ϕ (x′)
. (3.55)
The marginal posterior is the Quantum Bayes Rule,
ρˆθ = Trx(ρˆx,θ) =
∼
ϕx=x′,θ
∼
ϕ (x′)
≡∼ϕθ|x′, (3.56)
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which is equivalent to the standard POVM measurement formulation,
ρˆθ =
Ax′ϕˆθA
†
x′
ϕ(x′)
, (3.57)
because
∼
ϕx=x′,θ = Ax′ϕˆθA
†
x′ and
∼
ϕ (x′) = ϕ(x′). The posterior probability of θ indeed gives
the standard Bayes Rule,
ρ(θ) = Tr(ρˆθ|θ〉〈θ|) = Tr(
∼
ϕθ|x′ |θ〉〈θ|) = ϕ(θ|x′) = ϕ(θ, x
′)
ϕ(x′)
. (3.58)
As stated in [39], the off diagonal elements, 〈θ|ρˆθ|θ′〉, have a more exotic updating rule.
One may make further inferences about ρˆθ in (3.56), for instance, an inference leading to its
“simple collapse” (3.38).
Quantum Jeffreys Rule (QJR): In the same way as before, we may easily generalize
this rule to cases in which the final state of the pointer variable is uncertain and encoded by
a probability distribution ρD(x) rather than one exhibiting certainty δxx′. Simply replacing
the expectation value constraint (3.49) by,
Tr(|x〉〈x| ⊗ 1ˆθ · ρˆx,θ) = ρD(x), (3.59)
and performing the quantum maximum entropy method gives the marginal posterior,
ρˆθ = Trx(ρˆx,θ) =
∑
x
ρD(x)
∼
ϕθ|x=
∑
x
ρD(x)
AxϕˆθA
†
x
ϕ(x)
, (3.60)
which we call the Quantum Jeffreys Rule.
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What about inferring x from θ measurements? Above we have derived the QBR
and the QJR from the quantum maximum entropy method where it was assumed that a
density matrix in Hθ is to be inferred from detections of x’s. It is possible, however, to
consider the odd situation of detecting θ’s and making inferences about the pointer variables
in Hx. Through this computation we find that the resulting joint probability distribution
ρ(x, θ) of ρˆx,θ is independent of the order in which x’s and θ’s are detected, which is in
agreement with results of the delayed choice experiment.
Consider rewriting a similarly entangled pointer variable prior density matrix ϕˆx,θ from
(3.42) as,
ϕˆx,θ =
∑
x,x′
|x〉x〈x′| ⊗ (AxϕˆθA†x′) =
∑
θ,θ′
(AθϑˆxA
†
θ′)⊗ |θ〉θ〈θ′|, (3.61)
where the Aθ’s are a bit messy but obtained from moving and relabeling the components
of the unitary matrices. If another projection measurement device is designed to detect θ
states, rather than x states, an analogous argument can be used to decohere the joint prior
density matrix in the θ’s,
ϕˆx,θ →
∼
ϑx,θ=
∑
θ
(AθϑˆxA
†
θ)⊗ |θ〉θ〈θ|, (3.62)
rather than the x’s. It should be noted that in general
∼
ϑx,θ 6=
∼
ϕx,θ, from the previous section,
as they are block diagonal in different Hilbert spaces – this joint prior density matrix is block
diagonal in Hθ. The same analysis from the previous section is made: using
∼
ϑx,θ as the prior,
maximize the entropy with respect to normalization and the θ data constraint,
Tr(1ˆx ⊗ |θ〉〈θ| · ˆ̺x,θ) = δθθ′ , (3.63)
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and solve for the Lagrange multipliers. This gives
ˆ̺x,θ =
∼
ϑx,θ=θ′
ϑ(θ′)
⊗ |θ′〉〈θ′|, (3.64)
such that the marginal posterior is
ˆ̺x ≡
∼
ϑx|θ′= Trθ(ˆ̺x,θ) =
∼
ϑx,θ=θ′
ϑ(θ′)
, (3.65)
which is equivalent to,
ˆ̺x =
Aθ′ϑˆxA
†
θ′
ϑ(θ′)
, (3.66)
and is interpreted as the posterior density matrix of the pointer variable after a complemen-
tary Aˆθ′ measurement operator has been applied and θ
′ has been detected. One may make
further inferences on ˆ̺x, for instance, an inference leading to its “simple collapse” (3.38).
The posterior density matrices, ˆ̺x =
∼
ϑx|θ′ and ρˆθ =
∼
ϕθ|x′, are related in the following way:
Notice that although
∼
ϑx,θ 6=
∼
ϕx,θ in general, their components along the diagonal-diagonal are
equal, 〈x, θ| ∼ϑx,θ |x, θ〉 = 〈x, θ|
∼
ϕx,θ |x, θ〉 = 〈x, θ|ϕˆx,θ|x, θ〉, because both density matrices
are decohered in one way or another from equivalently entangled prior density matrices ϕˆx,θ.
This means
ϕ(x, θ) = ϑ(x, θ), (3.67)
and because ϕ(x) = ϑ(x) and ϕ(θ) = ϑ(θ),
ϕ(θ|x) = ϑ(x, θ)
ϕ(x)
=
ϑ(x, θ)
ϑ(x)
=
ϑ(x|θ)ϑ(θ)
ϑ(x)
= ϑ(θ|x), (3.68)
and likewise ϑ(x|θ) = ϕ(x|θ), we see all of the probability relationships hold and may be used
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interchangeably. It should also be noted that in general:
∼
ϑx 6=
∼
ϕx and
∼
ϑθ 6=
∼
ϕθ because their
off diagonal components may differ. The joint posterior density matrices
∼
ϑx,θ and
∼
ϕx,θ, and
their posterior marginals potentially differ in how they will evolve in time. Because the use
of appropriate measurement devices leads to ϕ(x, θ) = ϑ(x, θ), there is no interpretational
issue in the delayed choice experiment because collapse of both x and θ only occurs after
decoherence of both x and θ. The time order of the decoherence becomes irrelevant because
the joint probabilities are equal. Essentially what has happened in the delayed choice exper-
iment is that you do not know if you have done a “which slit” measurement or not, which is
like having a “mixed state of potential measurement outcomes”, but, this is precisely what
a POVM measurement represents.
Quantum Jeffreys Rule via thermal baths: Rather than detecting the result of a
projective measurement on the pointer variable state, we consider the posterior density
matrix one would obtain if the pointer variable is sent into a thermal box – the result can
be naturally generated in the quantum maximum entropy method. We will see inferences
of this type allow the experimenter some control over the distribution of the final states of
θ by adjusting the initial temperature of the thermal box that will be used to capture the
pointer particle. Here we will let the Hilbert space Hx of the pointer variable be spanned
by {|n〉}, the energy basis eigenstates of the pointer variable in the thermal box having a
Hamiltonian Hˆn =
∑
n ǫn|n〉〈n|. The joint prior density matrix is prepared similar to how it
was prepared above, where
∼
ϕx,θ≡
∼
ϕn,θ, such that,
∼
ϕn,θ=
∑
n′
|n′〉〈n′|⊗ ∼ϕn=n′,θ . (3.69)
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The following energy expectation value is used to represent the constraint of a pointer variable
in a thermal box,
Tr(Hˆn ⊗ 1ˆθ · ρˆn,θ) = 〈Hˆn〉. (3.70)
Again notice that this information alone is not enough to fully constrain ρˆn,θ as there are
many ρˆn,θ which satisfy this constraint. We therefore employ the quantum maximum entropy
method; that is, to maximize the quantum relative entropy subject to normalization, this
constraint, and with respect to the prior
∼
ϕn,θ,
0 = δ
(
S − λ[Tr(ρˆn,θ)− 1]− β[Tr(Hˆn ⊗ 1ˆθ · ρˆn,θ)− 〈Hn〉]
)
, (3.71)
which gives,
ρˆn,θ =
1
Z
exp
(
βHˆn ⊗ 1ˆθ + log(
∼
ϕn,θ)
)
. (3.72)
Because the prior density matrix is block diagonal log(
∼
ϕn,θ) =
∑
n |n〉〈n| ⊗ log(AnϕˆθA†n) =∑
n |n〉〈n| ⊗ log(
∼
ϕn=n,θ) we have that,
ρˆn,θ =
1
Z
∑
n
|n〉〈n| ⊗ eβǫn1ˆθ+log(
∼
ϕn=n,θ) =
1
Z
∑
n
eβǫn|n〉〈n|⊗ ∼ϕn=n,θ . (3.73)
Imposing normalization gives,
Z = Tr
(∑
n
eβǫn |n〉〈n|⊗ ∼ϕn=n,θ
)
=
∑
n
eβǫn
∑
θ
〈θ| ∼ϕn=n,θ |θ〉 =
∑
n
eβǫn
∼
ϕ (ǫn). (3.74)
The expectation value constraint forces,
〈Hn〉 = Tr(Hˆn ⊗ 1ˆθ · ρˆn,θ) = 1
Z
Tr(Hˆn ⊗ 1ˆθ
∑
n
eβǫn |n〉〈n|⊗ ∼ϕn=n,θ)
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=
1
Z
Tr(
∑
n
ǫne
βǫn |n〉〈n|⊗ ∼ϕn=n,θ) =
∑
n
ǫne
βǫn
Z
∼
ϕ (ǫn) =
∂
∂β
log(Z), (3.75)
meaning one can solve β = β(〈Hn〉) = − 1kT by inverting the above equation after computing
Z as is done in Statistical Mechanics. The marginal posterior is a realization of the Quantum
Jeffreys Rule using thermalization,
ρˆθ = Trn(ρˆn,θ) =
∑
n
eβǫn
Z
∼
ϕn=n,θ=
∑
n
ϕ(ǫn)e
βǫn
Z
∼
ϕθ|n=
∑
n
ρ(ǫn)
∼
ϕθ|n
=
∑
n
ρ(ǫn)
An
∼
ϕθ A
†
n
ϕ(ǫn)
, (3.76)
in which the state ρˆθ of the system may be controlled by forcing the pointer variable into
a box with temperature β or β ′ as the resulting joint posterior density matrices differ. In
particular, if β ≪ 0 this implies T ≈ 0 and therefore ρˆθ ≈ A0
∼
ϕθA
†
0
ϕ(ǫ0)
with n = 0 being the
ground state energy of the particles in the thermal box. This is similar in nature to a
postselection measurement scheme from [43], which will be reviewed in Chapter 5, except
here we used a thermal box and the quantum maximum entropy.
3.3 Generalizations
General inferences of ρˆ on the basis of a prior state of knowledge ϕˆ and arbitrary expectation
value constraints {〈Aˆi〉} give the following general updating rule,
ρˆ =
1
Z
exp
(∑
i
αiAˆi + ln(ϕˆ)
)
, (3.77)
from ϕˆ→ ρˆ in light of new information about {〈Aˆi〉}. This is of-course the general solution
to the quantum maximum entropy method, but now it is clear it may be interpreted as the
solution for general purpose inference in QM when applied correctly.
75
3.3.1 Non-commutativity for Simultaneous and Sequential Up-
dates
The constraints and priors used in the derivation of the QBR and QJR factored in the
exponential because they took the form exp
(
Aˆ ⊗ 1ˆ + 1ˆ ⊗ Bˆ
)
= exp(Aˆ) ⊗ exp(Bˆ), in part
because of commutation of [Aˆ ⊗ 1ˆ, 1ˆ ⊗ Bˆ], even when the individual operators [Aˆ, Bˆ] 6= 0
do not commute themselves. Thus general inferences involving expectation values of non-
commuting operators and prior density matrices generalizes these rules and the solution is
found by diagonalizing the exponential and using convex optimization methods (i.e. the
general solutions for (3.77)). Perhaps the simplest example of such a situation is the mixed
spin state example given in Appendix C.
The above inferences have all been instances of simultaneous updating, so a note should
be made on sequential updating. Consider updating ϕˆ with respect to a set of constraints
(∗1) such that ϕˆ ∗1→ ρˆ1 via the quantum maximum entropy method. If one receives new
information, (∗2), and we consider ρˆ1 to be the new prior, we may update ρˆ1 ∗2→ ρˆ1,2. These
sequential updates give the following inference chain ϕˆ
∗1→ ρˆ1 ∗2→ ρˆ1,2. If one were instead to
apply these constraints in an opposite order, even if the operators in (∗1) and (∗2) commute,
in general ϕˆ
∗2→ ρˆ2 ∗1→ ρˆ2,1 6= ρˆ1,2. The posterior ρˆ1,2 is guaranteed to satisfy 2, but not
1, whereas the posterior ρˆ2,1 is guaranteed to satisfy 1 but not 2. The third case is the
simultaneous update using both pieces of information (∗1)(∗2) = (∗3). This gives ϕˆ ∗3→ ρˆ3 in
one update, which again is not equal to ρˆ1,2 or ρˆ2,1 in general as it is guaranteed to satisfy
both constraints 1 and 2 simultaneously. This type of non-commutation appears also in the
standard maximum entropy method [8, 9, 21], so its manifestation in the quantum maximum
entropy method is not surprising. The conclusion using the quantum maximum entropy
method is the same; sequential and simultaneous updating ultimately refer to different states
of knowledge, and therefore one should expect the entropic method to give different results.
The fact that the applied order of constraints does not in general commute is therefore
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a feature [8] of the quantum maximum entropy method – if new information rules out old
expectation value constraints, then sequential updating to ρˆ1,2 or ρˆ2,1 is appropriate, whereas,
if both constraints are expected to hold in the posterior, then one should simultaneously
update the state to ρˆ3.
3.3.2 Canonically Modified Quantum Bayes Rule
Finally, to the joint prior density matrix
∼
ϕx,θ=
∑
x |x〉x〈x| ⊗ (AxϕˆθA†x) one may simultane-
ously apply a data constraint to the pointer variable (that would result in a Quantum Bayes
Rule) while simultaneously constraining the θ space with respect to an expectation value
〈f(θˆ)〉. This results in a state that cannot alone be inferred from either a von Neumann
maximum entropy procedure or a Quantum Bayes procedure alone. The resulting state is,
analogous to its probabilistic form in [8], a canonically modified Quantum Bayes Rule. Max-
imizing the quantum relative entropy with respect to these constraints and normalization
gives,
ρˆx,θ =
1
Z
∑
x
|x〉〈x| ⊗ eαx1ˆθ+βf(θˆ)+log(
∼
ϕx=x,θ) =
1
Z
∑
x
eαx |x〉〈x| ⊗ eβf(θˆ)+log(
∼
ϕx=x,θ). (3.78)
Imposing the data constraint, ρD(x) = Trθ(|x〉〈x| ⊗ 1ˆθ · ρˆx,θ), gives,
ρD(x) =
eαx
Z
Tr
(
exp(βf(θˆ) + log(
∼
ϕx=x,θ))
)
, (3.79)
which means the data Lagrange multiplier is,
eαx =
ZρD(x)
Tr
(
exp(βf(θˆ) + log(
∼
ϕx=x,θ))
) ≡ ZρD(x)
ζ(x, β)
. (3.80)
77
We therefore arrive at a canonically modified Quantum Jeffreys Rule,
ρˆθ = Trx(ρˆx,θ) =
∑
x
ρD(x)
ζ(x, β)
exp
(
βf(θˆ) + log(
∼
ϕx=x,θ)
)
. (3.81)
The special case, if ρD(x) = δxx′, gives a canonically modified Quantum Bayes Rule,
ρˆθ = Trx(ρˆx,θ) =
exp
(
βf(θˆ) + log(Ax′ϕˆθA
†
x′)
)
ζ(x′, β)
. (3.82)
If the expectation value constraint is not imposed, or if β = 0, then the canonical factors drop
out and the Quantum Bayes Rule is recovered. Note that the values of 〈f(θˆ)〉 are mutually
compatible with the data constraint and the prior as to guarantee a logical solution – this
logical restriction is present equally well in the canonically modified Bayes Rule [8].
3.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we applied the quantum maximum entropy method and derived the Lu¨ders
collapse (and partial collapse) rules, the QBR, and the QJR. Furthermore, it was discussed
why the order of sequential updates do not commute in general, even when the operators
within the sequentially implemented expectation value constraints do. Having derived a
Quantum Bayes Rule from the quantum maximum entropy method, the suggestion of such a
possibility in [64] is met. The subject matter reviewed in this chapter therefore unifies topics
in Quantum Information and quantum measurement through quantum entropic inference
just as much as Caticha and Giffin unified topics in information theory and Bayesian inference
through standard entropic inference [7–9].
The article [2] shows how the quantum maximum entropy method can eliminate ad hoc
collapse postulates in QM, in agreement with [11, 12]; however decoherence is still required.
As is demonstrated by the arguments leading up to the PDMT and as the derivation of
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the above inference rules have showed, the phrase “collapse of the wavefunction” should be
replaced by “decoherence and the collapse of the mixed state”. This is in agreement with
Lu¨ders’ notion that the application of a measurement device is to mix the incoming state
ρˆ→∑i PˆiρˆPˆi if collapse is going to occur. In this sense, a pure state is already a collapsed
state, so trying to directly collapse this state to a different pure state is illogical (by the
PDMT) unless the state first decoheres – “uncollapsing” the state.
The main conclusion from [7–9] is that the standard maximum entropy method is the
“universal method for inference” because it can reproduce Bayesian inference as a special
case, while also being able to make inferences not achievable through Bayesian inference or
maximum entropy inference (having prior’s set to 1 in the relative entropy) – the method
updates ϕ(x)
∗→ ρ(x) for arbitrary (∗). The main conclusion from this chapter is analogous
– the quantum maximum entropy method is the “universal method of density matrix in-
ference”, the method updates ϕˆ
∗→ ρˆ for arbitrary (∗). Although pure state prior density
matrices fail to update ϕˆ
∗→ ϕˆ due to the PDMT, there is no contradiction, because one may
still correctly unitarily evolve pure state priors ϕˆ → UϕˆU †, and so one may simply accept
the non-update as one does for biased probability distributions ϕ(x)
∗→ ϕ(x) in the standard
maximum entropy procedure.
Because Entropic Dynamics (reviewed next chapter) is able to derive Quantum Mechan-
ics and a density matrix formulation using the standard maximum entropy method and
information geometry, it implies that the quantum maximum entropy method is really a
special case of the standard maximum entropy, and so, it retains its title of the universal
method of inference. The quantum maximum entropy method thus retains the more special-
ized title of: “the universal method of density matrix inference”. As the quantum maximum
entropy method has utilized nothing but techniques from the standard quantum mechanical
formalism, it, and its results, may be appended to the standard formalism.
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Part II: Entropic Dynamics and the
Solution to the Quantum
Measurement Problem
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Chapter 4
Entropic Dynamics
The previous chapters review the design of probability, relative entropy, and quantum relative
entropy. By developing the foundations, and designing the tools of inference thereafter, we
were able to make progress. In particular, we found that the standard and quantum relative
entropies are designed for the purpose of inference, each formulated from the same Principle
of Minimum Updating and design criteria, and that the Quantum Bayes Rule is a special case
of quantum entropic inference. We formulated the Prior Density Matrix Theorem (PDMT),
which states that a quantum system can only be inferentially updated in the regions spanned
by its eigenspace, using the quantum maximum entropy method. This stems from the logic
that if a pure state, or the set of them in ρˆ, is known with certainty, than any information that
would lead to a deviation from this fact is moot. Hence, the unitary evolution generated from
the Schro¨dinger Equation (SE), which is capable of rotating the eigenvectors of ρˆ out of their
original eigenspace, is not in general an update that can be implemented by the quantum
maximum entropy method due to the PDMT. We would like to understand unitary evolution
from the point of view of inference; however, the quantum maximum entropy method cannot
provide the type of understanding we seek.
The material in Chapter 2 and 3 is all predicated on the assumed existence of the stan-
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dard quantum formalism. While the standard quantum formalism is great in practice, the
formalism itself is empty – there is no agreed upon interpretation of QM as it is difficult
to formulate why the oddities of QM are the way they are. This is likely because in most
approaches to the foundations of QM, one starts with the formalism and then appends an
interpretation to it, almost as an afterthought. Entropic Dynamics (ED) [13, 21, 25–28], on
the other hand, starts with the interpretation, that is, one specifies what the ontic elements
of the theory are, and only then one develops a formalism appropriate to describe and pre-
dict those ontic elements. Laws of physics are derived as applications of standard entropic
inference, and thus, ED differs from most theories in physics.
This framework is extremely constraining. For example, there is no room for “quan-
tum probabilities” in Entropic Dynamics. Probabilities are neither classical nor quantum,
they are tools for reasoning that have universal applicability, as is touched upon in previous
chapters. The wavefunction should therefore be an epistemic object (i.e. |Ψ|2 is a proba-
bility) and its time evolution – the updating of Ψ – should not be arbitrary. Given that
probability theory has universal applicability, the dynamics of probabilities in QM should be
dictated by the usual rules of inference. Entropic Dynamics is indeed able to formulate QM
as an instance of standard probability updating through entropic inference and information
geometry.
It should be noted that ED is not the “be all end all” in physics – rather it generates mod-
els for inference that happen to be consistent with physics. Along a similar line of thought,
at this point in the development of ED, “the discoveries” are the inferential constraints and
pertinent information required to obtain physics from probability theory, rather than the
physics equations themselves [45]. Past, current, and future research in ED involves: refor-
mulating other fields of physics as inference [86–88], refining and strengthening methods in
ED [13, 89], addressing the classical limit [90], giving a derivation of the exact renormaliza-
tion group [91], deriving the Black and Scholes equation [92], addressing and differentiating
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between the QM in ED and its Bohmian limit [93, 94], and using ED to address measurement
problems and no-go theorems in Quantum Mechanics [3, 4, 14] – the later being the central
focus of subsequent chapters.
This chapter is a review of the ED formalism presented in [13, 25, 26, 89]. It follows
sections of [3, 4] as well as discussions with A. Caticha [45]. The newest formulation of
ED is [13] and the most primitive is [26]. Novel material appears in Section 4.2 – it is a
straightforward application of ED that produces mixed quantum states.
Ontological Positions and Epistemic Inferables in Entropic Dynamics:
An assumption that permeates theories of physics is the existence of particles. Whether
or not this assumption is “true”, it is nonetheless useful [44]. As ED is an application of
inference toward deriving laws of physics, we need something “physical” or “ontic” to actually
make inferences about, otherwise ED may be critiqued as ungrounded. We therefore assume
the existence of particles and understand them to be the primitive ontological elements we
wish to make inferences about – at least at the level of this effective theory or model. The
natural follow-up question is, “What inferences will we be making?”.
For the results of ED to be verifiable, we must be able to perform experiments, collect
data, and make inferences. Given that we live in space, it is impossible to point to a detector
that is not located in some region of space. Therefore on some level, any detection made by
a detector gives some amount of positional information. Furthermore, we know a detection
has taken place when our detector changes, which may be indicated to the observer in
any number of convenient, and usually macroscopic, ways (digital text, needle positioning,
flashing lights, signal amplification,...). The detector is itself in principle a construction of
particles, located in space, where changes are enacted upon to reach a newly distinguished
“detector” state. Following this line of thought, and after contemplating the nature of what
we might mean by a particle, define: a particle is a piece of ontology at a position. In this
sense, and like Bohmian mechanics, particle positions will play the role of beables [15] in ED.
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Because the observer ultimately holds the final desiderata for inference, they hold the
degrees of rational belief, all verifiable quantities in Physics are inferred and are therefore
categorized as what we call inferables [3]. As ED is founded on probability and probability
updating, Hermitian observables, as well as the wavefunction, are epistemic and do not
have an ontological predisposition in ED. Standard Hermitian “observables” are more aptly
referred to as “inferables” as their values will be inferred from positional measurements or
positional correlations in a probability distribution [3, 14].1 The thought that perhaps the
only type of measurements we do in physics are position measurements, and that other
quantities are inferred from position, is not original: Bell [15, 17, 95], Feynman [96], Caticha
[3, 14, 45, 97], and other physicists have expressed this shared philosophy on experiment. As
position is the only ontological variable, and the fact that objects other than position may
be treated as epistemic inferables, the interpretation of QM is drastically different in ED.
This ends up providing a solution to the quantum measurement problem [3, 14] while also
not being ruled out by the Bell-Kochen-Specker [17–19] no-go theorem (as well as the Bell
[20] and no ψ-epistemic theorem [16]) [4].2 A common interpretation of the Bell-Kochen-
Specker theorem is that observables in QM are contextual, meaning that an observable’s
“character”, “aspect”, or “value” depend on the remaining set of observables it is considered
along-side-with in a measurement setting.
4.1 From Entropic Dynamics to Quantum Mechanics
This remainder of section 4.1 is a review of [13, 89]. In the context from above, Entropic
Dynamics seeks to generate useful and dynamical inferential models toward understanding
the things we can infer from nature. These models eventually take the form of Physics
1As well as other measurement quantities of interest like the complex valued, and a bit mysterious, Weak
Values from [43].
2The Bell-Kochen-Specker no-go theorem rules out interpretations of QM that assign definite values
to operators that simultaneously belong to noncommuting sets of internally complete sets of commuting
observables.
84
equations, but because they were generated from the foundation of probability and proba-
bility updating, we can claim to know “what we needed to know” in our model to solve the
problem.
Here we are interested in the constraints and assumptions required to derive QM from the
first principles of inference and probability updating using Entropic Dynamics. The first step
is to state the universe of discourse, the set of possible microstates or the subject matter, one
would like to infer on the basis of incomplete information – these are the ontological positions
of N particles in a flat Euclidean space X (metric δab). Our knowledge of the positions of
particles is characterized by a probability density ρ(x), where x is a coordinate in a 3N
dimensional configuration space XN = X× ...×X of particle coordinates x = {xan} ≡ {xA},
and where a = 1, 2, 3 denotes the ath spatial axis of the nth particle’s position, or for short
A = (n, a). From the onset, particles have definite yet unknown positions and are treated as
the “physical” or “ontological” quantities of interest – the proposition x in ρ(x) reads: “the
configuration space coordinate x correctly represents the ontological positions of the particles
in 3D space”. Expectation values of over ρ(x),
∫
xnρ(x) dx, or simply integrations
∫ b
a
ρ(x) dx,
are therefore integrations over the propositions x rather than the actual ontological positions
of the particles since a particle can only have one position.3 However for brevity, we will
simply call x “the position of the particles”.
The fact that positions are “ontological” and probabilities are epistemic, immediately
separates the interpretation of QM in ED from other mainstream interpretations of QM,
like: the Copenhagen interpretation whose ontological values are created by the measure-
ment device, the Bohmian interpretation in which wavefunctions are configuration space
ontological fields, and the Many Worlds interpretation that perhaps makes the largest as-
sumption in physics possible – that there exists infinitely many ontological and branching
universes. Our assumption is simple, “Particles have ontological positions” and the designed
3Later this implies that the eigenvalues x of the position operator xˆ are themselves propositions rather
than ontological particle positions.
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features of probability updating work.
Now that the microstates have been specified, we are inclined to ask how the position of
these particles change. In particular, we wish to know how probable it is for x→ x′, that is,
we seek a transition probability of the form P (x′|x) to quantify this uncertainty while being
consistent with the notion that particles have definite yet unknown, ontological positions. We
therefore make the following assumptions: 1) particles move along continuous trajectories,
2) particles have a tendency to be correlated and thus undergo interparticle correlated drift
based their configuration, 3) particles have a tendency to undergo uncorrelated individual
drifts depending on their location in 3D space. Once the form of the transition probability
P (x′|x) is found, it will be used to inferentially update ρ(x) ∗→ ρ′(x′) = ∫ P (x′|x)ρ(x) dx.
This crucial step is also the reason why ED naturally avoids the PDMT.
1) Continuous motion: The first assumption is implemented by making large ∆xan =
x
′a
n − xan improbable. This is done by imposing that each particle have small variances, κn,
in particle coordinates,
∫
∆xan∆x
b
nδabP (x
′|x) dx′ = 〈∆xan∆xbn〉δab = κn, (n = 1, . . . , N) (4.1)
where motion is continuous in the limit κn → 0. We use N Lagrange multipliers αn to impose
these N constraints. The Lagrange multipliers αn eventually turn out to be proportional to
the masses of the particles.
2) Interparticle correlation and drift: Interparticle correlation and drift is imple-
mented in the following way. Letting φ(x) = φ(x1, ..., xN ) be a scalar function over the
configuration space of our N particles, we design φ(x) such that its configuration space par-
tial derivatives ∂φ(x)
∂xA
≡ ∂φ(x)
∂xan
≡ ∂naφ(x) ≡ ∂Aφ(x) regulate the expected drift of the particles,
i.e., φ(x) is a “drift potential”. We impose this regulation be distributed over the N particles,
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and thus impose it with a single constraint over the set of particles,
〈∆φ〉 = 〈∆xA〉∂Aφ(x) = κ′, (4.2)
where κ′ is a small constant. Designed over configuration space, φ(x) allows for interparticle
correlations and drift, and eventually, entanglement. A point is made in [13] to note that
the origins of φ(x) are unexplained, which is an interesting topic for future research.4 Not
giving the precise (perhaps microscopic) origins of φ(x), but still using it for the purpose
of modeling probabilistic updates in the Entropic Dynamics approach, is analogized to not
giving the precise microscopic origins forces, but still finding their use in Newton’s law. We
will use the Lagrange multiplier α′ to impose this constraint.
3) Uncorrelated individual particle drift: Imposing the first two constraints without
this one leads to an interesting evolution, but richer forms of dynamics are found by further
imposing this constraint. As uncorrelated individual particle drifts are unconcerned with
the drifts of other particles, we introduce a field χ(xn), with xn ∈ X in 3D space, to regulate
the expected independent drift of the N particles. We further assume that the field χ can
be redefined by different amounts γ(xn) at each location such that what is called the “0”
field value at one location may not be the “0” field value at another location. This is a
local gauge symmetry, and the way to compare field values at different locations is through
a connection field Aa(xn) that reveals how the field value at x is related to the field value
at x+∆x in 3D space. The connection field is constructed such that gauge transformations
in χ→ χ+ γ also shift the connection field by Aa → Aa + ∂aγ, and thus ∂aχ− Aa remains
invariant. The gauge invariant particle drift constraints regulate each particle’s individual
expected drift,
〈∆xA〉[∂Aχ(xn)−Aa(xn)] = κ′′n, (4.3)
4One potential explanation is in terms of the entropy of some other microscopic (y) variables [26].
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and thus we require N Lagrange multipliers βn to impose these N constraints. If χ(xn) =
χ(xn)+2π has the topology of an angle, it solves Wallstrom’s objection to Nelson’s stochastic
mechanics [89, 98–100], and the Lagrange multipliers βn eventually turn out to be propor-
tional to the (quantized) electric changes of the particles. This will be discussed a bit more
later when it is more relevant.
Maximum Entropy: There are many probability distributions P (x′|x) that satisfy the
above expectation value constraints (4.1 - 4.3). We therefore use the standard maximum
entropy method [10, 21, 22, 24] to rank the candidate distributions. Without any prior
knowledge, the prior transition distribution Q(x′|x) is a very broad normalizable Gaussian
distribution to encode that, given nothing is known about particle motion (equations (4.1 -
4.3) are yet to be imposed), particles may jump anywhere with near to equal probability –
there is no reason to believe otherwise.
Maximizing the relevant relative entropy with respect to P (x′|x),
S[P (x′|x), Q(x′|x)] = −
∫
dx′P (x′|x) log P (x
′|x)
Q(x′|x) , (4.4)
subject to the expectation value constraints, (4.1 - 4.3), and normalization, via the Lagrange
multiplier method forces the probability updating scheme to evolve probabilities in a way
that is consistent with the notion of particles having definite yet unknown, and ontological,
positions.5 The maximum entropy update gives,
P (x′|x) = 1
Z
exp
[
− 1
2
∑
n
αnδab(△xan − 〈△xan〉)(△xbn − 〈△xbn〉)
]
, (4.5)
after completing the square. Because Q(x′|x) is nearly constant over regions of interest, it
5This, and the assumption that particles have ontological positions in ED, is of tantamount importance
for the remainder of the discussion in this thesis.
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has been absorbed into the normalization constant Z. The expected drift of the particles is,
〈∆xA〉 = 1
αn
δab[α′∂B φ(x) + βn∂Bχ(xn)−Ab(xn)], (4.6)
with B = (n, b). We will absorb α′ as a scaling constant into φ(x) without loss of generality.
A generic displacement can be expressed as the expected drift plus a fluctuation,
∆xan = 〈∆xan〉+∆wan, (4.7)
respectively, where,
〈∆wan〉 = 0 and 〈∆wan∆wbn〉 =
δab
αn
. (4.8)
One finds that for large αn the dynamics is dominated by fluctuations, ∆w
a
n ∼ 〈∆wan∆wbn〉1/2,
which are of order O(α
−1/2
n ) whereas the expected drifts are on the order of O(α−1n ). Large αn
implies small κn, meaning that the large αn limit is the continuous limit of particle motion,
and that in this limit, fluctuations dominate.
4.1.1 Entropic Time
So far, there has been no explicit mention of time; rather, the only assumptions made are
that particles have a tendency to change ontological positions and follow drift gradients.
But aren’t these changes in position exactly what we as observers refer as a mechanism for
keeping track of time classically? We therefore introduce time as a bookkeeping parameter
to index change. If we have some initial knowledge of the positions of particles ρ(x), we may
consider how our distribution changes once our particles have undergone a fluctuation and
drift by considering,
ρ(x′|t′) =
∫
P (x′|x,∆t)ρ(x|t) dx. (4.9)
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We have let t label the distribution ρ(x) ≡ ρ(x|t) and let t′ = t + ∆t label the distribution
ρ(x′) ≡ ρ(x′|t′) “after” the distribution been updated “entropically” by P (x′|x,∆t) (4.5).
Equation (4.9), and its preliminaries, are what separate Entropic Dynamics from the stan-
dard “time independent” probability updating one is usually accustomed to seeing in the
maximum entropy approach. It is natural to call equation (4.9) the “entropic dynamics
update”.
Before continuing, we need to introduce the concept of duration ∆t in our transition prob-
abilities P (x′|x,∆t). Because short steps imply short time periods, and because fluctuations
〈∆wan∆wbn〉 = 1αn δab dominate for short steps (αn → ∞), the notion of continuous motion
must be implemented at the level of short steps. This implies the form of αn =
mn
~
1
∆t
∝ 1
∆t
,
where later it will be revealed that the particle specific constant mn is the mass of the nth
particle and the constant ~, that fixes units, is Planck’s constant. We have that “equal
fluctuations” of a particle are equal measures of times.
The information metric of the transition probability in configuration space coordinates
is,
γAB = C
∫
dx′ P (x′|x)∂ logP (x
′|x)
∂xA
∂ logP (x′|x)
∂xB
. (4.10)
In the limit of short steps, one finds,
γAB =
Cmn
~∆t
δnn′δab =
Cmn
~∆t
δAB, (4.11)
which diverges as ∆t goes to zero. This is somewhat expected due to the nature of the
information metric being a measure for statistical distinguishability. In this limit P (x′|x) is
sharply peaked and thus P (x′|x) and P (x′|x + ∆x) overlap less and are thus “more distin-
guishable”. If we choose the arbitrary scale constant C such that it is proportional to ∆t,
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then this metric can be recast as a “mass tensor”
mAB =
~∆t
C
γAB = mnδAB. (4.12)
The inverse mass tensor is therefore,
mAB =
C
~∆t
γAB =
1
mn
δAB. (4.13)
These tensors will become particularly relevant later in the derivation.
Using our notion of time, we may reformulate the previously defined quantities. Recasting
〈∆xA〉 as,
〈∆xA〉 = bA(x)∆t, (4.14)
with
bA(x) = mAB[~∂B (φ+ χ)− AB], (4.15)
allows b(x) to be interpreted as the drift velocity of the particle, where
χ(x) ≡
∑
n
βnχ(xn) and AA(x) ≡ ~βnAa(xn). (4.16)
The new form of,
〈∆wA∆wB〉 = ~mAB∆t, (4.17)
makes clear time has been designed such that equal measures of a particle’s fluctuation occur
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over equal durations of time. The transition probability is,
P (x′|x,∆t) = 1
Z
exp[−1
2
∑
n
mnδab
~∆t
(∆xan − 〈∆xan〉)(∆xbn − 〈∆xbn〉)] , (4.18)
which specifies the entropic dynamics update in (4.9).
Equation (4.9) is the integral form of the Fokker-Planck (diffusion) equation and may be
recast as the differential Fokker-Planck equation (a derivation is reviewed in [21]),
∂tρ = −∂A(ρ bA) + 1
2
~mAB∂A∂Bρ = −∂A
(
ρvA
)
, (4.19)
where the current velocity vA = bA + uA is the current = drift + osmotic velocities of the
probability flow in configuration space, respectively. Specifically:
vA = mAB(∂BΦ− AB) and Φ = ~(φ+ χ− log ρ1/2), (4.20)
is a function defined in terms of previously defined variables. In this sense Φ is something
like a “current potential” for the current velocity vA that tells us how ρ is going to change
in time by (4.19). At this point, Φ’s only time dependence is through ρ, but it is important
to evaluate what we have been able to derive using ED so far:
ED has managed to show that the the Fokker-Planck equation (4.19) may be interpreted
as a mechanism of entropic probability updating. The “current potential” Φ, as argued above,
is thus a mechanism or function that guides probability updating, and in this sense, it is
purely epistemic – it is informative. To derive QM, we need an additional mechanism for
updating the constraints (4.2) and (4.3) in the entropic dynamics update (4.9). We also let
Φ(x) → Φ(x, t) to be labeled by time such that Φ has further functionality in its ability to
update and mediate correlations in ρ – that is, we let Φ be dynamically informative.
Note that nothing prevents us from rewriting (4.19) as a functional derivative ∂tρ =
δH˜
δΦ
,
92
where,
H˜[ρ,Φ] =
∫
dx
[1
2
ρmAB(∂AΦ− AA)(∂BΦ− AB) + F [ρ]
]
, (4.21)
has an integration functional constant of ρ, named F [ρ]. At this point the dynamics of φ, χ,
and consequently Φ, are unknown and we need a natural way to tie down the functional
form of the time dependence in Φ. The form of Φ should originate from considerations of
the system of particles being modeled and how we might expect it to respond to changes
in x or ρ. The current potential Φ gives the modeler freedom to model different systems in
ED. Previous versions of ED that eventually lead to QM impose that the dynamics of Φ are
determined by changes Φ′ = Φ + δΦ that keep dH˜/dt = 0, that is, H˜ plays the role of a
Hamiltonian. We will take the newer approach [13], as it better adheres to the probabilistic
foundations in ED.
4.1.2 Geometry of e-phase space
In the search for the constraints on Φ that lead to QM, we look for inspiration from infor-
mation geometry, and impose that χ(xn) = χ(xn) + 2π has the topology of an angle (i.e.
now Φ has the topology of an angle). Imposing that χ has the topology of an angle solves
Wallstrom’s objection6 to Nelson’s stochastic mechanics [89, 98–100]. Working with spin-1/2
particles in which a “spin frame field” also contributes to the updating of ρ(x), χ becomes
one of the orientation angles of the spin frame field [13, 45] (forthcoming [101]) and the argu-
ment for χ having the topology of an angle becomes more palatable. To obtain a mechanism
for updating Φ(x) we will extend the information metric from a discrete simplex Sν−1 over
{ρi} to the 2ν-dimensional ensemble phase space (e-phase space) with extended coordinates
6Wallstrom’s objection is that stochastic mechanics leads to phases and wavefunctions that are either
both multi-valued or both single-valued. Both alternatives are unsatisfactory because on one hand QM
requires single-valued wavefunctions, while on the other hand single-valued phases exclude states that are
physically relevant (e.g., states with non-zero angular momentum). [89]
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{ρi} → {ρi,Φi}, and then take the continuous limit and utilize the simplectic structure of
the e-phase space. This derivation is similar in nature to [102, 103]; however, the deriva-
tion presented in [13] is motivated for the purpose of doing inference in Entropic Dynamics.
First, however, in preparation for this derivation, we will review a relevant derivation of the
information metric on a discrete statistical manifold [13, 104].
Due to normalization, the statistical manifold over a set of discrete probabilities {ρ1, ..., ρν}
is the simplex Sν−1, that is 1 =
∑
ρi is the equation of a simplex. One may consider changing
coordinates to ξi = (ρi)1/2 and then the normalization condition takes the form
∑ν
i (ξ
i)2 = 1,
which suggests the ξi coordinates parameterize the surface of a sphere. This suggestion can
be taken seriously, and from it, declare that the simplex is a (ν − 1) sphere embedded in
a ν-dimensional spherically symmetric space. The generic form of a length invariant in a
spherical symmetric space takes the form,
dℓ2 = (a(|ρ|)− b(|ρ|))(
ν∑
i
ξidξi)2 + |ρ|b(|ρ|)
ν∑
i
(dξi)2, (4.22)
where a(|ρ|) and b(|ρ|) are two arbitrary smooth and positive functions of |ρ| = ∑νi ρi.
Changing back to the original ρi coordinates and letting the probabilities be normalized to
unity gives the information metric up to an overall scale,
dℓ2 = b(1)
ν∑
i
1
ρi
(dρi)2. (4.23)
In the present derivation, we wish to consider an information metric that is extended
from the simplex to the 2ν-dimensional e-phase space (ρi,Φi) by imposing the following
conditions: (A) that the extended space is compatible with the information metric on the
simplex, and (B) that Φ has the topological structure of an angle. Condition (B) suggests
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the following polar coordinate representation,
ξi = (ρi)1/2 cosΦi/~ and ηi = (ρi)1/2 sinΦi/~, (4.24)
such that the equation of the simplex is maintained,
|ρ| =
ν∑
i
ρi =
ν∑
i
[(ξi)2 + (ηi)2] = 1, (4.25)
while also suggesting the space is over the surface of a sphere in 2ν dimensions. To satisfy
(A) we will follow the same algorithm that was used to find the information metric. That
is, we take the “spherical suggestion” seriously and declare spherical symmetry in the space
of (ρ,Φ),
dℓ2 = (a(|ρ|)− b(|ρ|))[
ν∑
i
(ξidξi + ηidηi)]2 + |ρ|b(|ρ|)
ν∑
i
[(dξi)2 + (dηi)2]. (4.26)
Transforming back to the coordinates (ρi,Φi) and setting |ρ| = 1, gives, again up to an
arbitrary proportionality constant,
dℓ2 = b(1)
ν∑
i
[
~
2ρi
(dρi)2 +
2
~
ρi(dΦi)2
]
. (4.27)
Taking the continuous limit gives the desired form of the e-phase space metric,
dℓ2 = b(1)
∫
dx
[
~
2ρ
(δρ)2 +
2
~
ρ(δΦ)2
]
. (4.28)
The square displacement may be interpreted as a measure of distinguishability between (ρ,Φ)
and (ρ+ δρ,Φ+ δΦ) in the e-phase space. As is proven and reviewed in [13], this metric has
an extra symmetry: a complex structure and thus has a symplectic 2-form. The symplectic
2-form leads to the canonical Hamilton-Jacobi formalism with ρ and Φ being the canonically
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conjugate variables. The explicit derivation is not entirely relevant for the remainder of this
thesis so it will be omitted, but it may be found in [13].
The availability of complex structure allows for the change of coordinates,
Ψ = ρ1/2 exp(iΦ/~) and Ψ∗ = ρ1/2 exp(−iΦ/~), (4.29)
under which the metric takes a simple form,
dℓ2 = b(1)
∫
dx δΨ∗δΨ. (4.30)
In these coordinates, i~Ψ∗ is the canonically conjugate momentum to Ψ as they satisfy the
following Poisson brackets:
[Ψ(x),Ψ∗(x′)] =
∫
dx′′
( δΨ(x)
δρ(x′′)
δΨ∗(x′)
δΦ(x′′)
− δΨ
∗(x)
δρ(x′′)
δΨ∗(x′)
δΦ(x′′)
)
] =
1
i~
δ(x− x′), (4.31)
and,
[Ψ(x),Ψ(x′)] = [Ψ∗(x),Ψ∗(x′)] = 0. (4.32)
At this point we may let the arbitrary scale constant b(1) = 1/4 as is common in spherical
embedding derivations of the information metric [21].
4.1.3 Synthesis and the Schro¨dinger Equation
By finding the flow in e-phase space that preserves the symplectic symmetry, we may find
a Hamiltonian and find the appropriate dynamics for Φ(x), thus, the constraints (4.2) and
(4.3) may be updated at each time step of (4.9). As it stands, the geometry of the e-phase
space is independent from ED. We must incorporate the following features for the geometry
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of e-phase space to be useful and consistent with ED: the notion of ontological particle
positions, entropic time, and the entropic dynamics update (4.9) that leads to the Fokker-
Planck equation (4.19). The synthesis of these topics with the e-phase space geometry gives
the fully equivalent Schro¨dinger Equation (SE) with the added interpretation that ρ, Φ, and
Ψ are epistemic, whereas particle positions are ontic.
As positions are the ontic variables, and because there is no notion of time in the e-phase
space as of yet, consider the potential positional displacements δxA = x′A − xA of particles
and evaluate the changes to ρ and Φ:
δρ(x) = ∂Aρδx
A and δΦ(x) = (∂AΦ−AA)δxA, (4.33)
and therefore,
δΨ = (∂AΨ− i
~
AAΨ)δx
A. (4.34)
The form of the metric under these variations is found by substitution,
dℓ2 =
1
~
∫
(h˜ABδx
AδxB) dx, (4.35)
where,
h˜AB = ρ
[1
2
(∂AΦ− AA)(∂BΦ− AB) + ~
2
8ρ2
∂Aρ∂Bρ
]
, (4.36)
or in the complex coordinates,
h˜AB =
[
~
2
2
(∂AΨ
∗ − i
~
AAΨ
∗)(∂BΨ− i
~
ABΨ)
]
. (4.37)
This is a tensor in the e-phase space that measures distinguishability under small displace-
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ments. To introduce entropic time, we follow [13] and demand that duration be a measure
of fluctuations, because fluctuations (4.17, 4.18) dominate the dynamics as ∆t → 0. That
is, in probability δxAδxB converges to 〈∆xA∆xB〉 for small ∆t,
δxAδxB = 〈∆xA∆xB〉+ o(∆t) = ~mAB∆t + o(∆t), (4.38)
(from [98] section 5), so therefore in probability,
dℓ2 = H˜ABm
AB∆t ≡ H˜0∆t, (4.39)
where
∫
h˜AB dx = H˜AB. For small duration, the expected square displacement in the e-phase
space is effectively proportioned by the particles’ expected fluctuations, or equally well, the
reciprocal of their masses.
The final synthesizing step is to demand that ∂tρ have the form of the Fokker-Planck
equation. This simply requires the identification of the e-Hamiltonian H˜0 = m
ABH˜AB with
the general form of H˜ ’s, from (4.21), that are compatible with ∂tρ. As this construction is
built for small times, H˜0 turns out to be the free particle e-Hamiltonian. To account for
additional interactions, a potential term V (x) is added to the free e-Hamiltonian and thus
the full e-Hamiltonian is,
H˜ =
∫
mABρ
[1
2
(∂AΦ− AA)(∂BΦ−AB) + ~
2
8ρ2
∂Aρ∂Bρ+ V
]
dx, (4.40)
which is allowed, and consistent with, the form of (4.21). Due to the symplectic structure of
the e-phase space and its synthesis into the ED analysis above, the e-Hamilton equations
∂ρ
∂t
=
δH˜
δΦ
and
∂Φ
∂t
= −δH˜
δρ
, (4.41)
correctly satisfy all of the required ED constraints and mechanisms. In the complex coordi-
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nates (Ψ,Ψ∗) we have,
H˜ [Ψ,Ψ∗] =
∫
dx
[
~
2
2
mAB(∂AΨ
∗ − i
~
AAΨ
∗)(∂BΨ− i
~
ABΨ) + Ψ
∗ΨV
]
=
∫
dxΨ∗
[
− ~
2
2
mAB(∂A − i
~
AA)(∂B − i
~
AB) + V
]
Ψ (4.42)
(the second equality is reached through integration by parts) and therefore the e-Hamilton
equation(s) are,
∂tΨ(x) =
δH˜
δ(i~Ψ∗(x))
, (4.43)
which is the Schro¨dinger Equation (SE),
i~
∂Ψ
∂t
= −~
2
2
mAB(∂A − i
~
AA)(∂B − i
~
AB)Ψ + VΨ. (4.44)
In standard notation this is,
i~
∂Ψ
∂t
= −
∑
n
~
2
2mn
δab(
∂
∂xan
− iβnAa(xn))( ∂
∂xbn
− iβnAb(xn))Ψ + V (x)Ψ, (4.45)
where one identifies ~ as Planck’s constant, mn as the particle masses, and βn =
qn
~c
as
proportional to particle charges. The condition for compatibility of the probabilistic and
linear structure of the SE that leads to full equivalence between ED and the QM of charged
particles is that charges are quantized [13, 89]. Entropic Dynamics has managed to derive
general unitary evolution of pure states as an application of the standard maximum entropy
method and information geometry, as was desired in the introduction.
At this point the standard Hilbert space formalism may be adopted to represent the
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epistemic state Ψ(x) as a vector for convenience,
|Ψ〉 =
∫
dxΨ(x)|x〉 with Ψ(x) = 〈x|Ψ〉. (4.46)
The expression of |Ψ〉 in another basis may be interpreted as a potentially convenient way
of expressing position space wavefunctions in ED.
4.2 Mixed States in ED
The derivation of mixed quantum states in ED involves a straightforward application of
probability theory. First, consider the derivation of pure state QM up to equation (4.9),
ρ(x′|t′) =
∫
P (x′|x,∆t)ρ(x|t) dx. (4.47)
Recall that the transition probability is,
P (x′|x,∆t) = 1
Z
exp[−
∑
n
δab(
mn
2~∆t
(∆xan − 〈∆xan〉)(∆xbn − 〈∆xbn〉)] , (4.48)
having the expected drifts,
〈∆xA〉 = mAB[~∂B (φ+ χ)− AB]∆t, (4.49)
and
χ(x) ≡
∑
n
βnχ(xn) and AA(x) ≡ ~βnAa(xn). (4.50)
The evolution of ρ in (4.47) is generated based on the implicit assumption that if the
potentials (φ, χ, Aa), contributing to the expected drift of the particle 〈∆xA〉, are known
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with certainty – and ρ(x|t) is given – that the form of ρ(x′|t′) is known with certainty. That
is, given that the initial conditions {φ, χ, Aa, ρ(x|t)} are known, we may find ρ(x′|t′).
Let’s suppose, that in addition to our uncertainty in the definite yet unknown particle
positions, that there exists an uncertainty in the set of initial conditions under which the
system has been prepared. Let p(k) represent the probability the particles evolve according to
the kth set of initial conditions {φ, χ, Aa, ρ(x|t)}k ≡ {φk, χk, Aak, ρ(x|k, t)}. The probability
distribution of interest is the joint probability ρ(x, k) = p(k)ρ(x|k), so we seek updates of
the form ρ(x, k|t)→ ρ(x′, k|t′). This can be accomplished by considering
ρ(x′, k|t′) =
∫
P (x′|x, k,∆t)ρ(x, k|t) dx, (4.51)
however, the situational probabilities p(k) factor out,
p(k)ρ(x′|k, t′) = p(k)
∫
P (x′|x, k,∆t)ρ(x|k, t) dx, (4.52)
which means that for all k,
ρ(x′|k, t′) =
∫
P (x′|x, k,∆t)ρ(x|k, t) dx. (4.53)
We therefore may evaluate the entropic dynamics update ofN particles in the kth preparation
ρ(x|k) independently from the other preparations. Because the original entropic dynamics
that leads to pure state QM is indeed a special case of this entropic dynamics when the
initial conditions k are known with certainty, we may follow the exact derivation of pure
state QM from (4.9) onwards and arrive at the SE for the kth preparation,
i~
∂Ψk
∂t
= −
∑
n
~
2
2mn
δab(
∂
∂xan
− iβnAak(xn))( ∂
∂xbn
− iβnAbk(xn))Ψk + Vk(x)Ψk. (4.54)
Because each of the k preparations are over exactly the same N particles, intrinsic particle
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qualities having to do with n, such as masses mn and the quantized charges βn =
qn
~c
, are
independent of the initial conditions; i.e, we may not know k but we do know that the masses
and charges are independent of k. The index k is left on the external vector potential and
the scalar potential Vk to include instances in which the observer in question does not know,
as part of k, the potential used in the preparation procedure of k. Because the inference of k
is over the same N particles, the scalar potential is expected to factor Vk(x) = Vin(x)+vk(x)
into an internal potential Vin (like particle-particle Coulomb interactions between the N
particles), which are independent of k, and the externally prescribed potential vk(x) that
does depend on k. If the observer in question is the one applying the external potential(s),
then the k indices on the potentials drop out, but Ψk retains its index through ρ(x|k) and
Φk.
At this point the standard Hilbert space formalism may be adopted to represent the
epistemic state Ψk(x) as a vector,
|Ψk〉 =
∫
dxΨk(x)|x〉 with Ψk(x) = 〈x|Ψk〉. (4.55)
If the observer in question is interested in calculating the probability that the set of N
particles are located at the point x in configuration space, it is
ρ(x) =
∑
k
p(k)ρ(x|k) =
∑
k
p(k)|〈x|Ψk〉|2 =
∑
k
p(k)〈x|Ψk〉〈Ψk|x〉 = 〈x|ρˆ|x〉, (4.56)
and we may extract the density matrix ρˆ =
∑
k p(k)|Ψk〉〈Ψk| as a matter of convenience.
Expectation values are treated in the usual way by introducing the trace,
〈f(x)〉 =
∑
k
∫
f(x)ρ(x, k)dx =
∑
k
p(k)〈f(x)〉k = Tr(f(xˆ)ρˆ). (4.57)
Probabilities are expectation values of projectors p(a) = Tr(|a〉〈a|ρˆ). One should note that
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in general,
p(Ψk) = Tr(|Ψk〉〈Ψk|ρˆ) =
∑
k′
p(k′)|〈Ψk|Ψk′〉|2 6= p(k), (4.58)
meaning the probability p(k) that the particles were prepared in k, is not equal in general
to the probability that the state could end up being inferred as |Ψk〉, due to the fact that
〈Ψk|Ψk′〉 6= δkk′ in general.
The time derivative of this density matrix is the quantum Liouville equation dρˆ
dt
= 1
i~
[Hˆ, ρˆ],
thus, using ED, it can be interpreted as an application of inference. This completes the
derivation of density matrices in ED with static probabilities p(k), which is sufficient for this
thesis. A future topic of research is to recast the general dynamics of density matrices as an
application of inference using ED.
Now that density matrices are specified in ED, one may go ahead and use the quantum
relative entropy,
S(ρˆ, ϕˆ) = −Tr(ρˆ log ρˆ− ρˆ log ϕˆ), (4.59)
for the purpose of updating density matrices as we did in earlier Chapters. It is now clear
that because QM was derived from standard probability theory, that the quantum maxi-
mum entropy method cannot be a generalization of “probability updating” and that density
matrices cannot be “generalizations of probability”. Rather than density matrices being
generalizations, they are “particularizations”, as their function is specifically designed for
describing quantum systems [45]. All probability updating in this instance has been accom-
plished by the use of the standard relative entropy and information geometry in ED. This
will be discussed further in the next chapter on Quantum Measurement in ED.
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Chapter 5
Solution to the Quantum
Measurement Problem in Entropic
Dynamics
This chapter follows [3, 14] and expands upon a few sections in [3].1 In the previous chapter,
Quantum Mechanics (QM) was derived as an application of probability updating and infor-
mation geometry in Entropic Dynamics (ED). ED itself is an inference framework that is
general enough to process arbitrary information in the form of dynamical constraints on the
probability distribution in question. In standard QM, wavefunctions follow one of two modes
of dynamical evolution that are usually considered to be detached from one another: the
Schro¨dinger Equation (SE), which evolves states unitarily from one pure state to another,
and its discontinuous collapse once a detection has been made [42]. In ED, these modes of
evolution are both described as instances of entropic probability updating and are therefore
two sides of the same coin [14]. In the sense of [7–9], there is only one universal probability
updating mechanism (entropic updating), and therefore in ED there is no reason to privilege
1Reference [3] extends the treatment to von Neumann, weak measurements, and fully specifies the solution
to the preferred basis problem.
104
one instance of probability updating (SE or collapse) over another.
As is mentioned in the preamble of the previous chapter, in an inference framework such as
ED, the common reference to “observables” is misguided. “Observables” should be replaced
by Bell’s term “beables” [15] for ontic elements such as particle positions, and “inferables”
for those epistemic elements associated to probability distributions [3].2 This distinction
between ontological and epistemic variables is essential toward the future development of
this thesis, and indeed using more rigorous verbiage leads to a clearer interpretation of QM
[15, 95]. Ultimately, it is these notions that prevent ED from being ruled out by any of
the aforementioned QM no-go theorems [4], as well as providing clear interpretations of the
quantum measurement process in ED [3, 14].
In ED it is possible to infer “observables” other than position, e.g. momentum, energy,
and spin [3, 14]. While positions are the only ontic elements, other “observables” are purely
epistemic; they are properties of a probability distribution (or equally well an epistemic
wavefunction), not of the particle [14]. These ideas can be pushed to an extreme when
discussing the notion of a Weak Value [43, 105, 106] of an operator. The Weak Value of an
operator Aˆ in which the system is prepared in an initial state |Ψ〉 and “post-selected” in
state |Ψ′〉 is defined to be,
Aw =
〈Ψ′|Aˆ|Ψ〉
〈Ψ′|Ψ〉 . (5.1)
The Weak Value of an operator may take values far outside the acceptable range of eigen-
values while also being complex in general. They are therefore not Hermitian observables,
and yet, they can still be inferred. Interpreting Weak Values as being part of the ontology
leads to paradoxes, which are usually advertised in the titles of various Weak Value articles:
“How the result of a measurement of a component of the spin of a spin-1/2 particle can
turn out to be 100” [43], “The quantum pigeonhole principle and the nature of quantum
2Although, beables are inferables too.
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correlations”3 [107, 108], as well as the “Quantum Cheshire Cats” [109] in which properties
of a particle (its spin in this case) seemingly travels along one arm of an interferometer while
the particle itself travels along the other. Although stimulating, many of these paradoxes
can be resolved by treating a Weak Value as nothing more than a potentially interesting
epistemic inferable, which we will do later in this chapter. It should be noted that weak
measurement and Weak Values have been used as a practical amplification technique given
a large number of measurements are made [43, 106]. At this point we will take a step back
from Entropic Dynamics and review the quantum measurement problem(s).
5.1 The Quantum Measurement Problems
There are two measurement problems outlined in [41]: the first is the problem of definite
outcomes, and the second is the problem of preferred basis (or degenerate basis). We will
introduce them here:
The problem of definite outcomes stems from the difference between how Quantum Me-
chanics (QM) describes the world, and how the world is described in everyday experience.
In QM, particles evolve from one pure state to another, and in some sense never “settle
down” to a definite final state, in all but the most trivial cases. This is in stark contrast
to our everyday experience and the detected results of quantum mechanical experiments.
Although the experimental results match the predictions of QM in probability, they fail to
match in formalism. “Wavefunction collapse” is usually tacked onto the formalism ad hocly
to cover the blemish of QM’s lack of definite outcomes. The quantum formalism fails to
predict when its unitary evolution will halt4 and collapse the state, as was given in the 2012
paper “Quantum measurement occurrence is undecidable” [110].
3From [107], “The classical pigeonhole principle states that if N objects are placed in M < N separate
boxes, then at least one box must contain more than one object. In [108] it is argued that quantum systems
do not obey this principle. ”
4“Halt”, precisely in the sense of computability theory.
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The second measurement problem, the problem of preferred basis or degenerate basis, is
a bit more technical in nature. In the von Neumann measurement scheme, the system we
would like to measure, |Ψ〉 =∑αn|an〉, is entangled with a “pointer variable” that indicates
the state of a measurement device. The pointer variable is treated quantum mechanically
and correlated with the system of interest in such a way that by detecting its state, we may
infer the state |an〉 with certainty. Starting the pointer variable in a “ready state” |r〉, it is
entangled with the system of interest via a unitary time evolution,
(∑
n
αn|an〉
)
|r〉 t−→
∑
n,m
αnδnm|an〉|bm〉. (5.2)
This is the von Neumann measurement procedure. A detection that finds the pointer variable
in state |bn〉 seemingly allows the observer to infer that the system of interest has become
the state |an〉; however, the catch is that the system and measurement device evolve into a
special entangled state called a “biorthogonal” state [41], which has the form of a Schmidt
decomposition. The problem is, without a proper specification of the ontology, the right
hand side of (5.2) can be expanded in other bases, and due to possible degeneracies in
the probabilities of the measurement outcomes and the unspecified ontology of the pointer
variable, it can be unclear what state was actually detected, and therefore, what state was
inferred – this specifies the problem of preferred basis [41]. These degenerate basis raise the
question of which basis should be the preferred basis, i.e. the basis which is actually present
in the ontology of the quantum experiment. A pedagogical example is that an entangled
spin state |Ψ〉 = 1√
2
(| + −〉 − | − +〉) in σz may be expanded into the eigenbasis of σx,
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|x+x−〉 − |x−x+〉), which both have an identical probability spectrum. There is
no ontological matter of fact about which outcome has been obtained in the measurement
process (| ± ∓〉 or |x±x∓〉) because both instances are probabilistically indistinguishable.
There is no reason to believe that σx pointer states should be more ontological than σz
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pointer states, or the reverse, and take the privileged role of the preferred basis in general
measurement setups. Thus, because the standard quantum formalism fails to specify the
preferred basis, quantum measurement procedures are insufficient in general.
5.2 Position and Inference: The Solution to the Quan-
tum Measurement Problem in Entropic Dynamics
The two major quantum measurement problems outlined in [41], and introduced above, are
the problem of definite outcomes (collapse) and the problem of preferred basis or degenerate
basis. Solutions to the measurement problem are often called “interpretations of QM”, the
idea being that all such “interpretations” agree on the formalism and thus the experimen-
tal predictions [111]. Other solutions involve making modifications to Quantum Mechanics
[111]. Entropic Dynamics presents a third type of solution to the quantum measurement
problem(s). By showing that QM is a subset of the available inference applications in en-
tropic inference, representing collapse through inferential Bayesian updates is self-contained
within ED’s theoretical framework [3, 14].5 Furthermore, stating that the positions are the
ontological variables of interest, and updating probabilities in a way that is consistent with
this notion,6 solves the problem of preferred basis. This matches the conclusion in [112]
that the preferred basis must be supplied as an additional postulate outside of quantum
mechanical law, and indeed, this is how the preferred basis is prescribed in ED [3, 14]. Thus,
Entropic Dynamics solves the quantum measurement problems in a way that afflicts other
interpretations of QM (and their solutions to the quantum measurement problems).
How it is that ED is not ruled out by the Bell-Kochen-Specker Theorem7 and other no-go
5Reference [3] extends the treatment to von Neumann, weak measurements, and fully specifies the solution
to the preferred basis problem.
6Specifically equations (4.1) - (4.5), and (4.9).
7The Bell-Kochen-Specker Theorem is a no-go theorem that rules out interpretations of QM that assign
ontological status to the eigenvalues of operators that simultaneously belong to multiple (noncommuting) sets
of internally complete sets of commuting observables. The interpretation of the Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem
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theorems is discussed in the next chapter. The remaining measurement problems in ED are
to describe collapse and the inference of inferables other than position. Due to the nature of
“inferables” in ED, we are able to interpret Weak Values in the weak measurement scheme
as interesting epistemic inferables, which will be discussed later.
5.2.1 Detection as an Entropic Update: The “Collapse” of the
Wavefunction
The “problem” of wavefunction collapse is never truly encountered in ED for the same reason
that it is not encountered in epistemic “classical” probability theory. No one asks how the
probability distribution of a die role collapses during measurement; this just follows from the
inductive logic expressed by Bayes Rule, which again, is a special case of entropic probability
updating [7–9]. If a particle with wavefunction Ψ is detected at xD with certainty, the prior
probability ϕ(x) = |〈x|Ψ〉|2 is updated to ρ(x) = δ(x−xD) – the entropic dynamics updating
scheme comes to a halt and addresses the new data via the standard maximum entropy
method reviewed in previous chapters. What should be emphasized is that, in Entropic
Dynamics, both the unitary evolution of the wavefunction and its collapse are probability
updates compatible with entropic inference – probability is always updated with respect to
the available information. A question of interest in Entropic Dynamics is “What is the
inference procedure for detecting particles?”. This requires the specification of measurement
devices in ED.
As is discussed in the preamble of the previous chapter, detectors are themselves made
of particles with definite positions. Let the internal state of a detector be represented by the
positional configuration of its constituting particles {d} (the bold face is to differentiate this
d from the differential d). As the particles of interest in ED also have ontological positions
is that operators in QM are contextual, meaning that their character or value depend on the remaining set
of commuting observables in a measurement setting.
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x, the detector’s particles with ontological positions d may be described equally well in
ED, and positional correlations between the system and measurement device ϕ(x,d) =
ϕ(x)ϕ(d|x) 6= ϕ(x)ϕ(d) may be generated and capitalized upon by the observer for the
purpose of inference. In principle, we have access to the joint probability ϕ(x,d) as it can
be generated from the SE. Correlations of this type are possible in ED because detectors
ultimately consist of particles, and thus, their inner workings may be described purely from
that basis. For instance, one may describe a voltmeter as measuring voltage in terms of the
displacements of the voltmeter’s internal particle configurations (a current that generates an
amplified signal in the sense below). The inclusion of the positional detector states {d} into
the analysis further actualizes the notion of a detector given in [3, 14]; however, the final
results are the same.
The internal mechanisms of a detector that lead to a detection can be expressed “classi-
cally” as an amplification [14], and so, we may let the signal amplification of a detector be
represented (for the purpose of inference) by an “amplification” likelihood function q(D|d)
that gives the probability of a (usually macroscopic) detection signal D when its particles
have transitioned from a ready configuration dr to a final configuration d. The likelihood
functions q(D|d) are capable of representing a large class of detectors from CCD cameras,
to bubble chambers, or even our own eyes, each having various likelihood functions specific
to the effectiveness of the amplification process of the detector in question. The full mea-
surement inference includes amplified detection signals D, detector states d, and the system
of interest x. This is incorporated into the inference procedure by considering a larger space
of variables ϕ(x,d)→ ϕ(x,d, D).
Here is a quick summary of the discussion so far: the particles of interest with configura-
tion space coordinate x are correlated with the positions d of particles that are considered
to be part of the “detector”. These correlations result in the joint probability ϕ(x,d), that
may be generated using QM. Furthermore, for the convenience of the observer, the final
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result of d is amplified through the detector, which, by design, gives the signal D. The
effectiveness of conveying the result of d through D is represented by the amplification like-
lihood function q(D|d). The entire inference process may be stated by the joint probability,
ϕ(x,d, D) = ϕ(x|d, D)q(D|d)ϕ(d). The conditional probability ϕ(x|d, D) = ϕ(x|d) is in-
dependent of D in general because, by construction, D is some probabilistic function of d,
and thus D cannot give any more information about x than can d through the conditional
probability ϕ(x|d) that was generated using QM. Thus the joint probability of interest takes
a slightly simplified form ϕ(x,d, D) = ϕ(x|d)q(D|d)ϕ(d) = ϕ(x,d)q(D|d).
An ideal device has amplified signals Dd that are in a one to one correspondence with d
such that q(Dd|d′) = δd,d′ = q(Dd)ϕ(d′) q(d′|Dd) = q(d′|Dd), and q(Dd) = ϕ(d). Ideal amplifica-
tion of this type is impossible to implement in practice when the number of relevant detector
particles, having the configuration space coordinate d, is macroscopic in number. However, if
the relevant number of detector particles is manageable, for instance when detector particles
are initialized in an unstable equilibrium that when perturbed results in a chain reaction that
amplifies its signal, the number of relevant macroscopic (amplified) detector signals {Dd}
are manageable. We will assume these probability relationships to hold for now as it leads
to the description of an ideal measurement device.
The purpose of D is to provide the observer with a convenient macroscopic interface for
detection so the observer doesn’t need to concern themselves with the potentially compli-
cated internal detector states {d}. These states may be marginalized over and indeed give
ϕ(x,D) = ϕ(x|D)ϕ(x), where ϕ(x|D) is equal in value to the correlations originally pre-
sented by ϕ(x|d), if the efficiency of the detector amplification q(Dd|d′) = δDd,d′ = q(d′|Dd)
is ideal. The proof can be seen by writing the marginalization in the following form,
ϕ(x,Dd) =
∫
dd′ ϕ(x,d′, Dd) =
∫
dd′ ϕ(x,d)q(D|d) =
∫
dd′ ϕ(x|d′)ϕ(d′)δDd,d′
= ϕ(x|Dd)ϕ(Dd). (5.3)
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Here we see the likelihood function for the detector particle (configuration) is ϕ(d|x) =
ϕ(Dd|x) ≡ ϕ(D|x), which is equal to that of its amplified signal, and in some sense, the
correlations between (x,d) have propagated to (x,D) through the amplification process.
Given an idealized amplification process, the probability that the particle was at x given the
amplified signal D is,
ρ(x) = ϕ(x|D) = ϕ(x)ϕ(D|x)
ϕ(D)
, (5.4)
by Bayes rule, which may be generated using entropic methods [7–9] (reviewed in the in-
troduction of Chapter 3). An idealized inference process allows one to detect the pres-
ence of a particle in an infinitesimally small region centered around xD, that is, (5.4) is
ρ(x) = δ(x − xD). This requires both the amplification likelihood function to be ideal
q(Dd|d′) = δDd,d′ as well as an ideal detector particle configuration conditional probability
ϕ(x|d) = δ(x−xd). Correlations such as ϕ(x|d) = δ(x−xd) are sought after by the observer
and this is indeed why the von Neumann measurement process is valuable.
In most physical situations there is a lack of efficiency in the amplification process such
that q(Dd|d′)→ q(D|d′) 6= δD,d′ . There are many such examples of non-idealized amplifica-
tion likelihood functions q(D|d): a Gaussian (or other) distribution for D having an average
value f(d), a CCD camera that clicks with certainty if d is within a certain interval8, or
any such detector that has signals D = D(d) that are a surjective function of the detector
particle configurations (in practice D maps d from its high dimensional space to D’s lower
dimensional space). In any of these cases, the Bayes update becomes an instance of Jeffreys
Rule,
ρJ(x) = ϕJ(x|D) =
∫
ϕ(x,d, D) dd
q(D)
=
∫
ϕ(x|d)ϕ(d)q(D|d)
q(D)
dd =
∫
ϕ(x|d)q(d|D) dd,
8Unlike the maximally efficient detector whose likelihood function is a delta, the likelihood function for
a CCD camera q(D|d) is an indicator function.
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(5.5)
such that a detection at D specifies x with probability ϕJ(x|D). Even if x and d are equally
correlated ϕ(x,d), here and in the ideal case, the lack of efficiency in signal amplification
on part of the detector q(D|d′) 6= δD,d′ leads to further uncertainty in the final position of
x (5.5). It should be noted that the type of uncertainty presented in signal amplification
q(D|d′) 6= δD,d′ is not necessarily quantum mechanical in origin. Jauch was able to show
this experimentally, his measurements of position had less uncertainty than did the particle’s
quantum mechanical statistical uncertainty [113], i.e., you can detect the position of a par-
ticle with a finer precision than the original quantum statistical uncertainty permits. This
statement is as simple as differentiating between the statistical uncertainty of a coin flip and
our ability to detect that it indeed landed on heads or tails with certainty. Detection and
collapse in ED are therefore characterized by (5.4) and (5.5).
Compatibility with the the quantum maximum entropy method: The explanation
presented in [3] for collapse, and reiterated above, is completely consistent with the quantum
maximum entropy method [2] from Chapter 3. This is because the data update of the
density matrix
∼
ϕ→ ρˆ using the quantum maximum entropy method is simply a probabilistic
update of its components ϕ(x) → ρ(x). In the language of density matrices, the prior pure
state ϕˆ, with probability ϕ(x) = |〈x|Ψ〉|2, needs to decohere ϕˆ →∼ϕ with the measurement
device before it could be collapsed using the quantum maximum entropy method to avoid
the PDMT. This step of decoherence may be expressed using the standard QM tools from
Chapter 3 in the ED of mixed states formalism, or one can simply skip to a more probabilistic
explanation as was given in the above discussion as the positional detector states {d} are
marginalized over. The states {d} are in principle the same detector states from Chapter
3. If however, the prior probability between x and the macroscopic detector states D are
already known ϕ(x,D), one could simply use the standard maximum entropy method with
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the appropriate data constraint ρ(D), to derive the appropriate Bayes or Jeffreys rule [7–
9, 14] – all of which are available tools within the ED framework. Depending on the type
of detector, the final inferred state(s) of the particle(s) in question may continue to evolve
under the same or a new Hamiltonian, by some other inferential means, or perhaps be thrown
away entirely in preparation for the next experiment.
5.2.2 Unitary Measurement Devices
A question of interest answered in [14, 114] is, “How can we measure (infer) observables (or
in the present case “inferables”) other than position (given that position is the preferred
basis) in ED?”. The subtext has been added for clarity and flow in this thesis, and the
surprisingly simple arguments of [14, 114] are reviewed here.
Consider the wavefunction of a single particle living on a discrete lattice,
|Ψ〉 =
∑
i
ci|xi〉 with Prob(xi) = pi = |〈xi|Ψ〉|2 = |ci|2 . (5.6)
As the particles have ontological positions in ED, pi gives the probability the particle is
at location xi. In a more “complicated” measurement, the particle is subject to additional
interactions right before reaching the position detector. Let such a setup A be described by
a particular unitary time evolution UˆA that is designed to take particles from an initial state
|ai〉 to the position |xi〉 on the discrete lattice with certainty – that is, UˆA|ai〉 = |xi〉. The
unitary measurement device is the analog of a light prism; it takes well defined momentum
states of particles and deflects them onto a screen for position detection. Since the set {|xi〉}
is orthonormal and complete, the set {|ai〉} is also orthonormal and complete. To figure out
the effect of A on some generic initial state vector |Ψ〉, expand the state of interest in the
basis of the inferables of interest |Ψ〉 = ∑i ci|ai〉, where ci = 〈ai|Ψ〉. Then the state |Ψ〉
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evolves according to UˆA into a new state at a later time t
′,
UˆA|Ψ〉 =
∑
i
ciUˆA|ai, t〉 =
∑
i
ci|xi, t′〉, (5.7)
which, invoking the Born rule for position measurements, implies that the probability of
finding the particle at the position xi at a later time is pi = |ci|2 = |〈xi|Ψ(t′)〉|2 = |〈ai|Ψ(t)〉|2,
which is equal to the probability of ai at an earlier time. These positional probabilities then
may evolve with {d} on the screen in the above section and one may collapse the system and
infer an original positional state |ai〉 =
∑
j cij|xj〉. That is, directly from [3] (and inspired
by [14, 114]), “From a physics perspective there is nothing more to say but we can adopt
a different language: we can say that the particle has been “measured” as if it had earlier
been in the state |ai〉” – although, in-fact, it was not, because the full state at that time
was a superposition of |ai〉’s. Thus, the setup A is a device that in principle “measures” all
operators of the form Aˆ =
∑
i λi|ai〉〈ai| where the eigenvalues λi are arbitrary scalars. Note
that there is no implication that the particle previously had or now currently has the value
λi. In the context of this thesis and in ED, the states {|ai〉} and operator Aˆ are inferables
of the theory that are inferred from detections of the preferred ontological position basis.
If one wants to infer a continuous variable from a state like |Ψ〉 = ∫ da ψ(a)|a〉 one uses
a unitary device UˆA with the property UˆA|a, t〉 = |x, t′〉. A change of variable is required
a = a(x) → x, where a(x) is the appropriate monotonic correspondence function of the
unitary device (for simplicity consider a(x) = cx, where c converts and scales what positions
on a screen correspond to what values of |a〉 at an earlier time). This amounts to,
UˆA|Ψ〉 =
∫
dx
(da(x)
dx
)1/2
|x, t′〉〈a(x), t|Ψ〉 =
∫
dx
(da(x)
dx
)1/2
|x, t′〉〈a(x), t|
∫
daψ(a)|a〉
=
∫
dx
(da(x)
dx
)1/2
ψ(a(x))|x, t′〉, (5.8)
such that ρ(x) = |ψ(a(x))|2|da/dx| and therefore p(a) = |ψ(a, t)|2da = |ψ(x, t′)|2dx = p(x)
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at the later time t′. Again Bayes Rule may be used as an instance of collapse as is specified
above. Observables of the form Aˆ are thus inferred from position.
5.2.3 Von Neumann Measurements in Entropic Dynamics
This subsection discusses the method for generating correlations between the detector states
d and the inferables of interest using a von Neumann measurement procedure in ED. As
well, this discussion provides an example that shows how both the measurement problems
of definite outcomes and preferred basis are resolved within the ED framework.
Given a state of interest |Ψi〉 =
∑
n αn|an〉, which has been expanded in the basis of the
inferables of interest {an}, a von Neumann measurement is one in which |Ψi〉 evolves with an
auxiliary “pointer variable” (or detector) state, |Φi〉 = |d0〉 → {|dm〉}, of which both become
entangled, such that an may be inferred from detections of dn. In ED, the natural pointer
variables are the positions of (detector) particles as position is the preferred basis. These
“pointer variables” dm may be interpreted as the internal positional states of a detector or
as the position of a single particle being fed into a detector, from Section 5.2.1. The resulting
state from a von Neumann measurement is the entangled state,
(∑
n
αn|an〉
)
|d0〉 ∆t−→
∑
n,m
αnδnm|an〉|dm〉, (5.9)
that’s unitary evolution will be discussed now.
Initially, the state of interest is |Ψi〉 =
∑
n αn|an〉 and the pointer variable is in its “ready”
state |Φi〉 = |d0〉. The initial joint system is represented by the tensor product of the initial
states |Ψi〉 ⊗ |Φi〉 ≡ |Ψi〉|Φi〉. The pure state evolves with the detector states {d} via a
unitary evolution to a final entangled state |Ψf ,Φf〉,
|Ψi〉|Φi〉 =
(∑
n
αn|an〉
)
|d0〉 −→ |Ψf ,Φf 〉 = Uˆ |Ψi〉|Φi〉. (5.10)
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The general form of this unitary operator is,
Uˆ =
∑
n,n′,m,m′
un,n′,m,m′ |an〉|dm〉〈an′|〈dm′| =
∑
m,m′
Bdmdm′ ⊗ |dm〉〈dm′ |, (5.11)
with the sub-block matrices,
Bdmdm′ =
∑
n,n′
un,n′,m,m′ |an〉〈an′|. (5.12)
We define a good detector as one in which the anth state only entangles with the dnth
positional state of the detector, which is an argument for the sub-block matrix to take a
simple form,
Bdmd0 =
∑
n,n′
δm,nδm′,n′|an〉〈an′| = |am〉〈am|. (5.13)
This then gives a fully entangled (von Neumann measurement) state at a later time,
|Ψf ,Φf 〉 =
∑
n,m
αnδnm|an〉|dm〉. (5.14)
Because position plays the role of the preferred basis in ED, the state does not have degenerate
bases and the measurement problem of preferred basis is solved – particle or particles are
ontologically present at one of the locations dn. This solution is equally valid for the beable
particle positions in Bohmian Mechanics. Although ED does assume that particles have
definite yet unknown (and ontological) positions from the start, this assumption is carried
throughout, and in-fact, helps guide the derivation of QM from ED. The probability updating
scheme evolves probabilities ρ(x|t) in a way that is consistent with notion that particles
having definite yet unknown, and ontological, positions as can be seen in the discussion
before, around, and through equations (4.1) - (4.5), and (4.9).
117
Given the von Neumann measurement above in ED, the joint probability is,
P (an,dm) = |〈an|〈dm|
∑
n′,m′
αn′δn′m′ |an′〉|dm′〉|2 = |αnδnm|2 = |αn|2δnm, (5.15)
which is normalized
∑
n,m |αn|2δnm =
∑
n |αn|2 = 1. Given ideal amplification d → D from
Section 5.2.1, and that the value of the data isD, the (standard) entropic updating procedure
(from the introduction in Chapter 3 or [7–9]) gives Bayes Theorem,
P (an|D) = P (an, D)
P (D)
=
|αnδnD|2∑
n |αnδnD|2
= δnD, (5.16)
which is collapse in Entropic Dynamics [3, 14]. For a von Neumann measurement, a detection
of D allows a precise inference of the inferable in question. The resulting state is accurately
describable by a particular eigenvector |aD〉, which is understood to be a convenient repre-
sentation of its position space wavefunction |aD〉 =
∫
ΨaD(x)|x〉 dx.
Again we emphasize that in Entropic Dynamics, both the unitary evolution of the wave-
function and its collapse are both probability updates compatible with entropic inference.
The state evolves unitarily when the information available is with respect to the continuous
positional expected drift of the particles (i.e. it undergoes the entropic dynamics update with
updating drift potentials), and if there is new information in the form of data, the entropic
dynamics update halts, addresses the data, and updates the current probability distribution
accordingly. Thus, the measurement problem of definite outcomes is solved using inference
methods that are completely contained within the inference framework that is Entropic Dy-
namics. Both of the quantum measurement problems outlined in [41] are therefore solved in
Entropic Dynamics.
These notions can easily be extended to “weak measurements”, which we will discuss
now.
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5.3 Weak Measurements and Weak Values in Entropic
Dynamics
This section discusses the method for generating correlations between the detector states d
and inferables of interest, in ED.
5.3.1 Weak Measurements in Entropic Dynamics
To avoid clutter we will set ~ = 1 and save the normalization factors until the end of the
calculation. An ideal pointer variable, or detector state, in ED has a definite initial state in
position space,
|Φideal〉 =
∫
e−
(d−di)
2
4ǫ2 |d〉 dd, (5.17)
i.e., ǫ ≪ 1 and |Φideal〉 approaches a delta function. We consider a more general case in
which the initial state is,
|Φi〉 =
∫
e
− d2
4△2 |d〉 dd, (5.18)
where △ is some finite volume, which reproduces the ideal measurement device when △→ ǫ
after normalization. Using the completeness relation 1 =
∫
dp|p〉〈p|, the state of the pointer
particle can be represented in momentum space as,
|Φi〉 =
∫
e
− d2
4△2
∫
|p〉〈p|d〉 dddp =
∫
e
− d2
4△2
∫
e−ip·d dd|p〉dp =
∫
e−△
2p2 |p〉 dp. (5.19)
In this section we will consider d to be the position of a single particle in 3D space. The
quantum system to be entangled with the measurement device is a preselected or prepared
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superposition state, that when expanded in the basis of the inferable of interest Aˆ, is
|Ψi〉 =
∑
n
αn|A = an〉. (5.20)
A particularly telling situation is one in which the measuring device and system of interest
are coupled by a coupling or interaction Hamiltonian,
Hˆ = −g(t)pˆAˆ, (5.21)
where pˆ is the canonical conjugate of the pointer variable, which thereby generates transla-
tions in the pointer variable dˆ, and g(t) is a coupling constant with compact support near
the time of measurement that integrates to a finite number [43]. We can assume that the
coupling Hamiltonian will dominate over the full Hamiltonian for the, assumed small, period
of measurement. The time evolution of our entangled system is,
|Ψf ,Φf 〉 = U |Ψi〉|Φi〉 = e−i
∫
Hˆdt|Ψi〉|Φi〉
=
∑
n
αn
∫
e−△
2p2eipˆAˆ|A = an〉|p〉 dp =
∑
n
αn
∫
e−△
2p2eipan |A = an〉|p〉 dp, (5.22)
which, in the position space representation, is
=
∑
n
αn
∫
e−△
2p2e−ip(d−an)|A = an〉|d〉 dp dd =
∑
n
αn
∫
e
− (d−an)2
4△2 |A = an〉|d〉 dd. (5.23)
This is a superposition of potentially overlapping Gaussian distributions that have peaks at
the eigenvalues of Aˆ. When the Gaussian wavefunctions overlap we have a so-called “weak
measurement” [43]; when the Gaussian distributions are neatly resolved we have a “strong”
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or von Neumann measurement (∆→ ǫ) [43]. The joint probability of the system is,
Pf(an,d) = |〈an,d|Ψf ,Φf 〉|2 = |αn|
2e
− (d−an)2
2△2
Z
. (5.24)
In the present case, we may infer the probability the system of interest is accurately de-
scribable by a particular eigenvector |an〉 by making detections of the position of the pointer
particle and entropically collapse the system following Section 5.2.1. The result is given by
Bayes Rule,
P (an) = Pf (an|D) = Pf (an, D)
Pf(D)
=
|αn|2e−
(D−an)
2
2△2∑
m |αm|2e−
(D−am)2
2△2
. (5.25)
Thus a detection of D (generally macroscopic) allows us to infer the probability that the
system is accurately describable by |an〉. Bayes Rule leads to a “weak” collapse of the state
of knowledge of {|an〉} because the initial state of the pointer variable d is itself uncertain.
As is pointed out in [43], by making repeated measurements on identically prepared weak
measurement states, one can infer |αn|2 with certainty. In the limit △ → 0 and a detection
D, we can infer the eigenstate |an〉 with probability 1 using (5.25) – this results in a full
state collapse in ED.
So far we have taken into account the uncertainty in the preparation of the pointer
variable but we have assumed that the pointer variable d has been amplified with 100%
efficiency. If the detector is not completely efficient such that q(D|d′) 6= δDd,d′ then there is
a second source of uncertainty that contributes in addition to the initial uncertainty of the
pointer variable in (5.18). The probability the state is accurately described by |an〉, if the
detection is noisy, is given by Jeffreys Rule,
PJ(an) = ϕJ(an|D) =
∫
P (an,d
′, D) dd′
P (D)
=
∫
P (an|d′)q(d′|D) dd′, (5.26)
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which we see only gives the same state of knowledge as (5.25) if q(D|d′) = δDd,d′ = q(d′|D)
is an ideal amplification, otherwise the detector introduces extra uncertainty (as is discussed
in Section 5.2.1). For instance, a CCD camera’s likelihood function might be uniform over
the width of the corresponding pixel, which changes the probability of an after a detection
D of that pixel.
It should be noted a more robust set of operators Bˆ can be measured in ED by compound-
ing a unitary device Uv, from (5.7), with the weak measurement. This is a combination of a
unitary measurement device with the weak measurement scheme, and doing this maps a non-
position pointer variable {|v〉} to a position pointer variable {|d〉} for inference. Consider
the coupling Hamiltonian
Hc = g(t)Bˆvˆconj , (5.27)
where vˆconj is the Fourier conjugate to vˆ such that 〈v|vconj〉 = e−ivconjv (for instance vˆ = kpˆ
where k has arbitrary units compatible with Bˆ). Evolution under this Hamiltonian entangles
the states,
|Ψf ,Φf 〉 = U |Ψi〉|Φi〉 =
∑
n
αn
∫
e−△
2v2conjeivconjbn |B = bn〉|vconj〉 dvconj, (5.28)
which, in the v space representation,
=
∑
n
αn
∫
e−△
2v2conje−ivconj(v−bn)|B = bn〉|v〉 dvconj dv =
∑
n
αn
∫
e
− (v−bn)2
4△2 |B = bn〉|v〉 dv.
(5.29)
Sending the pointer variable state through a unitary measurement device Uv with the prop-
erty Uv|v, t〉 = |d, t′〉 and a simple device correspondence function v = g(d) = cd [14],
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gives,
|Ψf ,Φf〉′ = I ⊗ Uv|Ψf ,Φf 〉 = c
∑
n
αn
∫
e
− c2(d−bn/c)2
4△2 |B = bn〉|d〉 dd. (5.30)
This is again a superposition of potentially overlapping Gaussian distributions having peaks
at the eigenvalues of Bˆ/c. Detections of D at t′ allow us to infer the most likely |bn〉 at t,
P (bn|D) = P (bn, D)
Pf(D)
=
|αn|2e−
c2(D−bn/c)
2
2△2∑
m |αm|2e−
c2(D−bm/c)2
2△2
. (5.31)
Measurement device uncertainty can be included using the same arguments from (5.26). The
mechanics for the Stern-Gerlach experiment is well known [43, 105, 115]; however a brief
discussion of the inference of spin from position detections (including weak measurements)
is given in Appendix D.
5.3.2 Exotic Inferables and Weak Values in Entropic Dynamics
The Weak Value Aw ≡ 〈Ψ′|Aˆ|Ψ〉/〈Ψ′|Ψ〉 of a Hermitian operator Aˆ was first introduced
by Aharonov, Albert, and Vaidman [43] (AAV) in 1989 as an interesting application of a
weak measurement that gives nonintuitive results (recent review [106]). What is particularly
significant in AAV’s paper [43] is not that they defined an odd quantity associated to Aˆ, but
rather they found, after a series of approximations (see [105]) a way in which Aw could be
“measured.” A Weak Value is a complex number which may lie outside the set of eigenvalues
of Aˆ when 〈Ψ′|Ψ〉 is sufficiently small. Due to this, the interpretation of Weak Values has
had a “colorful history” [106], much of which can be summarized by the question, “Are Weak
Values ontic properties of a particle?”. The answer given by ED is negative in that respect
– Weak Values are inferables of the theory.
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Postselection: The method for inferring a Weak Value involves two steps: first the system
must undergo a weak measurement to couple |Ψ〉|Φ〉 → |Ψf ,Φf〉 as in (5.23) and then
postselect the final state of the system of interest. A postselection is in principle no different
than a preselection (in the sense of [116]), which is the appropriate filtering and selecting of
an initial quantum state except it happens after, rather than before, the system is correlated
with the pointer variable [43]. Because the system of interest’s final state is known |Ψ〉 → |Ψ′〉
when successfully postselected to |Ψ′〉, the probability of the pointer variable taking a value
d is,
P (d|Ψ′) = P (d,Ψ
′)
P (Ψ′)
=
|〈Ψ′,d|Ψf ,Φf〉|2∫
dd |〈Ψ′,d|Ψf ,Φf〉|2 , (5.32)
in agreement with the analysis in [117] that concludes that postselections may be represented
simply through conditional probability.
Weak Values: In ED, variables other than position either: are inferred from position,
are useful parameters in the position probability distribution of the particle, or may be
a particularly convenient basis for representing the position space probability distribution
ρ(x) = |Ψ(x)|2. From this perspective it is clear that inferring Aw does not indicate that
the particle is ontically expressing Aw, in the same way as inferring the momentum from
position detections does not imply it is ontic. Consider the final state of an entangled joint
system from (5.22) that has been postselected into a peculiar state |Ψ′〉 = ∑α′n|A = an〉,
such that,
|Φf 〉 = 〈Ψ′|U |Ψ〉|Φi〉 = 〈Ψ′|e−i
∫
Hˆdt|Ψ〉|Φi〉 ≈ (〈Ψ′|Ψ〉+ ipˆ〈Ψ′|Aˆ|Ψ〉+ ...)|Φi〉
= 〈Ψ′|Ψ〉(1 + ipˆAw + ...)|Φi〉 ≈ 〈Ψ′|Ψ〉
∫
dpeipAwe−△
2p2|p〉, (5.33)
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which in the position space representation is,
|Φf 〉 ≈ 〈Ψ′|Ψ〉
∫
dd exp
(
− (d−Aw)
2
4△2
)
|d〉, (5.34)
given the postselection is in the desired range of validity [105, 106]. In the ED framework
we are interested in the probability distribution of d postselected into Ψ′,
P (d|Ψ′) ≈ 1
Z
exp
(
− (d− Re[Aw])
2
2△2
)
, (5.35)
and note the real part of the weak value Re[Aw] is taken as a feature of the probability
distribution of d. Because Aw appears as a parameter in the probability distribution of d,
we may consider P (d) = P (d|Re[Aw]) and invert the problem to ask, “what is the probability
the parameter Re[Aw] has a certain value given a detection of the pointer particle at x
′” –
that is we may use P (Re[Aw]|{d}) ∝ exp
(
− (Re[Aw]− d)2/(2△2 /N)
)
and the parameter
estimation scheme in [21] to find Re[Aw] in agreement with [43]. Equally well we can find the
imaginary part of the Weak Value by using a unitary measurement device (5.7). Consider
using Up|p, t〉 = |d, t′〉 with a simple correspondence function p = g(d) = cd,
Up|Φf 〉 ≈ c〈Ψ′|Ψ〉
∫
ddeicdAwe−(c△d)
2 |d〉, (5.36)
and after completing the square and normalizing one finds,
P (d|Im[Aw]) = 1
Z
exp
(
− 2(c△)2(d+ Im[Aw]/2c△2)2
)
, (5.37)
where Im[Aw] is the imaginary part of Aw and again after many detections, Im[Aw] and thus
Aw = Re[Aw] + i Im[Aw] may be inferred in full.
There are several potentially interesting Weak Values, but in particular consider that the
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operator Aˆ = |x〉〈x| postselected in the zero momentum state,
Aw =
〈p|x〉〈x|Ψ〉
〈p|Ψ〉
p=0→ kΨ(x), (5.38)
is proportional to the full wavefunction, where k is a constant that will be removed after
normalization [118]. Lundeen et al show that the real and imaginary parts of Ψ(x) are
proportional to the position and momentum shifts of the pointer variable and claim they
are “directly measuring the wavefunction”. From the ED perspective it is more appropriate
to say that the value of the wavefunction at each x is being “directly” inferred. If the
complex valued Ψ(x) is inferred with certainty then it is possible to also solve for the phase
of the wavefunction Φ (up to an additive constant 2πn), and thus, Φ is also an inferable.
This provides a link to Wiseman’s use of Weak Values to measure the probability current in
Bohmian Mechanics [119].
Especially in cases as exotic as the above, ED takes the standpoint that Weak Values
and quantities other than position (energy, momentum, spin, etc.) are best considered as
epistemic “inferables” rather than ontic beables or observables.
5.4 POVM Measurements in Entropic Dynamics
A POVM measurement can be looked at as a generalization of a von Neumann measure-
ment, where detections result in the inference of a density matrix rather than a pure state.
As POVM measurement can be described using the designed quantum maximum entropy
method [1, 2], it can naturally be incorporated into Entropic Dynamics. In particular, the
Section on the Quantum Bayes Rule (QBR) from Chapter 3 can be added into the ED
framework wholesale with the requirement that the x’s and d’s which appear in the QBR
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are in-fact particle positions. The resulting density matrix in the Quantum Bayes Rule
(3.56), ρˆθ =
∼
ϕθ|x, is the inferable that results from the position detection x after a POVM
measurement. This is analogous to the inferable |an〉 that results from the detection of dn
in the von Neumann measurement scheme (5.14).
5.5 Conclusion
Both of the quantum measurement problems outlined in [41] are completely solved within the
Entropic Dynamics framework [3, 14]. Both the unitary evolution of the wavefunction and
its collapse are probability updates compatible with entropic inference. The state evolves
unitarily when the information available corresponds to the continuous positional motion
of the particles (i.e. it undergoes the entropic dynamics update (4.9) with updating drift
potentials (4.41)), and if there is new information in the form of data, the entropic dynamics
update halts, addresses the data, and updates the current probability distribution accord-
ingly. Entropic updates with respect to data yield Bayesian probability updates [7, 8]. Thus,
the measurement problem of definite outcomes is solved using inference techniques that are
completely contained within the inference framework that is Entropic Dynamics.
The measurement problem of preferred basis is solved within ED due to the assumption,
and ontological treatment throughout the derivation and measurement process, of definite
yet unknown particle positions. “Observables” other than positions are more aptly called
“inferables” as their values are inferred on the basis of position detections. The title of
“observables” is downgraded to the title of “inferables”, which plays a central role into why
ED is not ruled out by the Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem next chapter.
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Chapter 6
Entropic Dynamics and the sense in
which no-go theorems can go again
This chapter follows [4] and continues to get back to the original quote by Jaynes (A) in the
introduction. Now that we have derived precise notions of probability, probability updating,
density matrix updating, Quantum Mechanics (QM) and quantum measurement in Entropic
Dynamics (ED), we can address age-old no-go theorems and tactfully avoid pitfalls that some
interpretations of QM fail to do. In particular, we will discuss the following relevant no-go
theorems: Bell’s theorem, the Bell-Kochen-Specker (BKS) theorem, and the more recent
ψ-epistemic no-go theorem by Pusey-Barret-Rudolph (PBR), in the context of ED.
On one hand, Quantum Mechanics is hugely successful in its ability to predict the set
of eigenvalues, expectation values, and operators for a particle system of interest. On the
other hand, the states of interest hold intrinsic unpredictability, quantified by a probability
distribution, except for a few trivial cases. This unpredictable nature, coupled with a desire
to solve the quantum measurement problem(s) which are left open by QM’s standard for-
malism, leaves a space for the many interpretations of QM to coexist inharmoniously within
the community – a community, no doubt, easily bothered by disharmony of any type.
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The community reduces and organizes this disharmony by ruling out interpretations and
foundational theories of QM that disagree with the predictable findings of QM. This is done
by first making a few seemingly reasonable assumptions a theory of QM may obey, and
then by showing these assumptions lead to contradictions in the formalism, construct a
no-go theorem. This is the basis of Bell’s theorem [20], the BKS theorem [17–19], as well
as the findings of Pusey-Barret-Rudolph (PBR) [16] (reviewed in [120]) on the epistemic
interpretation of the wavefunction.
Bell’s theorem and the BKS theorem are intimately connected – the failure of one some-
times implying the failure of the other, i.e., they are both capable of ruling out local hidden
variable theories.1 The interpretation of the BKS theorem is that operators in QM are con-
textual, meaning that their character (or value) depend on the remaining set of commuting
observables in a measurement setting. After considering the final results of these no-go the-
orems, theories and interpretations of QM are sometimes classified using tables, for instance
the 2 by 2 table:
ψ-ontic ψ-epistemic
contextual A B
noncontextual C D
,
might be followed by statements like, “theories of type “C” or “D” which have noncontextual
operators are ruled out by the BKS theorem and “B” is ruled out by PBR”. A reader may
be inclined to conclude that QM must be a theory of type “A” (potential interpretation of
Bohmian mechanics or Many Worlds). The 2 by 2 table is by its nature an over simplification;
it fails to span the entire set of plausible theories, and consequently interpretations, of QM.
This is due the fact that no-go theorems are proofs by contradiction, and only theories which
strictly adhere to their assumptions are ruled out.
In particular, this chapter shows that Entropic Dynamics (ED) is a theory of QM that
1A review of many joint proofs of the BKS and Bell theorems, together with references to the original
papers, can be found in [121].
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lies on the line between theories “B” and “D”, while not being ruled out by any of the
aforementioned no-go theorems. We classify ED as a hybrid-contextual theory of QM because
the positions of particles are treated noncontextually, as they are the preferred basis [3, 14],
while it is shown that all other observables are treated contextually – the main result of [4].
Although being “hybrid-contextual”, ED is not ruled out by the BKS theorem. Concepts
in ED are naturally communicated in the language of probability, and for this reason, the
operator language used in contextuality proofs do not naturally coincide with the language
in ED – this will be touched upon more later. We will discuss the ψ-epistemic no-go theorem
(PBR), Bell’s Theorem, and finally the BKS theorem in the context of ED.
6.1 ψ-epistemic?
In the previous chapters we claimed that ψ is an epistemic object that helps represent our
current knowledge of the system in question. This seemingly runs into conflict with the
ψ-epistemic no-go theorem from [16]; however, there is no issue. An excellent review of the
ψ-epistemic/ontic dichotomy is presented in [120]; however, the ψ-epistemic classifications
there (and in [16]) do not meet the exact ψ-epistemic classification that ED formulates from
the first principles of probability and probability updating.
The first assumption in [16] is 1) that “a ψ-epistemic system has ‘physical states’ upon
which inferences may be made” (paraphrased). The “physical states” of a system are de-
noted by λ. ED agrees with this assumption, and the variables which are “physical” in ED
are alone the definite yet unknown positions of particles. The second assumption 2) is that
“systems which are prepared independently have independent physical states” (PIP). The
PBR theorem finds a contradiction between assumption 2) and QM for systems which are
prepared independently and then measured in an entangled basis, i.e., the physical states
have dependencies in the entangled basis that are seemingly not present in their prepara-
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tion. Thus, throwing away assumption 2) seemingly implies that ψ must be ontic by their
definition.
The second assumption (called the PIP) is considered to have a weak point [120], “In
my view, the weakest part of the PIP is the CPA, i.e., the idea that there should be no
global properties of a system that are not reducible to properties of its subsystems when it is
prepared in a product state”. It is further stated “... the only time global properties would
necessarily have to play a role is when a joint measurement is made, e.g. a measurement in
an entangled basis” (on which the PBR theorem depends) and, “ It would still be possible to
work with separate systems completely independently of each another, in blissful ignorance of
the global properties, until we decide to do an experiment that necessarily involves bringing
the systems together.”. The description of bringing the systems together in space is not
present in the mathematical formalism of the PBR proof. The measurement process in the
PBR is treated like a “black box”, having inputs and outputs where nothing is discussed
about what happens in the middle. Caticha [45] finds this to be a weak point in the PBR,
it fails to take Bell’s advice about measurement – we should be careful and describe the
full inference procedure. Rather than discussing the second assumption and the entire PBR
proof, we will discuss how the notions of “physicality” and ψ-epistemology in [16] and ED
differ, which is reason enough for our version of ψ-epistemic states to not be ruled out.
The conclusion of [16] is that wavefunctions are “physical properties” of quantum systems
because the second assumption that “systems which are prepared independently have inde-
pendent physical states” fails to hold up in their definition of ψ-epistemic states. By their
definition, a “property” L = L(λ) is a function of the “physical states” λ of the probability
distribution µ(λ) in question. The set of properties {L, L′, ...} are considered to be “physical
properties” iff µL(λ) and µL′(λ) do not overlap in λ. This guarantees that a measurement
of λ allows L or L′ to be inferred uniquely. The following classical particle example is given
in the PBR paper [16]:
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“... if an experimenter knows only that the system has energy E, and is otherwise
completely uncertain, the experimenter’s knowledge corresponds to a distribution
µE(x, p) uniform over all points in phase space with H(x, p) = E. Seeing as the
energy is a physical property of the system, different values of the energy E and
E ′ correspond to disjoint regions of phase space, hence the distributions µE(x, p)
and µE′(x, p) have disjoint supports. On the other hand, if two probability dis-
tributions µL(x, p) and µL′(x, p) have overlapping supports, i.e. there is some
region ∆ of phase space where both distributions are non-zero, then the labels L
and L′ cannot refer to a physical property of the system.”
From this classical example we see that the physicality of a “property” L is determined on
the basis of whether or not any physical states λ are shared between µL and µL′. These
definitions are considered in QM where one would like to know if the wavefunction is a
“physical property” of the system (ψ-ontic) or if it is not a physical property (ψ-epistemic).
From [16]:
“Suppose that, for any pair of distinct quantum states |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉, the dis-
tributions µ0(λ) and µ1(λ) do not overlap: then, the quantum state |ψ〉 can be
inferred uniquely from the physical state of the system and hence satisfies the
above definition of a physical property. Informally, every detail of the quantum
state is written into the real physical state of affairs. But if µ0(λ) and µ1(λ) over-
lap for at least one pair of quantum states, then |ψ〉 can justifiably be regarded
as mere information.”
In ED, the only “physical states” and “physical properties” are the positions of particles x
– all other “properties” I are “inferables”. Independent of whether two probability distribu-
tions are overlapping in x, such that I or I ′ can (or cannot) be uniquely inferred from position
detections, the “properties” I and I ′ are epistemic inferables (positions are ontic however).
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In ED, the “physicality” of a property is not determined by one’s ability to make an inference
with certainty. The previous chapter shows this.2 Where [16] finds contradiction between
the notion that prepared quantum states cannot in general be uniquely inferred from mea-
surements of λ, ED finds no contradiction – probability theory is designed for the purpose
of addressing one’s lack of complete information, and thus, indeterminacy is commonplace
in the ED framework.
In [120] the following relevant comment is made about Bohmian Mechanics when ad-
dressed in the context of the PBR theorem:
“The particle positions are supposed to be the things in the theory that provide
a direct picture of what reality looks like to us, e.g. when we observe the pointer
of a measurement device pointing to a specific value then it is the positions
of the particles that make up the pointer that determine this. Nevertheless, the
wavefunction is still needed as part of the ontology because it determines how the
particles move via the guidance equation. The response of a measurement device
to an interaction with a system it is measuring depends on the wavefunction of
the system as well as the particle positions, so the wavefunction is still part of the
ontic state, even if it is in some sense less primitive than the particle positions.”
Consider the following: In ED, “interactions” occur between the positions of the particles
in the system of interest and positions of the particles in the detector. These interactions
cause changes in the detector particle’s positions, and then we make inductive inferences.
The realization that these interacting fields are intermediary, that they are predicated in ex-
periment between particle-based-apparatuses and the particles of interest themselves, speaks
to an interpretation that their function may simply be a convenient representation, or set
of mechanisms, for describing peculiar positional correlations between particles [45]. The
2It also shows that the wavefunction itself is an inferable through position detections using the weak
measurement and Weak Value scheme.
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particles themselves are “doing whatever they are doing” and our model does its best to
make inferences on the basis of the available information. The phase Φ is guided by the
e-Hamilton equations (4.41) and Hamiltonian, which informs us about the expected drift of
the particles through the expectation value constraints (4.2, 4.3), rather than dictating the
motion of the particles directly – (ρ,Φ) is a location in e-phase space. The ontology of any
intermediating fields can only be specified as far as the epistemic correlations (conditional
dependencies) they build between ontic particle positions in ρ(x). The conclusion from this
assessment is not that “fields are not real”, but rather, that there is space for the inquisi-
tion “must we demand in our model that these fields are real?” - the answer in ED is “no,
particles with peculiar probabilistic correlations is enough”. In the absence of QED in ED,
this is just a conjecture, but regardless, the conjecture works well enough for the model of
QM in ED [45].
As the leading assumptions of what entails a ψ-epistemic state differ, the ψ-epistemic
no-go theorem does not apply, which is admitted as a possible exemption to their no-go
theorem in the conclusion of [16]. We are therefore justified in treating ψ epistemically by
our own definition – that ψ =
√
ρeiΦ is a convenient representation for epistemic probability
distributions ρ = |ψ|2 and how ρ is inferentially updated, that has nothing to do with
probability distribution overlap or preparation. Although the PBR theorem may be valuable
for “ontological models” [120], it is not particularly valuable here.
6.2 Hidden Variables, Realism, and Non-locality
The subject of hidden variables, realism, and non-locality in ED has been touched upon
in [14, 21] and it will be further explored here. In Bell’s landmark paper [20], he found a
contradiction between QM and hidden variable theories which claimed local realism. It was
accomplished by considering a hidden variable λ, which if known, would give the outcome of
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an experiment (an eigenvalue of an operator) with certainty a0 = A(λ = λ0). By integrating
over the probability of a hidden variable,
〈A(λ)B(λ)〉 =
∫
p(λ)A(λ)B(λ) dλ, (6.1)
he showed that such expectation values do not always agree with the expectations values of
QM, for general p(λ).
In ED there is no such hidden variable. The particle dynamics is non-deterministic as
can be seen by the Brownian like paths particles take due to the form of the transition
probability P (x′|x) in (4.18), or after “energy conservation”, that the particles are under-
going a non-dissipative diffusion. The process that is deterministic in ED is the evolution
of the probability distribution as it follows the e-Hamilton equations from (4.41) given the
appropriate constraints, boundary, and initial conditions are known. The phase of the wave-
function Φ(x) updates the probability distribution of particle locations rather than guiding
each particle at every point. In the same fashion as above, “The particles themselves are
“doing whatever they are doing” and our model does its best to make inferences on the bases
of the available information. The phase Φ is guided by the e-Hamilton equations (4.41), and
Hamiltonian, which informs us about the expected drift of the particles ... ”. The nonlocal
nature of probability as a means for quantifying knowledge (of the future, past, or present)
accounts for the “quantum mechanical” nonlocal correlations between particles in ED.
As spin states are regularly used in Bell-type experiments, before ED can give a full
account of the Bell experiment, the ED of spin must be developed fully. At this point it
seems like spin states are represented by “spin frames” [45, 101] (Forthcoming by Caticha,
Cararra) that provide additional information about the positions of particles in ρ(x) much
in the same fashion that Φ(x) does, and therefore, spin should be an epistemic inferable.
Note that by detecting positions in a von Neumann or weak measurement setting, the spin
may be inferred from position detections as is reviewed in Appendix D.
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Using a multiple observer probability analysis, Bell’s theorem was investigated in epis-
temic frameworks of QM [5]. As any collapse is an epistemic change in the system, each
viable observer is obligated to assign distributions that coincide with their current state of
knowledge of the system. If Alice and Bob are stationed at space-like separated measure-
ment devices, they have access to different information throughout the experiment due to
the observed order of events being different. I find that, at best, the Bell and the related
CHSH inequality [122, 123] can only be “nonlocally violated counterfactually” as the CHSH
is generated from the posing of an if-then question due to the asymmetry of each observer’s
local information.3 As the CHSH and Bell inequalities are expectation values, they are them-
selves epistemic inferables. The final result of [5] is that probabilities in QM over nonlocal
measurement settings must have counterfactual (if-then) dependencies on their measurement
settings as it cannot be verified otherwise by any local observer. This provides support for
epistemic interpretations of the wavefunction and their use as a tool for inference.
6.3 BKS type Theorems
The BKS theorem shed light on the incompatibility of hidden variable theories and Quantum
Mechanics [17, 18]. Years later Mermin [19] demonstrated what is considered to be the
simplest expression of what is usually an algebra and geometry intensive BKS theorem using
observables. BKS proofs have been generalized to the N -qubit Pauli group [124], and [125]
gives a BKS proof using continuous position and momentum observables. In [124], they give
a simple algorithm to convert observable based BKS proofs to a large number of projector
based BKS proofs, so here we will focus on the simpler observable based proofs.
The class of hidden variable theories excluded by the BKS theorem satisfy the following
seemingly reasonable conditions. The value of an operator is definite yet unknown such
3 i.e. if Alice’s measurement setting and outcome is θA and +, then Bob would expect the measurement
outcomes to be ... ; however Bob does not actually know Alice’s measurement setting and outcome until
after she communicates it.
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that we may assign it a preexisting value (its eigenvalue) by applying what is called a
valuation [19, 116, 124]. The reason for introducing valuations is to make a connection to
hidden variable theories (6.1) in which, given the hidden variable λ is known, A(λ) is known
too. The alleged power of the proof below is that it is independent of the state |ψ〉. This
immediately conflicts with the inferential ideology of QM in ED, however, we will continue
to introduce the proof. The valuation of an operator Aˆ at any time is one of its eigenvalues,
v(Aˆ) = 〈a|Aˆ|a〉 = a. (6.2)
It is also assumed that functional relationships between the operators f(Aˆ, Bˆ, Cˆ, ...) should
hold throughout the valuation process,
v(f(Aˆ, Bˆ, Cˆ, ...)) = f(v(Aˆ), v(Bˆ), v(Cˆ), ...), (6.3)
as the values of the operators are supposed to take definite values. Thus it is found that
operators must commute v(AˆBˆ) = v(Aˆ)v(Bˆ) = v(BˆAˆ) when taking valuations for (6.3) to
hold. Mermin demonstrates the contradiction of equations (6.2) and (6.3) with Quantum
Mechanics by considering what is now know as the Peres-Mermin Square:
ZI IX ZX
IZ XI XZ
ZZ XX YY
.
Each table entry is an observable from the 2-qubit Pauli group consisting of a joint eigenbasis
consisting of 4 eigenvectors. As a notational convenience we will omit tensor products when
there is no room for confusion and let Z = σz such that an arbitrary table entryXI represents
σ
(1)
x ⊗ I(2), following the notational structure in [124]. The standard matrix product of the
operators along a given row or column is the rank 4 identity I(4) = II (in this notation)
with the exception of the last row, which is −II. Consider the valuation of the standard
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matrix product of the elements of the first row,
v(ZI · IX · ZX) = v(II) = 1. (6.4)
Supposing (6.3) is true then
v(ZI · IX · ZX) = v(ZI)v(IX)v(ZX) = 1. (6.5)
The valuation of the ijth element Aij in the table is v(Aij) = ±1, and therefore (6.3)
imposes a constraint on the individual valuations v(ZI)v(IX)v(ZX) = 1, which is only
satisfied if either 0 or 2 of the valuations are −1. This cuts the number of possibilities from
23 = 8 to 4. Let Ai⊙ be the product of the operators in the ith row and A⊙j the product
of the operators in the jth column such that above A1⊙ =ZI · IX ·ZX is the standard
matrix product between the listed operators. Mermin showed his square indeed leads to a
contradiction when considering the product of the row and column valuations,
∏
i
v(Ai⊙)v(A⊙i) = v(II)5v(−II) = −1, (6.6)
whereas applying (6.3) to each row and column, v(Ai⊙) =
∏
j v(A
ij), gives,
∏
i
v(Ai⊙)v(A⊙i)→
∏
i
∏
j
v(Aij)2 = 1, (6.7)
which is a contradiction. This is due to the fact that not all of the elements in Mermin’s
square commute and therefore all of the observables cannot simultaneously be assigned
definite eigenvalues. Quantum mechanical formalism and experiment agree with (6.6) and
not with (6.7) and thus (6.3) is ruled out. Bell makes a point that it may be overconstraining
for the valuation to produce identical values when different sets of commuting observables
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are being considered, just to refute it by noting that a space-like separated observer could
change which set of commuting observables he/she wishes to measure mid-flight. A hidden
variable theory would then have to explain this nonlocal change in the valuation meaning
that the BKS theory only refutes local hidden variables theories [17].
6.3.1 Interpreting the Contradiction: Contextuality
The standard interpretation of the contradiction by Bell, Kochen, Specker, Mermin and
others is that quantum mechanical observables are contextual, meaning that the operator’s
“aspect”, “character”, or “value” depend on the remaining set of commuting observables
under which it is considered, that is, which observables it would be measured along side
with. Any observable that does not depend on the remaining set of commuting observables
in this way is called noncontextual, which, for example, are the individual observables v(Aij)
from the Mermin square and (6.7).
In more recent years the interpretation of the BKS theorem, which in principle would
rule out all local hidden variable theories obeying (6.2) and (6.3), has been under scrutiny,
in essence, for having a more restricted interpretation than the theorem claims. The work
by [126–128] opens a loophole due to the impracticality of infinite measurement precision,
and thus the BKS theorem is “nullified” in their language. Appleby (and others) find the
“nullified” critique to be too harsh of a criticism [129]. De Ronde [130] points out that
epistemic and ontic contextuality are consistently being scrambled into a omelet when per-
haps the yoke and egg whites should be cooked separately. He defines “ontic contextuality”
as the formal algebraic inconsistency of the operator and valuation formalism of Quantum
Mechanics within the BKS theorem – having nothing to do with measurement. Its epis-
temic counterpart is more aligned with the principles of Bohr in that Quantum Mechanics
involves an interaction between the system and measurement apparatus whose outcomes are
inevitably communicated in classical terms – the context is given by the measurement device.
139
The difference is subtle but, as noted, “ontic contextuality” is defined to be independent of
the differing interpretations of quantum mechanics whereas epistemic contextuality need not
be. Our treatment of contextuality does separate in this fashion; however, de Ronde’s usage
of the word “ontic” refers to the quantum formalism, whereas our usage only refers to ontic
particle positions in ED.
6.3.2 Critiques on representing onticity with valuations in QM
As shown, the assumptions (6.2) and (6.3) lead to contradictions. The main critique we
present is, “how do we know that the valuation of an observable v(Aˆ) accurately represents
the notion of definite, preexisting values of an operator, that would be obtained if a mea-
surement is carried out?”. The alleged strength of the BKS theorem is that the analysis
has been done independent of the particular state |Ψ〉 and thus it should hold for all |Ψ〉 in
general. This is troubling for a number of reasons, the first being that a particular |Ψ〉 may
not have components along every eigenvector of an operator Aˆ, in which case a zero proba-
bility event could be assigned a definite existence, and one would never know because |Ψ〉,
which all of the observables in question pertain to, has not been specified. This issue here is
an interplay between the ontic and epistemic contextuality given by de Ronde, because only
sensible valuations may be given if the state of the system is known – in general the density
matrix ρˆ.
If the valuation process is to be applicable to arbitrary “observables” independent of the
state at hand, then one runs into another logical inconsistency when attempting to apply
valuations to a density matrix, ρˆ, because it represents the probabilistic state of a system.
It makes little sense to have different sets of commuting observables {ρˆ1, ρˆ2, ρˆ3...} which are
required to span the same Hilbert space as the state in question |Ψ〉 (or ρˆ). Furthermore,
the valuation of a density matrix ρˆ =
∑
i pi|i〉〈i| gives one of its eigenvalues, pi, which are
probabilities themselves and are never directly observed, but are usually inferred from the
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frequency of a large number of independent trials. One cannot possibly claim that a system
is ontically expressing a definite preexisting probability value pi. Probability by its nature is
a measure of the uncertainty of a state |i〉 rather than a value (physically) carried by the state
|i〉 – which is as epistemic as it gets! If Alice knowingly prepares one system and Bob does
not know which system Alice has prepared, then it is clear that pi’s cannot have a definite
existence because both Alice and Bob disagree about said values over the same single “ontic”
system of interest. Furthermore, when a measurement is made to determine the state, the
probability value updates (the eigenvalue changes) and in this sense the assignment of an
eigenvalue ρˆ through valuation represents nothing physical about the state of the system’s
definite, preexisting values that would in principle be obtained if a measurement was carried
out. If this one ρˆ valuation counter example can be found, it is unclear how many other
observables would also be counter examples. In general the eigenvalues of operators do not
represent definite, preexisting (noncontextual) values of an operator that would be obtained
if a measurement was carried out.
Due to these critiques, and that in ED one may infer eigenvalues from position detections,
it is difficult to know what precisely a valuation procedure represents meta-physically, besides
the simple choice of a matrix element. As discussed, the valuation of an operator may not
always represent an ontic value of an observable, and therefore we suggest relaxing this
notion and replacing it by the more general statement, “The valuation of an operator (or set
of operators) represents a quantity that in principle may be inferred”, or in the language of
[3], “The valuation of an observable is an inferable of the theory”. In this sense, the problem
presented by the BKS theorem never truly arises in the ED framework – operators, simply
put, are epistemic inferables.
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6.3.3 ED: A hybrid-contextual theory
It should be noted that in Entropic Dynamics, the idea of valuation is very unnatural. An
inference based theory allows us to state, quantify, and represent how much we do not know
about the state of a system through a probability distribution, upon which we use the rules
of inference and probability updating to determine what we do. The resulting interpretation
of the BKS theorem (contextuality) when performed in the ED framework “is that operators
and their eigenvalues do not in general pertain to the ontology of particles” – they are, in
general, inferables. Although a precisely prepared state |a〉 can be measured (inferred) with
certainty using a unitary measurement device from Section 5.2.2, it is important to recall
the note, “... there is no implication that the particle previously had or now currently has
the value a” [3, 14].
Strictly speaking, the BKS theorem discards realist theories in which all of the considered
operators are treated ontically through their valuation. This leaves open the possibility for
a hybrid-contextual theory in which only a subset of commuting observables are definite yet
unknown, or noncontextual, while other variables (or sets of commuting observables) are
contextual inferables.
The only operators that are required to undergo valuation in ED are the 3N -particle
position coordinates with their corresponding 3N operators Xˆ(n) as they are the preferred
basis. In the language of valuations, we have,
vx(xˆ
(n)
i ) ≡ 〈x(n)i |xˆ(n)i |x(n)i 〉 = x(n)i , (6.8)
for a particular coordinate x
(n)
i . Position operators trivially obey (6.3),
vx(f(xˆ
(n)
i , xˆ
(m)
j , ...)) = f(v(xˆ
(n)
i ), v(xˆ
(m)
j ), ...), (6.9)
for any function f , because all position operators mutually commute. No parity contradiction
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in the sense of [19, 124] can be reached. At the end of the day, the BKS proofs are proofs
by contradiction which means that a set of counter examples has been found which rule out
the general applicability of assigning definite yet unknown values to all operators all the
time. However, as seen above, there are instances in which there is no contraction and the
assignment of definite yet unknown values in this instance is consequently not ruled out.
Operators other than position, Aij , need not be noncontextual in ED as they are consid-
ered to be epistemic in nature. In this case, one should not claim Aij , one of its eigenvalues
aijn , or a state |aij〉 =
∫
dxψaij (x)|x〉, to have a definite existence outside of characterizing
our knowledge of the definite yet unknown positions of particles x. That being said, the
operators Aij can in general be expanded and interpreted in the position basis. When ap-
plying positional valuations to Aij, we find that they are naturally contextual in the sense
that equation (6.3) fails to hold in general. Although the following argument does hold true
mathematically, the valuation process is unwarranted in ED as ED never claims the operator
Aij any of its eigenvalues, aijn , or the results of their valuations, to be ontic – it is meaningless
to talk about the noncontextuality of non-position variables. We will proceed anyhow for
completeness.
Proof that position valuations of non-position operators are contextual: If one
were to perform the valuation of an arbitrary (non-position) operator Aij in ED before
measurement, because the positions of particles are the preferred basis, the only valuation
function worth considering, vx, is the one that considers definite particle positions.
4 Thus,
we should consider valuation of the diagonal matrix elements of Aij in the position basis
(here let |x〉 ≡ |x1〉 ⊗ |x2〉... ⊗ |xN 〉 for the N particles and N operators that are tensor
4The Hermitian Aij operators are arbitrary: they could be tensor products of 1D projectors, standard
QM observables of interest like Hˆ or pˆ, or subsets of them.
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multiplied in Aij),
vx0(A
ij) ≡ 〈x0|Aij |x0〉 = 〈x0|
∑
n
|aijn 〉aijn 〈aijn |x0〉
=
∑
n
aijn |〈x0|aijn 〉|2 6= aijn , (6.10)
where in this case it is supposed that the definite yet unknown value of x is x0. The
positional valuation vx(A
ij) is not one of the eigenvalues or “observables” of Aij, but in ED,
Aij is an inferable and so is vx(A
ij) (through for instance the use of a Weak Value [107]).
The positional valuation vx(A
ij) is some real number that in principle may be assigned to
the xth position coordinate, and potentially has nothing to do with the state of the system
|Ψ〉 as is remarked in the critiques in Section 6.3.2. The position valuation vx(Aij) may be
interpreted as an expected value of the operator Aij if the position of the particle(s) were
known to be exactly at the value x0 in configuration space, that is,
∫
vx(A
ij)δ(x− x0)dx =∫ 〈x|Aij |x〉δ(x−x0)dx = 〈Aij〉x0 = vx0(Aij). The actual location of the particle is not known
in general and should be weighted by the appropriate ρ(x) if one is considering expectation
values of Aij . Parity type proofs of the BKS theorem require Aij to be simultaneously part
of an even number of sets of commuting observables [124]. This means an operator Aij is
simultaneously diagonalized in (at-least two) different basis,
Aij =
∑
n
|ai⊙n 〉aijn 〈ai⊙n | =
∑
n
|a⊙jn 〉aijn 〈a⊙jn |, (6.11)
where, for example in the Peres-Mermin square, |ai⊙n 〉 refers to the eigenvectors of the com-
muting set of variables from the ith row and |a⊙jn 〉 refers to the eigenvectors of the commuting
set of variables from the jth column; however, the argument is valid for all (non-spin) KS-
sets. The largest number of distinct sets of eigenvectors is equal to the number of sets of
commuting observables in the BKS proof (the number of rows and columns of the Peres-
Mermin square). Using this notation we may denote the product of the operators in a
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commuting set by,
Ai⊙ =
∑
n
|ai⊙n 〉ai1n ai2n ...aiNn 〈ai⊙n | =
∑
n
|ai⊙n 〉ai⊙n 〈ai⊙n |,
(6.12)
where N is the number of commuting observables in the set of commuting observables {Aij}i.
In general, the application of (6.3) to the position valuations of {Aij}i will not hold,
vx(A
i⊙)→
∏
j
vx(A
ij), (6.13)
because it would require,
∑
n
|〈x0|ai⊙n 〉|2ai⊙n =
∏
j
(∑
n
aijn |〈x0|ai⊙n 〉|2
)
j
, (6.14)
which holds in a few trivial cases (identity, null, orthogonal), but not in general. Note that
this equation is the analog of (6.5), expect with position valuations, and here, equation (6.3)
already fails to hold in general. This poses no issue in ED because Ai⊙ or the individual
Aij need only exist epistemically, so their valuations (matrix elements) need not agree -
the product of matrix elements need not be the matrix element of the product so imposing
equality is nonsensical. Equations like (6.3) do not hold true in general because, if valuations
are interpreted as inferables (Section 6.3.2), then expecting something like vx(A
2) = vx(A)
2
to hold true is analogous to expecting expectation values like 〈A2〉x = 〈A〉2x to hold true,
which of-course is not true in general.
Furthermore, “ontic contextuality” in the sense of de Ronde (contextuality due to the
operator formalism of QM) is preserved among non-position observables (for noncontextual
position). Furthermore, if (6.3) is applied to the product of all of the commuting sets of
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observables,
∏
i
vx(A
i⊙)vx(A⊙i)→
∏
i
∏
j
vx(A
ij)2 ≥ 0, (6.15)
for situations when the LHS is less than zero or it is simply not equal to the RHS (com-
pounding from (6.14)). This calculation shows that definite (noncontextual) positions before
measurement do not imply definite (noncontextual) Aij , and therefore, we are further justi-
fied in treating the operators Aij contextually - which means we should not apply valuations
to them, or if we do, we should not expect (6.3) to hold. The current form of ED would
potentially be ruled out if Aij were required to be ontological - but this is not the case.
Because position operators always mutually commute with one another, and are therefore
all simultaneously diagonalizable in the same set of position eigenvectors (i.e. |x〉 = |xi⊙〉 =
|x⊙j〉 = |x⊙⊙〉), they may be treated noncontextually together. If an operator is a (tensor
or dot) product of contextual and noncontextual operators, it remains contextual as it is
epistemic (or equally well due to the lack of equality in (6.14)). This can be seen by applying
position space valuations to the continuous operators defined in [125]. Spin in ED is epistemic
(forthcoming [45, 101]) so their noncontextual valuations are not required as well and thus
spin will be contextual in general. As noted in the critiques, the valuation of an operator
may not always express the definite yet unknown values of an observable – it may be best
to relax this notion such that the valuation of an operator represents a quantity that in
principle may be inferred, an inferable, in general.
Inferring contextual operators: In the previous section, the positional valuations of
the operators are a bit obscure, partially because the measurement process in ED was not
included (it is as if positions measurements were made before applying a unitary measurement
device, so the eigenvalues of A’s were not actually being inferred). A question of interest
is, how, if everything is to be measured or inferred using a (non-contextual) position basis
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(Chapter 5 and [3, 14]), is the contextual nature of a set of contextual operators {Aˆij} non-
contradictory? This question is especially tricky because it mixes the epistemic and ontic
notions of contextuality in the sense of [130], who, quote Mermin , “the whole point of an
experimental test of BKS [theorem] misses the point.”. ED perhaps sheds some light onto
Mermin’s statement about the lack of an experimental test of the BKS.
Suppose Alice prepares a two particle system and sends it to Bob who has a compound
unitary measurement device (5.7) for each set of commuting observables (each row and col-
umn) of the Mermin square (for simplicity), but really this is applicable to any construction
of sets of commuting observables. Because Bob can only measure one row or column for a
given pair of particles sent from Alice, him choosing the ith row or column means he has
chosen and applied the unitary measurement device UˆAi⊙ to the incoming state and mapped
it to position coordinates for detection and inference. This measurement device is designed
to infer one set of commuting observables at a time from position detections. That is, the
physical application of UˆAi⊙ picks, P
i, the ith set of commuting observables,5
P i ∗
A11 A12 A13
A21 A22 A23
A31 A32 A33
−→ UˆAi⊙ Ai1 Ai2 Ai3
−→ xi1 xi2 xi3 ,
and at a later time one may apply valuation(s) to the associated position operators if one
wishes because the operators are diagonal in the position basis (at that later time) Aij →
Aij(t) =
∑
n |xijn 〉aijn 〈xijn |. The positions may be detected and the associated commuting set
of Aij may be inferred. The notion of detectors picking sets of commuting observables is
mentioned in [19], but here the process is specified to show how contextuality is preserved.
5It should be noted that the square of A’s is depicted for the purpose of illustrating that measurement
devices pick a set of commuting observables. This and the previous sections refer to arbitrary (non-spin)
KS-sets, not just those that can be arranged in squares.
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Observables Aij not in row i (after UˆAi⊙ is applied) are not in general diagonal in x as they
did not originally commute with all of the observables in i by construction, and naturally,
their eigenvalues are not being inferred. It is as if picking a set of commuting observables,
by the application of a unitary measurement device, rotates the entire KS-set (the square
in this illustration) about the picked “axis” (the picked set of commuting observables), the
picked set of commuting observables now being diagonal in position. Picking other sets of
commuting observables requires using a different unitary measurement device UˆAi′⊙, which
rotates the whole KS-set differently (about a different “axis” for the sake of the analogy).
Thus, mixtures of noncontexutal position operators with epistemic contextual operators are
contextual as a unitary measurement device will be needed for the inference of the contextual
operators, which “rotates” the KS-set.
The operators Aij are treated contextually, or hybrid contextually in the preferred basis.
As only one set of commuting observables may be picked at a time by Bob, the quantum
mechanical expectation values match that as inferred by Bob (and are therefore in the form
of (6.6)). Alice, being in the dark, does not know which row Bob will pick and is free to
assign a probability Bob picks the ith row or column, and after learning the chosen row or
column may she update her probability accordingly [5].
6.4 Discussion
The most natural inferential tool in ED is probability. The critiques given in Section 6.3.2
are further motivation for the use of probability to make rational inferences, while the inter-
pretation of valuation functions as assigning ontic values, which inevitably lead to paradox
in the BKS theorem, is not generally applicable. There, reason was given for the need of
a more general interpretation of the valuation of an operator, which was stated, “The val-
uation of an operator (or set of operators) represents a quantity that in principle may be
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inferred”. Because the probability of a state is only defined in terms of its set of commuting
observables, and because there is no way to generate a unique joint probability distribution
among non-commuting observables [131], a rational discussion on the potential simultane-
ous onticity of non-commuting observables is not possible. As ED formulates QM as an
application of entropic inference while assuming the position of particles to be the only ontic
variables, the positions form the preferred basis for inference, and therefore ED is a “hybrid-
contextual” theory of QM that does not violate any of the relevant aforementioned no-go
theorems. Although it is unverifiable if reality truly consists of particles with ontic position,
the concept and model is demonstratively useful for making predictions and for analyzing
the results of experiment. In a pragmatic approach [44, 45], when a model turns out to be
trustworthy and reliable, we recognize its success and say the model or theory is “true” and
the ontic elements are “real”.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
Presented in this thesis is the synthesis of probability and entropic inference with Quantum
Mechanics and quantum measurement. The standard and quantum relative entropies were
shown to be designed for the purpose of updating probability distributions and density ma-
trices, respectively, from the same inferential origins. The Quantum Bayes Rule and collapse
were derived as an application of the quantum relative entropy maximization, which unifies
topics in quantum measurement and Quantum Information through entropic inference – sim-
ilar to the unification of Bayesian probability updating and the standard maximum entropy
method in [7–9]. Because the quantum maximum entropy method is able to simultaneously
process inferences that neither a Quantum Bayes procedure nor a maximum von Neumann
entropy procedure can process alone, the designed quantum maximum entropy method may
be considered “a universal method of density matrix inference”. Because the quantum max-
imum entropy method only utilizes the standard quantum mechanical formalism, it, and its
results, may be appended to the standard quantum mechanical formalism. In this sense,
the quantum measurement problem of collapse is solved within the quantum mechanical
formalism, but the quantum measurement problem of preferred basis is not.
The derived interpretations of probability and its entropic updating allows one to formu-
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late Quantum Mechanics as an application of entropic inference called Entropic Dynamics.
In Entropic Dynamics, particles have definite yet unknown positions and probabilities are
purely epistemic. This separates Entropic Dynamics from other theories and interpretations
of Quantum Mechanics because one may address the quantum measurement problem and
quantum no-go theorems in a new light. Pivotal to both of these discussions is the concept
that observables in Quantum Mechanics may better be stated as inferables, that is, quantities
one may wish to infer. Entropic Dynamics suggests this change of language, observables →
inferables, when it derives Quantum Mechanics as an application of inference; and although
on the surface this change of language seems purely semantical, it has deep implications
for the interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. The combination in Entropic Dynamics of
epistemic inferables that lack an ontological predisposition, the positions of particles that are
ontological, and use of epistemic probability theory, end up resolving the measurement prob-
lems of preferred basis and definite outcomes, as well as the no-go theorems of ψ-epistemic,
Bell’s inequality, and the BKS theorem, in effect, without ever being a problem in Entropic
Dynamics in the first place [3, 4, 14]. Because Entropic Dynamics derives Quantum Me-
chanics from the standard maximum entropy method, as well as the beginnings of a density
matrix formalism added here, the quantum maximum entropy method can be derived from
Entropic Dynamics; and therefore, the standard maximum entropy method retains its title
as the “universal method of inference” [7–9].
In the spirit of E.T. Jaynes’ quote (A) presented in the introduction to this thesis,
through the precise design of probability theory, the maximum entropy method, and the
use of Entropic Dynamics, we have managed to push the theory of Quantum Mechanics
past some of the derailing ambiguities of its standard formalism. The culmination of the
articles reviewed in this thesis has led to a better understanding of Quantum Mechanics and
quantum measurement through inference and Entropic Dynamics.
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Appendix A
Functional Equations and Entropy
The Appendix loosely follows the relevant sections in [46], and then uses the methods re-
viewed to solve the relevant functional equations for φ, following [1].
A.1 Simple Functional Equations
If Cauchy’s functional equation
f(x+ y) = f(x) + f(y) (A.1)
is satisfied for all real x, y, and if the function f(x) is (a) continuous at one point, (b)
nonegative for small positive x’s, or (c) bounded in an interval, then,
f(x) = cx (A.2)
is the solution to (A.1) for all real x. If (A.1) is assumed only over all positive x, y, then
under the same conditions, (A.2) holds for all positive x.
The most natural assumption for our purposes is that f(x) is continuous at a point
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(which later extends to continuity all points as given by Darboux [132]). Cauchy solved the
functional equation by induction. In particular, Equation (A.1) implies,
f(
∑
i
xi) =
∑
i
f(xi), (A.3)
and if we let each xi = x as a special case to determine f , we find
f(nx) = nf(x). (A.4)
We may let nx = mt such that
f(x) = f(
m
n
t) =
m
n
f(t). (A.5)
Letting limt→1 f(t) = f(1) = c gives
f(
m
n
) =
m
n
f(1) =
m
n
c, (A.6)
and, because for t = 1, x = m
n
above, we have
f(x) = cx, (A.7)
which is the general solution of the linear functional equation. In principle, c can be complex.
The importance of Cauchy’s solution is that it can be used to give general solutions to the
following Cauchy equations:
f(x+ y) = f(x)f(y), (A.8)
f(xy) = f(x) + f(y), (A.9)
f(xy) = f(x)f(y), (A.10)
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by performing consistent substitution until they are the same form as (A.1), as given by
Cauchy. We will briefly discuss the first two.
The general solution of f(x+y) = f(x)f(y) is f(x) = ecx for all real or for all positive x, y
that are continuous at one point and, in addition to the exponential solution, the solution
f(0) = 1 and f(x) = 0 for (x > 0) are in these classes of functions.
The first functional f(x+y) = f(x)f(y) is solved by first noting that it is strictly positive
for real x, y, f(x), which can be shown by considering x = y,
f(2x) = f(x)2 > 0. (A.11)
If there exists f(x0) = 0, then it follows that f(x) = f((x− x0) + x0) = 0, a trivial solution,
hence the reason why the possibility of being equal to zero is excluded above. Given f(x)
is nowhere zero, we are justified in taking the natural logarithm ln(x), due to its positivity
f(x) > 0. This gives,
ln(f(x+ y)) = ln(f(x)) + ln(f(y)), (A.12)
and letting g(x) = ln(f(x)) gives,
g(x+ y) = g(x) + g(y), (A.13)
which is Cauchy’s linear equation, and thus has the solution g(x) = cx. Because g(x) =
ln(f(x)), one finds in general that f(x) = ecx.
If the functional equation f(xy) = f(x)+f(y) is valid for all positive x, y then its general
solution is f(x) = c ln(x) given it is continuous at a point. If x = 0 (or y = 0) are valid, then
the general solution is f(x) = 0. If all real x, y are valid except 0, then the general solution
is f(x) = c ln(|x|).
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In particular, we are interested in the functional equation f(xy) = f(x)+ f(y) when x, y
are positive. In this case, we can again follow Cauchy and substitute x = eu and y = ev to
get,
f(euev) = f(eu) + f(ev), (A.14)
and letting g(u) = f(eu) gives g(u+ v) = g(u) + g(v). Again, the solution is g(u) = cu and,
therefore, the general solution is f(x) = c ln(x) when we substitute for u. If x could equal 0,
then f(0) = f(x) + f(0), which has the trivial solution f(x) = 0. The general solution for
x 6= 0, y 6= 0 and x, y positive is therefore f(x) = c ln(x).
A.2 Functional Equations with Multiple Arguments
From [46] pages 213–217. Consider the functional equation,
F (x1 + y1, x2 + y2, ..., xn + yn) = F (x1, x2, ..., xn) + F (y1, y2, ..., yn), (A.15)
which is a generalization of Cauchy’s linear functional Equation (A.1) to several arguments.
Letting x2 = x3 = ... = xn = y2 = y3 = ... = yn = 0 gives
F (x1 + y1, 0, ..., 0) = F (x1, 0, ..., 0) + F (y1, 0, ..., 0), (A.16)
which is the Cauchy linear functional equation having solution F (x1, 0, ..., 0) = c1x1, where
F (x1, 0, ..., 0) is assumed to be continuous or at least measurable majorant. Similarly,
F (0, ..., 0, xk, 0, ..., 0) = ckxk, (A.17)
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and if you consider
F (x1 + 0, 0 + y2, 0, ..., 0) = F (x1, 0, ..., 0) + F (0, y2, 0, ..., 0) = c1x1 + c2y2, (A.18)
and, as y2 is arbitrary, we could have let y2 = x2 such that in general
F (x1, x2, ..., xn) =
∑
i
cixi, (A.19)
formulating the general solution.
A.3 Relative Entropy
We are interested in the following functional equation:
φ(ρ1ρ2, ϕ1ϕ2) = φ(ρ1, ϕ1) + φ(ρ2, ϕ2). (A.20)
This is an equation of the form,
F (x1y1, x2y2) = F (x1, x2) + F (y1, y2), (A.21)
where x1 = ρ1, y1 = ρ2, x2 = ϕ1, and y2 = ϕ2. First, assume all ρ and ϕ are greater than
zero. Then, substitute: xi = e
x′i and yi = e
y′i and let F ′(x′1, x
′
2) = F (e
x′1 , ex
′
2) and so on such
that
F ′(x′1 + y
′
1, x
′
2 + y
′
2) = F
′(x′1, x
′
2) + F
′(y′1, y
′
2), (A.22)
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which is of the form of (A.15). The general solution for F is therefore
F ′(x′1 + y
′
1, x
′
2 + y
′
2) = a1(x
′
1 + y
′
1) + a2(x
′
2 + y
′
2) = a1 ln(x1y1) + a2 ln(x2y2)
= F (x1y1, x2y2), (A.23)
which means the general solution for φ is
φ(ρ1, ϕ1) = a1 ln(ρ1) + a2 ln(ϕ1). (A.24)
In such a case, when ϕ(x0) = 0 for some value x0 ∈ X , we may let ϕ(x0) = ǫ, where ǫ is as
close to zero as we could possibly want—the trivial general solution φ = 0 is saturated by
the special case when ρ = ϕ from DC1’. Here, we return to the text.
A.4 Matrix Functional Equations
(This derivation is implied in [46] pages 347–349). First, consider a Cauchy matrix functional
equation,
f(Xˆ + Yˆ ) = f(Xˆ) + f(Yˆ ), (A.25)
where Xˆ and Yˆ are n × n square matrices. Rewriting the matrix functional equation in
terms of its elements gives
fij(x11 + y11, x12 + y12, ..., xnn + ynn) = fij(x11, x12, ..., xnn) + fij(y11, y12, ..., ynn) (A.26)
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and is now in the form of (A.15), and, therefore, the solution is
fij(x11, x12, ..., xnn) =
n∑
ℓ,k=0
cijℓkxℓk (A.27)
for i, j = 1, ..., n. We find it convenient to introduce super indices, A = (i, j) and B = (ℓ, k)
such that the component equation becomes
fA =
∑
B
cABxB, (A.28)
and resembles the solution for the linear transformation of a vector from [46]. In general,
we will be discussing matrices Xˆ = Xˆ1 ⊗ Xˆ2 ⊗ ... ⊗ XˆN which stem from tensor products
of density matrices. In this situation, Xˆ can be thought of as 2N index tensor or a z × z
matrix where z =
∏N
i ni is the product of the ranks of the matrices in the tensor product or
even as a vector of length z2. In such a case, we may abuse the super index notation where
A and B lump together the appropriate number of indices such that (A.28) is the form of
the solution for the components in general. The matrix form of the general solution is
f(Xˆ) = C˜Xˆ, (A.29)
where C˜ is a constant super-operator having components cAB.
A.5 Quantum Relative Entropy
The functional equation of interest is
φ
(
ρˆ1 ⊗ ρˆ2, ϕˆ1 ⊗ ϕˆ2
)
= φ
(
ρˆ1 ⊗ 1ˆ2, ϕˆ1 ⊗ 1ˆ2
)
+ φ
(
1ˆ1 ⊗ ρˆ2, 1ˆ1 ⊗ ϕˆ2
)
. (A.30)
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These density matrices are Hermitian, positive semi-definite, have positive eigenvalues, and
are not equal to 0ˆ. Because every invertible matrix can be expressed as the exponential of
another matrix, we can substitute ρˆ1 = e
ρˆ′1 , and so on for all four density matrices giving,
φ
(
eρˆ
′
1 ⊗ eρˆ′2 , eϕˆ′1 ⊗ eϕˆ′2
)
= φ
(
eρˆ
′
1 ⊗ 1ˆ2, eϕˆ′1 ⊗ 1ˆ2
)
+ φ
(
1ˆ1 ⊗ eρˆ′2 , 1ˆ1 ⊗ eϕˆ′2
)
. (A.31)
Now, we use the following identities for Hermitian matrices:
eρˆ
′
1 ⊗ eρˆ′2 = eρˆ′1⊗1ˆ2+1ˆ1⊗ρˆ′2 (A.32)
and
eρˆ
′
1 ⊗ 1ˆ2 = eρˆ′1⊗1ˆ2 , (A.33)
to recast the functional equation as,
φ
(
eρˆ
′
1⊗1ˆ2+1ˆ1⊗ρˆ′2 , eϕˆ
′
1⊗1ˆ2+1ˆ1⊗ϕˆ′2
)
= φ
(
eρˆ
′
1⊗1ˆ2 , eϕˆ
′
1⊗1ˆ2
)
+ φ
(
e1ˆ1⊗ρˆ
′
2 , e1ˆ1⊗ϕˆ
′
2
)
. (A.34)
Letting G(ρˆ′1 ⊗ 1ˆ2, ϕˆ′1 ⊗ 1ˆ2) = φ
(
eρˆ
′
1⊗1ˆ2 , eϕˆ
′
1⊗1ˆ2
)
, and so on, gives
G(ρˆ′1 ⊗ 1ˆ2 + 1ˆ1 ⊗ ρˆ′2, ϕˆ′1 ⊗ 1ˆ2 + 1ˆ1 ⊗ ϕˆ′2) = G(ρˆ′1 ⊗ 1ˆ2, ϕˆ′1 ⊗ 1ˆ2) +G(1ˆ1 ⊗ ρˆ′2, 1ˆ1 ⊗ ϕˆ′2).
(A.35)
This functional equation is of the form
G(Xˆ ′1 + Yˆ
′
1 , Xˆ
′
2 + Yˆ
′
2) = G(Xˆ
′
1, Xˆ
′
2) +G(Yˆ
′
1 , Yˆ
′
2), (A.36)
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which has the general solution
G(Xˆ ′, Yˆ ′) =
∼
A Xˆ
′+
∼
B Yˆ
′, (A.37)
analogous to (A.19), and finally, in general,
φ(ρˆ, ϕˆ) =
∼
A ln(ρˆ)+
∼
B ln(ϕˆ), (A.38)
where
∼
A,
∼
B are super-operators having constant coefficients. Here, we return to the text.
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Appendix B
Hermitian variations of ρˆ and
maximum entropy
Here we fill in the steps between equation (2.39) and (2.40). Letting δρˆ be Hermitian is
imposing δρij = δρ
∗
ji. The variation of interest is equation (2.39),
Tr
((δS(ρˆ, ϕˆ)
δρˆT
− λ1ˆ− αAˆ
)
δρˆ
)
= 0, (B.1)
which we write as,
Tr
(
Bˆδρˆ
)
= 0, (B.2)
with Bˆ ≡ δS(ρˆ,ϕˆ)
δρˆT
− λ1ˆ − αAˆ, being a Hermitian matrix. Rewritten in component form, the
trace is
∑
ij
Bjiδρij = 0, (B.3)
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which when partitioned by the diagonal, upper triangle, and lower triangle components of
δρij , gives
∑
i
Biiδρii +
∑
i<j
Bjiδρij +
∑
i<j
Bijδρji = 0. (B.4)
Because δρii is real, for arbitrary variations of δρii, Bii = 0, which reduces the sum to,
∑
i<j
Bjiδρij +
∑
i<j
Bijδρji = 0. (B.5)
Because Bˆ and δρˆ are Hermitian, δρij = δρ
∗
ji and Bij = B
∗
ji. Substitution above gives,
∑
i<j
(Bjiδρij +B
∗
jiδρ
∗
ij) = 0. (B.6)
Breaking the matrices’ components into real and imaginary parts gives,
∑
i<j
((
R(Bji) + i I(Bji)
)(
R(δρij) + i I(δρij)
)
+
(
R(Bji)− i I(Bji)
)(
R(δρij)− i I(δρij)
))
= 0, (B.7)
which reduces to
2
∑
i<j
R(Bji)R(δρij)− 2
∑
i<j
I(Bji)I(δρij) = 0. (B.8)
Therefore, arbitrary Hermitian variations of δρˆ require R(Bji) = I(Bji) = Bji = 0, and
therefore Bˆ = 0. Therefore, at the maximum, the variational derivative of S must satisfy
(2.40),
δS(ρˆ, ϕˆ)
δρˆT
= λ1ˆ + αAˆ, (B.9)
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for arbitrary or Hermitian variations of ρˆ.
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Appendix C
Spin Example - Quantum Maximum
Entropy Method
This follows [1]. Consider an arbitrarily mixed prior (in the ± spin-z basis for convenience)
with a, b 6= 0,
ϕˆ = a|+〉〈+|+ b|−〉〈−| (C.1)
and a general Hermitian matrix in the spin-1/2 Hilbert space,
cµσˆ
µ = c11ˆ + cxσˆx + cyσˆx + czσˆz (C.2)
= (c1 + cz)|+〉〈+|+ (cx − icy)|+〉〈−|+ (cx + icy)|−〉〈+|+ (c1 − cz)|−〉〈−|, (C.3)
having a known expectation value,
Tr(ρˆcµσˆ
µ) = c. (C.4)
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Maximizing the entropy with respect to this general expectation value and normalization is:
0 =
(
δS − λ[Tr(ρˆ)− 1]− α(Tr(ρˆcµσˆµ)− c)
)
, (C.5)
which after varying gives the solution,
ρˆ =
1
Z
exp(αcµσˆ
µ + log(ϕˆ)). (C.6)
Letting
Cˆ = αcµσˆ
µ + log(ϕˆ) (C.7)
gives
ρˆ =
1
Z
eCˆ = UeU
−1CˆUU−1 =
1
Z
UeλˆU−1
=
eλ+
Z
U |λ+〉〈λ+|U−1 + e
λ−
Z
U |λ−〉〈λ−|U−1, (C.8)
where λˆ is the diagonalized matrix of Cˆ having real eigenvalues. They are
λ± = λ± δλ, (C.9)
due to the quadratic formula, where explicitly:
λ = αc1 +
1
2
log(ab), (C.10)
and
δλ =
1
2
√(
2αcz + log(
a
b
)
)2
+ 4α2(c2x + c
2
y). (C.11)
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Because λ± and a, b, c1, cx, cy, cz are real, δλ is real and ≥ 0. The normalization constraint
specifies the Lagrange multiplier Z,
1 = Tr(ρˆ) =
eλ+ + eλ−
Z
, (C.12)
so Z = eλ+ + eλ− = 2eλ cosh(δλ). The expectation value constraint specifies the Lagrange
multiplier α,
c = Tr(ρˆcµσ
µ) =
∂
∂α
log(Z) = c1 + tanh(δλ)
∂
∂α
δλ, (C.13)
which becomes
c = c1 +
tanh(δλ)
2δλ
(
2α(c2x + c
2
y + c
2
z) + cz log(
a
b
)
)
,
or
c = c1 + tanh
(1
2
√(
2αcz + log(
a
b
)
)2
+ 4α2(c2x + c
2
y)
) 2α(c2x + c2y + c2z) + cz log(ab )√(
2αcz + log(
a
b
)
)2
+ 4α2(c2x + c
2
y)
.
(C.14)
This equation is monotonic in α and therefore it is uniquely specified by the value of c.
Ultimately, this is a consequence from the concavity of the entropy. The specific proof of
(C.14)’s monotonicity is below:
For ρˆ to be Hermitian, Cˆ is Hermitian and δλ = 1
2
√
f(α) is real—furthermore, because
δλ is real f(α) ≥ 0 and thus δλ ≥ 0. Because f(α) is quadratic in α and positive, it may be
written in vertex form,
f(α) = a(α− h)2 + k, (C.15)
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where a > 0, k ≥ 0, and (h, k) are the (x, y) coordinates of the minimum of f(α). Notice
that the form of (C.14) is
F (α) =
tanh(1
2
√
f(α))√
f(α)
× ∂f(α)
∂α
. (C.16)
Making the change of variables α′ = α− h centers the function such that f(α′) = f(−α′) is
symmetric about α′ = 0. We can then write
F (α′) =
tanh(1
2
√
f(α′))√
f(α′)
× 2aα′, (C.17)
where the derivative has been computed. Because f(α′) is a positive, symmetric, and mono-
tonically increasing on the (symmetric) half-plane (for α′ greater than or less that zero),
S(α′) ≡ tanh(
1
2
√
f(α′))√
f(α′)
is also positive and symmetric, but it is unclear whether S(α) is strictly
monotonic in the half-plane or not. We may restate
F (α′) = S(α′)× 2aα′. (C.18)
We are now in a convenient position to perform the first derivate test for monotonic functions:
∂
∂α′
F (α′) = 2aS(α′) + 2aα′
∂
∂α′
S(α′) (C.19)
= 2aS(α′)
(
1− aα
′2
aα′2 + k
)
+ a
aα′2
aα′2 + k
(
1− tanh2(1
2
√
aα′2 + k)
)
(C.20)
≥ 2aS(α′)
(
1− a(α
′)2
aα′2 + k
)
≥ 0 (C.21)
(C.22)
because a, k, S(α′), and therefore aα
′2
aα′2+k
are all> 0. The function of interest F (α′) is therefore
monotonic for all α′, and therefore it is monotonic for all α, completing the proof that there
exists a unique real Lagrange multiplier α in (C.14).
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Although (C.14) is monotonic in α, it is seemingly a transcendental equation. This can
be solved graphically for the given values c, c1, cx, cy, cz, i.e., given the Hermitian matrix and
its expectation value are specified. Equation (C.14) and the eigenvalues take a simpler form
when a = b = 1
2
because, in this instance, ϕˆ ∝ 1ˆ and commutes universally so it may be
factored out of the exponential in (C.6).
A specific example might be carry some insight. Consider a prior density matrix ϕˆ
diagonal in spin-z and having the components a = .75 and b = .25. If we then gain new
information that the density matrix in question actually has an expectation value of 〈σx〉 =
0.9, we may impose this expectation value and normalization via the quantum maximum
entropy method. In this instance one finds the Lagrange multiplier α ≈ 1.7, and a posterior
density matrix of,
ρˆ ≈
 0.65 0.45
0.45 0.35
 . (C.23)
This mixed state (λ1,2 > 0) is selected over other states that reproduce the expectation value
constraints, for instance, the pure spin x-state |Ψ〉 = √0.95|+ x〉 +√0.05| − x〉.
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Appendix D
Inference of spin from position
measurements
The inference of spin from position may be done by following the Stern-Gerlach mechanics in
[115], or by more-or-less following the mechanics in [43, 105], while demanding ontic particle
positions and their detections. The relevant coupling Hamiltonian from a Stern-Gerlach
device is of the form (5.27),
Hs = −λg(t)σˆz zˆ, (D.1)
where λ ∝ δBz/δz and the particles magnetic moment µ, and vˆconj = zˆ. Following the weak
measurement prescription, that is having |Ψi〉 be Gaussian in position space and letting
|Φi〉 = α+|+〉 + α−|−〉 be the initial uniform spin vector, the two vectors are entangled via
the coupling Hamiltonian, and
|Φf ,Ψf〉 = Us|Φi〉|Ψi〉 =
∫ ∑
±
α±e
∓izλe−△
2z2|±〉|z〉 dz =
∫ ∑
±
α±e
− (p∓λ)2
4△2 |±〉|p〉 dp. (D.2)
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Rather than using a unitary measurement device (5.7) to evolve momentum states to po-
sition, the particle is usually allowed to travel in free space for an additional time t before
hitting a screen,
|Φf ,Ψf〉 =
∫ ∑
±
α±e
− (p∓λ)2
4△2
−i p2
2m
t|±〉|p〉 dp ∝
∫ ∑
±
α± exp
(
−∆2
(z ∓ i λ
2(1+2i∆2t/m)
)2
(1 + 2i∆2t/m)2
)
|±〉|z〉 dz.
(D.3)
One arrives at joint probabilities like,
P (±, z) ∝ |α±|
2√
1 + 4∆4t2/m2
exp
(
− 2∆
2
1 + 4∆4t2/m2
(z ∓ λ∆t
m
)2
)
, (D.4)
and the distributions are more-or-less resolvable when the average displacement is larger
than a few standard deviations of either Gaussian distribution P (z|±). At the position z
and at the time t, the modulus squared of a component of the spin along ±z can be inferred
as,
P (±|z) =
|α±|2 exp
(
− 2∆2
1+4∆4~2t2/m2
(z ∓ λ∆~t
m
)2
)
∑
± |α±|2 exp
(
− 2∆2
1+4∆4~2t2/m2
(z ∓ λ∆~t
m
)2
) . (D.5)
Because the particle spins are never truly observed, but rather are inferred from position
detections, P (±|z) is more or less the probability that a particle would continue to translate
in space along ±z given another SG device was set up and the particle passed through z, i.e.
the probability of the spin being up or down. If the goal is to infer spin values ±x or ±y, one
uses a different orientations of the Stern-Gerlach device and a different unitary evolution.
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